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CRIMINAL LAW 
“NO” STILL MEANS “YES”: THE FAILURE 
OF THE “NON-CONSENT” REFORM 
MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN RAPE AND 
SEXUAL ASSAULT LAW 
JOHN F. DECKER
*




New Haven, Conn. 
Yale fraternity’s sexist chants 
A Yale University fraternity that counts both Bush presidents among its alumni has 
apologized after a video surfaced on YouTube showing prospective fraternity 
members marching through campus chanting obscenities in what a woman’s group 
called “an active call for sexual violence.”  Pledges to Delta Kappa Epsilon (DKE), 
which boasts “the maintenance of gentlemanly dignity” as one of its founding 
objectives, chanted phrases including “No means yes, yes means anal” during the 
campus march.  DKE later publicly apologized in a forum arranged by university 
officials.  “It was a serious lapse in judgment by the fraternity and in very poor taste,” 
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said fraternity president Jordon Forney.
1
 
This was the scene at an educational institution that grooms future 
presidents, governors, law professors, and Fortune 500 CEOs.  “No means 
yes” was the clarion call that these bright Elis thought totally acceptable 
until confronted by outraged individuals within the university.  Sadly, this 
event represented only too well the attitude of many American males when 
it comes to what standards of conduct should govern sexual relations with 
another.
2
  This view of sex was not isolated for the moment to a prestigious 
university fraternity.  Today, many believe it is totally proper to grab, 




This is the sorry state of affairs in America that prompts the 
development of this Article.  Earlier legal literature has described some of 
the problems documented in this study.
4
  However, sexual assault laws have 
experienced rapid change in recent years and, as such, the authors 
concluded that an updated comprehensive examination of the subject of 
consent and sexual assault would provide a useful contribution to 
understanding the depth of the problems that still exist with respect to 
unwanted sex in America. 
This Article explores criminal sexual assault and rape laws on the 
topics discussed above, as well as case law interpreting and enforcing these 
laws.  The findings and conclusions that follow are products of an 
exhaustive review of rape and sexual assault laws in all fifty states.  The 
Article focuses on statutes and case law dealing with adult claims of 
unwanted sex.  This study does not undertake an examination of the sexual 
prohibitions designed to protect minor victims in the various states on the 
assumption, perhaps faulty, that offenses involving children are taken much 
more seriously in state legislation and by law enforcement than those 
directed at adults. 
 
1 The Week at a Glance . . . United States: Yale Fraternity’s Sexist Chants, WEEK, Oct. 
29, 2010, at 9. 
2 For a perspective on the effects on young women of these young men’s attitudes toward 
sex, see Caitlin Flanagan, The Hazards of Duke, ATLANTIC, Jan./Feb. 2011, at 87. 
3 See generally David P. Bryden & Maren M. Grier, The Search for Rapists’ “Real” 
Motives, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 171 (2011) (examining theories about why rapes 
occur). 
4 Michelle J. Anderson, All-American Rape, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 625 (2005); see 
Michelle J. Anderson, Negotiating Sex, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1401 (2005); Patricia J. Falk, 
Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 39 (1998); Heidi Kitrosser, 
Meaningful Consent: Toward a New Generation of Statutory Rape Laws, 4 VA. J. SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 287 (1997); Dorothy E. Roberts, Rape, Violence, and Women’s Autonomy, 69 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 359 (1993); Ann T. Spence, A Contract Reading of Rape Law: 
Redefining Force to Include Coercion, 37 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 57 (2003). 
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Part II examines the “non-consent” strictures that outlaw any sexual 
penetration or sexual contact without consent of another but do not require 
proof of force, threat of force, or some other circumstance such as physical 
or mental incapacity of the victim.  Part III addresses whether a requirement 
of victim resistance, physical or verbal, still exists and to what extent it 
presents a barrier to the successful prosecution of unwanted sex. 
Part IV deals with measures that prohibit non-physical threats or some 
form of “coercion” resulting in non-consensual sex without force or a threat 
of force.  Part V examines those in positions of authority and whether 
exploiting that position of trust to gain sexual favor can or should be 
punished.  Part VI focuses on deception of a victim and the degree to which 
misrepresentations designed to take sexual advantage of another are 
criminal or not.  Part VII explores whether corroboration of a victim’s claim 
of rape is a precondition for conviction.  Part VIII looks at the survival of 
the common law marital exemption to prohibitions on unwanted sexual 
penetration and sexual contact. 
II. NON-CONSENT 
At English common law, a conviction of rape required evidence that 
the perpetrator used force or threats of force against the victim.  Rape was 
defined as “carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and against her will.”
5
  
Most jurisdictions in the United States originally adopted this definition of 
rape to include the force requirement.
6
  This Part of the Article analyzes the 
text of all fifty states’ current statutes to determine which states still require 
evidence of force to convict a perpetrator of a sex offense.  A facial 
examination of the current sex offense statutes across the country shows 
that many states still require a showing of forcible compulsion or a victim’s 
incapacity to consent for a conviction.
7
  Generally, “forcible compulsion” is 
the statutory language used to denote a force requirement.
8
  “Incapacity to 
consent” generally means an inability to appraise or understand a situation 
involving a sexual act.
9
  Alternatively, some states include non-consent 
 
5 Matthew R. Lyon, Comment, No Means No?: Withdrawal of Consent During 
Intercourse and the Continuing Evolution of the Definition of Rape, 95 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 277, 281 (2004) (citing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY: RAPE 
LAW 801 (2001) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *210)). 
6 Id. (citing SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
PROCESSES 318 (7th ed. 2001)). 
7 See infra notes 21–23. 
8 See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 556.061(12)(a)–(b) (West 1999 & Supp. 2011) (defining 
forcible compulsion as either a “[p]hysical force that overcomes reasonable resistance” or 
“[a] threat, express or implied, that places a person in reasonable fear of death, serious 
physical injury or kidnapping of such person or another person”). 
9 See, e.g., § 556.061(13) (defining “incapacitated” as a “physical or mental condition, 
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provisions within their sex offense statutes that permit convictions without 




This Part splits states into “true non-consent states,”  “contradictory 
non-consent states,” and “force states.”  In true non-consent states, the state 
can convict a defendant of at least one sex offense by showing that the 
victim did not consent to the sexual act.  The prosecution is not required to 
show that the perpetrator used force or threats of force against the victim to 
meet the statutory requirements.  Twenty-eight states fall into this 
category.
11
  However, only seventeen of the true non-consent states have 
non-consent provisions for sexual penetration offenses.
12
  The other eleven 
only have non-consent provisions for sexual contact offenses consisting of 
the touching of the intimate parts of a person.
13
  These eleven states still 
require a showing of “forcible compulsion” or “incapacity to consent” for 
 
temporary or permanent, in which a person is unconscious, unable to appraise the nature of 
such person’s conduct, or unable to communicate unwillingness to an act”). 
10 See infra notes 11–17. 
11 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-402, -404 (2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-73a (West 
2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West 2007); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-6-22.1 to .2 (West 
2009); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 707-731 to -733 (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2010); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 21-5501(a) (West, Westlaw through 2010 Legis. Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 510.130 (LexisNexis 2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:41 (2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
17-A, § 255-A (2006 & Supp. 2010); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-308 (LexisNexis 2002 
& Supp. 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.3451 (West 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 566.040, 
.070 (West 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502 (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-319 to -320 
(2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.366 (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 632-A:2(m) (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-12 (2004); 
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.52, .55 (McKinney 2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111.1 
(West 2002 & Supp. 2011); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.415, .425 (2009); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 3124.1, 3125–26 (West 2000 & Supp. 2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7.4 
(2006); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-503, -505 (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406 
(LexisNexis 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 9A.44.060 (West 2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-2 (LexisNexis 2010); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 940.225(3), (3m) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010). 
12 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-402, -404; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011; GA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 16-6-22.1 to .2; HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 707-731 to -733; MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 566.040, 
.070; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-319, -320; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.366; N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 632-A:2(m); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.52, .55; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111.1; 
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.415, .425; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3124.1, 3125–26; TENN. 
CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-503, -505; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, 
§ 3252; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.060; WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 940.225(3), (3m). 
13 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-73a; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5501(a); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 510.130; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:41; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 255-A; MD. 
CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-308; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.3451; MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-
502; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-12; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7.4; W. VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 61-8B-2. 




In contradictory states, it may appear as though the elements of a sex 
offense statute are met when a victim did not affirmatively consent to the 
act.  However, statutory definitions of “consent” reveal the contradictory 
nature of these laws.  To establish a “lack of consent” in contradictory 
states, the prosecution must show either the use of forcible compulsion or a 
victim’s incapacity to consent.
15
  Requiring force or a lack of capacity to 
consent completely negates the purpose of including a non-consent 
provision.  This Article categorizes such states as “contradictory non-
consent” states.  Nine states fall into this category.
16
  Three of these 
contradictory non-consent states also have at least one true non-consent 
offense in their criminal codes.
17
 
Furthermore, while a number of jurisdictions have implemented some 
form of a non-consent provision, only two states put the onus on the 
defendant to prove that he received the affirmative consent of the victim.
18
  
By not requiring the defendant to obtain affirmative consent from the victim 
before sexual contact, the other states continue to place some onus on the 
victim to object to the act.  Even Illinois, which defines consent as a “freely 
given agreement,”
19
 continues to require a showing of force to prove the 
absence of consent, thus negating any effect that this statutory definition 
might have on the underlying charge of sex assault or abuse.
20
 
Sixteen states do not have any non-consent sex offenses.
21
  This 
 
14 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-73a; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5501(a); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 510.130; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:41; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 255-A; MD. 
CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-308; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.3451; MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-
502; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-12; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7.4; W. VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 61-8B-2. 
15 See infra notes 52–88. 
16 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65 (LexisNexis 2005); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.410 (2010); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1404(a), -1406 (2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 772 (2007 & Supp. 
2010); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.4 (West 2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 510.130, .140; 
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-502 to -503; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.20; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 
§ 22.011 (West 2011). 
17 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.020; MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502; N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§§ 130.52, .55. 
18 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.70 (West Supp. 2011) (“‘Consent’ means a freely 
given agreement to the act . . . .”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(4) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010) 
(defining consent as “words or overt actions . . . indicating a freely given agreement”). 
19 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.70. 
20 Id. at 5/11-1.20(a) (“A person commits criminal sexual assault if that person commits 
an act of sexual penetration and uses force or threat of force . . . .”). 
21 ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-14-103, -125 (2006 & Supp. 2011); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 261, 
266(c) (West 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6101 (2004 & Supp. 2011); 720 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.20, .30, .50, .60; IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-1 (West 2004); MASS. ANN. 
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Article calls these states “force states.”  Fifteen of the force states require a 
showing of either “forcible compulsion” or “incapacity to consent” for at 
least one of their respective sex offenses.
22
  Massachusetts is the only state 
that requires a showing of forcible compulsion without consideration of the 
victim’s incapacity to consent.
23
 
Section A of this Part examines true non-consent states’ statutes, and 
Section B examines contradictory states’ statutes.  Section C provides 
illustrations of case law that either frustrates or confirms states’ statutory 
adoption of a non-consent standard in sex offense prosecutions.  Section D 
examines which party has the burden of showing consent or non-consent. 
A. TRUE NON-CONSENT STATES 
1. Sexual Contact or Penetration 
With twenty-eight true non-consent states, a trend toward rejecting 
force as a required element in sex offense prosecutions appears to be 
forming.  However, only sixteen of the twenty-eight true non-consent states 
have non-consent provisions for offenses involving sexual penetration.
24
  
For example, in Missouri, a person commits the offense of sexual assault if 
he “has sexual intercourse with another person knowing that he does so 
 
LAWS ch. 265, § 22 (LexisNexis 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.520(d)–(e) (West 
2004 & Supp. 2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65(4)(a) (2006 & Supp. 2011); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 2C:14-2 to -3 (West 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-27.2 to .5 (2009); N.D. CENT. 
CODE §§ 12.1-20-03 to -04, -07 (1997 & Supp. 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.02–
.03, .05–.06 (West 2006 & Supp. 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37-2, -4 (2002); S.C. CODE 
ANN. §§ 16-3-652 to -654 (2003 & Supp. 2010); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-61, -67.4 (2009); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-2-302 to -304 (2011). 
22 See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-14-103, -125; CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 261, 266(c); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 18-6101; 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.20, .30, .50, .60; IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 35-42-4-1; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.520(d)–(e); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65(4), 
(6); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:14-2 to -3; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-27.3, .5; N.D. CENT. CODE 
§§ 12.1-20-03, -07; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.02–.03, .05–.06; R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-
37-2, -4; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-652 to -654; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-61, -67.4; WYO. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 6-2-302 to -304. 
23 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 22. 
24 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-402(1), -404 (2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West 
2007); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-6-22.1 to .2 (West 2009); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 707-731 
to -733 (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2010); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 566.040, .070 (West 1999); 
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-319 to -320 (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.366 (LexisNexis 
2006 & Supp. 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2(I)(m) (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 
2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111.1 (West 2002 & Supp. 2011); OR. REV. STAT. 
§§ 163.415, .425 (2009); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3124.1, 3125–3126 (West 2000 & 
Supp. 2011); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-503, -505 (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406 
(LexisNexis 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 9A.44.060 (West 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 940.225(3), (3m) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010). 
2012] “NO” STILL MEANS “YES” 1087 
without that person’s consent.”
25
  In Nevada, a “person who subjects 
another person to sexual penetration, or who forces another person to make 
a sexual penetration on himself or another, or on a beast, against the will of 
the victim . . . is guilty of sexual assault.”
26
  In both of these states, the state 
need only show the victim’s lack of consent to successfully prosecute a sex 
offense under the statute. 
Yet while states like Missouri and Nevada criminalize non-consensual 
penetration without a showing of force or incapacity, eleven true non-
consent states impose the non-consent standard only on sexual contact 
offenses.
27
   Ten of those eleven states still require a showing of forcible 
compulsion or incapacity to consent for sexual penetration offenses.
28
  For 
example, Minnesota’s fifth-degree sexual conduct statute states: “A person 
is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the fifth degree if the person engages 
in non-consensual sexual contact.”
29
  Conversely, all of Minnesota’s other 
sex offenses, including penetration offenses, require a showing of force, 
threat of force, coercion, or deception.
30
  Likewise in Kansas, the sexual 
battery statute states: “Sexual battery is the touching of a victim who is not 
the spouse of the offender, who is 16 or more years of age  and who does 
not consent thereto, with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of 
the offender or another.”
31
  Yet Kansas’s other sex offenses, including 




While it is commendable that eleven states have created non-consent 
provisions for sexual contact offenses, it is troublesome that these eleven 
states do not impose the non-consent standard on sexual penetration 
 
25 MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.040; see also § 566.070. 
26 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.366. 
27 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-73a (West 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5501(a) (West, 
Westlaw through 2010 Legis. Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.130(1) (LexisNexis 2008); 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.1 (2007 & Supp. 2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 255-
A (2006 & Supp. 2010); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-308(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2002 & 
Supp. 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.3451 (West 2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502(1) 
(2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-12 (2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7.4 (2006); W. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-2 (LexisNexis 2010). 
28 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-70; KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-5503, -5505(b); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 510.040; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:41 (2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, 
§§ 255-A(1)(H), (P); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 3-303 to -304; MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 609.342–.344 (West 2009 & Supp. 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11; S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 22-22-1; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-4. 
29 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.3451.  Sexual contact is defined as the “intentional touching 
by the actor of the complainant’s intimate parts.”  § 609.341, subdiv. 11(i). 
30 §§ 609.342, .343–.345. 
31 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5501(a). 
32 §§ 21-5503, -5505(b). 
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offenses.  Without non-consent provisions for sex offenses involving 
penetration, these eleven states cannot successfully prosecute perpetrators 
of sex crimes who have non-consensual intercourse with victims, unless 
there is also evidence of force or incapacity.  Therefore, although twenty-
eight states appear at first glance to be true non-consent states, only 
seventeen of them are true non-consent states for sex offenses involving 
penetration and contact, whereas eleven are true non-consent states only for 
sex offenses involving sexual contact. 
2. Definitions of Consent 
Twelve of the twenty-eight true non-consent states provide statutory 
definitions of “consent” or “without consent.”
33
  For example, in 
Washington, rape in the third degree is a non-consent offense.
34
  The 
legislature defines consent as “actual words or conduct indicating freely 
given agreement to have sexual intercourse or sexual contact.”
35
  In 
Wisconsin, third- and fourth-degree sexual assault are also true non-consent 
offenses.
36
  The statute defines consent as “words or overt actions by a 
person who is competent to give informed consent indicating a freely given 
agreement to have sexual intercourse or sexual contact.”
37
 
Some states provide more detailed explanations of what constitutes 
consent.  In Colorado, for example, the offense of sexual assault 
criminalizes non-consensual sexual penetration.
38
  The statute states that 
“any actor who knowingly inflicts sexual intrusion or sexual penetration on 
a victim commits sexual assault if the actor causes submission of the victim 
by means of sufficient consequence reasonably calculated to cause 
submission against the victim’s will.”
39
  Another provision of Colorado law 
defines consent as “cooperation in act or attitude pursuant to an exercise of 
free will and with knowledge of the nature of the act.  A current or previous 
relationship shall not be sufficient to constitute consent . . . .  Submission 
 
33 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-401(1.5) (2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(1)(a) (West 
2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.020; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 255-A; MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 609.341, subdiv. 4; MO. ANN. STAT. § 556.061(5) (West 1999 & Supp. 2011); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28.318(8) (2008 & Supp. 2010); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05 (McKinney 
2009 & Supp. 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3251(3) (2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 9A.44.010(7) (West 2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-2; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(4) 
(West 2005 & Supp. 2010). 
34 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.060. 
35 § 9A.44.010(7). 
36 WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 940.225(3), (3m). 
37 § 940.225(4). 
38 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402 (2011). 
39 § 18-3-402(1)(a). 
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under the influence of fear shall not constitute consent.”
40
 
Three of the true non-consent states—Kentucky, Montana, and New 
York—have contradictory definitions of “without consent” for some sex 
offenses, but not others.
41
  Unlike the rest of the contradictory non-consent 
states discussed in Section B, these three states still maintain at least one 
true non-consent sex offense that is not negated by a contradictory 
definition of consent that requires force.
42
  However, in these three states a 
contradictory definition of consent is usually provided for sex offenses 
involving sexual penetration, not sex offenses involving sexual contact.  
Thus, in effect, the true non-consent provisions criminalize only non-
consensual sexual contact, not non-consensual sexual penetration.
43
 
For example, every sexual offense in Montana requires that the act was 
committed without the victim’s consent.
44
  Yet the Montana statutes and 
courts have defined non-consent differently for sexual assault (which 
criminalizes non-consensual sexual contact) and unlawful sexual 
intercourse.  The legislature did not define the term “without consent” for 
sexual assault.
45
  As discussed in Section C, the Montana Supreme Court 
has held that the “ordinary meaning of ‘without consent’” applies in cases 
of sexual assault.
46
  In contrast, the Montana legislature explicitly defined 
“consent” in the code as it relates to unlawful sexual intercourse.
47
  To meet 
the requirements of sexual intercourse without consent, the perpetrator must 
have compelled the victim to submit to intercourse by force against the 
victim or another person.
48
  “Force” is also explicitly defined by the 
Montana Code and includes “the infliction, attempted infliction, or 
threatened infliction of bodily injury or the commission of forcible felony 
by the offender” and “the threat of substantial retaliatory action that causes 
the victim to reasonably believe that the offender has the ability to execute 
the threat.”
49
  Therefore, although sexual intercourse in Montana is illegal if 
it is “non-consensual,” the definition of consent as it relates to intercourse 
 
40 § 18-3-401(1.5). 
41 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.020 (LexisNexis 2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501 
(2010); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.52, .55 (McKinney 2009). 
42 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 510.020, .130; MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502; N.Y. PENAL 
LAW §§ 130.52, .55. 
43 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 510.020, .130, .140; MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502; N.Y. 
PENAL LAW §§ 130.52, .55. 
44 MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-502 to -503, -505. 
45 § 45-5-502. 
46 State v. Detonancour, 34 P.3d 487, 495 (Mont. 2001).  See infra text accompanying 
notes 92–97 for a discussion of Montana case law on the definition of “without consent.” 
47 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501(1)(a). 
48 Id. 
49 § 45-5-501(2). 
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requires a showing of force or threat of force. 
The Kentucky criminal code states that “lack of consent” results from 
“(a) Forcible compulsion; (b) Incapacity to consent; or (c) If the offense 
charged is sexual abuse, any circumstances in addition to forcible 
compulsion or incapacity to consent in which the victim does not expressly 
or impliedly acquiesce in the actor’s conduct.”
50
  Kentucky therefore 
provides another example of a state including force or incapacity within the 
definition of consent for penetration, but allowing a true non-consent 
standard (not requiring force or incapacity) for sexual contact. 
The remaining sixteen true non-consent states do not have statutory 
definitions of “consent” or “without consent.”
51
  Section C below explores 
the state courts’ interpretations of “consent” when there is no legislative 
guidance as well as how the courts interpret and apply the statutory 
definitions. 
B. CONTRADICTORY NON-CONSENT STATES 
The high number of true non-consent states gives the initial impression 
that state legislatures are moving towards the use of non-consent standards 
in sex crimes.  However, while twenty-eight state legislatures have adopted 
non-consent provisions,
52
 the number shrinks significantly when statutory 
definitions are further reviewed.  Nine states’ statutory definitions 
minimize, contradict, or entirely defeat any non-consent language in their 
 
50 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.020 (LexisNexis 2008). 
51 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-503 (2010) (defining rape as “unlawful sexual 
penetration of a victim by the defendant or of the defendant by a victim . . . [when] the 
sexual penetration is accomplished without the consent of the victim and the defendant 
knows or has reason to know at the time of the penetration that the victim did not consent”). 
52 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-402, -404 (2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-73a (West 
2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West 2007); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-6-22.1 to .2 (West 
2009); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 707-731 to -733 (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2010); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 21-5501(a) (West, Westlaw through 2010 Legis. Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 510.130; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:41 (2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 255-A 
(2006 & Supp. 2010); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-308 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 
2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.3451 (West 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 566.040, .070 (West 
1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-319, -320 (2008); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 200.366 (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-
A:2(m) (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-12 (2004); N.Y. PENAL 
LAW §§ 130.05, 52, .55 (McKinney 2009 & Supp. 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111.1 
(West 2002 & Supp. 2011); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.415, .425 (2009 & Supp. 2010); 18 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3124.1, 3125–3126 (West 2000 & Supp. 2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 22-22-7.4 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-503, -505; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406 
(LexisNexis 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 9A.44.060 (West 2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-2 (LexisNexis 2010); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 940.225(3), (3)(m) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010). 
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sexual assault or rape statutory schemes.
53
 
For instance, Alabama’s criminal code states: “Whether or not 
specifically stated, it is an element of every offense defined in this article, 
with [one] exception . . . , that the sexual act was committed without 
consent of the victim.”
54
  Although the statute’s plain language appears to 
criminalize sex crimes so long as there is proof that the victim did not 
consent to the sexual act, the definition of “without consent of the victim” 
destroys the plain-language meaning.  The Alabama code defines lack of 
consent as resulting from “(1) Forcible compulsion, or (2) Incapacity to 
consent, or (3) If the offense charged is sexual abuse, any circumstances, in 
addition to forcible compulsion or incapacity to consent, in which the 
victim does not expressly or impliedly acquiesce in the actor’s conduct.”
55
  
By including this definition of non-consent, Alabama effectively negates its 
non-consent provision, requiring a showing of force or incapacity to prove 




The criminal codes of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Iowa, 
Kentucky, Montana, New York, and Texas contain at least one statute in 
which a sex crime appears punishable solely with evidence of the victim’s 
lack of consent.
57
  However, these states’ codes include contradictory 
definitional language negating the effect of some non-consent sex offense 
statutes.
58
  Some of the aforementioned states only criminalize “lesser” sex 
offenses when there is no evidence of force or threat of force.  Because of 
these distinctions between non-consensual sexual acts that many states 
make, this Part will also consider the “type” of sexual acts state lawmakers 
criminalize. 
 
53 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65 (LexisNexis 2005); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.410 (2010); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1404(A), -1406 (2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 761(j)(1), 772 
(2007 & Supp. 2010); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.4 (West 2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 510.140; MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502 to -503; N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.05, .20; TEX. 
PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011 (West 2011). 
54 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-70(a).  Alabama does not require a showing of lack of consent for 
“deviate sexual intercourse” between parties for whom non-deviate sexual intercourse would 
otherwise be legal.  §§ 13A-6-60, -65(a)(3). 
55 § 13A-6-70(b). 
56 Id.  While the legislature exempts sexual abuse from this limited definition of “lack of 
consent,” the offenses of sexual abuse in the first degree and sexual abuse in the second 
degree both require either forcible compulsion or incapacity to consent.  ALA. CODE §§ 13A-
6-66 to -67 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2010). 
57 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65; ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.410; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-
1404(A), -1406; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 772; IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.4; KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 510.130, .140; MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-502 to -503; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.20; 
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011. 
58 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-70(b). 
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1. Contradictory States with Non-Consensual Intercourse and Contact 
Provisions 
Of the nine states with non-consent statutes and contradictory 
definitional language, seven criminalize both non-consensual intercourse 
and non-consensual sexual contact.
59
  However, contradictory definitions 
negate the “non-consent” effect of many of these provisions.  For example, 
on its face, Alaska’s code criminalizes both non-consensual sexual contact 
and non-consensual sexual intercourse.  Alaska’s first-degree sexual assault 
statute states that an offender commits the crime if “[t]he offender engages 
in sexual penetration with another person without consent of that person.”
60
  
Likewise, Alaska’s second-degree sexual assault statute states that the crime 
is committed when “[t]he offender engages in sexual contact with another 
person without consent of that person.”
61
  Despite these seemingly 
unambiguous non-consent provisions, the Alaskan statutes are qualified by 
a provision stating that “without consent” means that the victim, “with or 
without resisting, is coerced by the use of force against a person or 
property, or by the express or implied threat of death, imminent physical 
injury, or kidnapping to be inflicted to anyone.”
62
  This definition 
invalidates the non-consent language for both the penetration and contact 
provisions, effectively placing Alaska in the same category as the “force 
states” discussed above. 
The Delaware code includes similar contradictory language.  
Delaware’s rape in the second degree statute reads: “A person is guilty of 
rape in the second degree when the person . . . [i]ntentionally engages in 
sexual intercourse with another person, and the intercourse occurs without 
the victim’s consent.”
63
  Similar non-consent language is used in the state’s 
unlawful sexual contact in the third degree
64
 and rape in the fourth degree 
statutes,
65
 which criminalize non-consensual sexual contact and sexual 
 
59 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65; ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.410, .420; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 13-1404(A), -1406; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 767, 770, 772; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 510.130, .140; MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-502 to -503; N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.05(1), 
(2)(a)–(b). 
60 ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.410. 
61 § 11.41.420. 
62 § 11.41.470(8)(A). 
63 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 772. 
64 § 767 (“A person is guilty of unlawful sexual contact in the third degree when the 
person has sexual contact with another person or causes the victim to have sexual contact 
with the person or a third person and the person knows that the contact is either offensive to 
the victim or occurs without the victim’s consent.”). 
65 § 770 (“A person is guilty of rape in the fourth degree when the person . . . 
[i]ntentionally engages in sexual penetration with another person [and] [t]he sexual 
penetration occurs without the victim’s consent.”). 
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intercourse, respectively.  Despite these three non-consent provisions, 
which appear to criminalize all non-consensual sexual acts, the Delaware 
code defines “without consent” to mean that the defendant 
compelled the victim to submit by any act of coercion as defined in §§ 791 and 792 of 
this title, or by force, by gesture, or by threat of death, physical injury, pain or 
kidnapping to be inflicted upon the victim or a third party, or by any other means 
which would compel a reasonable person under the circumstances to submit.
66
 





 and sexual assault
69
 statutes, and Montana’s sexual 
intercourse without consent
70
 and sexual assault
71
 statutes. 
New York’s sex crime statutes are anomalous in that the state code 
defines “lack of consent” differently for different provisions.
72
  Most of 
New York’s sex crime statutes fall under the state’s catchall definition, 
which specifically states that lack of consent results from forcible 
compulsion or incapacity to consent.
73
  Like the other “contradictory 
definition” states, this provision negates the “non-consent” effect of many 
of the original provisions.  However, the state’s sexual abuse and forcible 
touching statutes
74
 are specifically excluded from this provision and are 
 
66 § 761(j)(1).  This statute includes the phrases “by gesture” and “or by any other 
means,” which suggests that force may not always be required.  Id.  However, given the 
ambiguity in this contradictory definition and the lack of relevant case law, one cannot 
assume that the statute was intended to allow for convictions with a showing less than force. 
67 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65 (LexisNexis 2005). 
68 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1404(A) (2010) (“A person commits sexual abuse by 
intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual contact with any person who is fifteen or more 
years of age without consent of that person or with any person who is under fifteen years of 
age if the sexual contact involves only the female breast.”). 
69 § 13-1406 (“A person commits sexual assault by intentionally or knowingly engaging 
in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact with any person without consent of such 
person.”). 
70 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-503 (2010) (“A person who knowingly has sexual 
intercourse without consent with another person commits the offense of sexual intercourse 
without consent.”). 
71 § 45-5-502 (“A person who knowingly subjects another person to any sexual contact 
without consent commits the offense of sexual assault.”). 
72 Because most of New York’s sex crime statutes are governed by a contradictory 
definition of “lack of consent,” this Article includes it in the Type Two category.  However, 
the separate definitions for rape in the third degree, criminal sexual act in the third degree, 
sexual abuse, and forcible touching also place New York in the Type One category of true 
non-consent states. 
73 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(1), (2)(a)–(b) (McKinney 2009 & Supp. 2011). 
74 § 130.52 (“A person is guilty of forcible touching when such person intentionally, and 
for no legitimate purpose, forcibly touches the sexual or other intimate parts of another 
person for the purpose of degrading or abusing such person; or for the purpose of gratifying 
the actor’s sexual desire.”). 
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instead governed by a separate definition of “lack of consent.”  This 
separate definition states that lack of consent may be proven in any 
circumstance in which the victim does not expressly or impliedly acquiesce 
in the actor’s conduct.
75
  Rape in the third degree
76
 and criminal sexual act 
in the third degree
77
 are also excluded from the state’s catchall definition of 
consent.  These two offenses are governed by yet another separate 
definition of consent, stating that a person is guilty if he engages in sexual 
intercourse with another person without such person’s consent, where the 
lack of consent is by reason of some factor other than incapacity to 
consent.
78
  Altogether, New York applies three different definitions of 
consent to different sex offenses. 
Kentucky and Montana each have only one contradictory definition of 
non-consent.  However, both states apply the contradictory definitions of 
non-consent to certain sex crimes in their criminal codes and exclude 
others.  For example, at first glance, Kentucky looks like a non-consent 
state.  The third-degree sexual abuse
79
 and sexual misconduct
80
 statutes 
specifically state that a person is guilty of a sex crime if he subjects another 
person to sexual contact or sexual intercourse, respectively, “without the 
[victim’s] consent.”
81
  While these statutes appear to be unambiguous, a 
contradictory definition muddies the water.  One provision states: “Whether 
or not specifically stated, it is an element of every offense defined in this 
chapter that the sexual act was committed without the consent of the 
victim.”
82
  However, another provision states that lack of consent results 
from forcible compulsion, incapacity to consent, or, “[i]f the offense 
charged is sexual abuse, any circumstance in addition to forcible 
compulsion or incapacity to consent in which the victim does not expressly 
 
75 § 130.05(2)(c). 
76 § 130.25. 
77 § 130.40 (“A person is guilty of criminal sexual act in the third degree when [in 
relevant part]: He or she engages in oral sexual conduct or anal sexual conduct with another 
person without such person’s consent where such lack of consent is by reason of some factor 
other than incapacity to consent.”). 
78 § 130.05(2)(d) (“Where the offense charged is rape in the third degree . . . , or criminal 
sexual act in the third degree . . . , the victim clearly expressed that he or she did not consent 
to engage in such act, and a reasonable person in the actor’s situation would have understood 
such person’s words and acts as an expression of lack of consent to such act under all the 
circumstances.”). 
79 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.130(1) (LexisNexis 2008) (“A person is guilty of sexual 
abuse in the third degree when he or she subjects another person to sexual contact without 
the latter’s consent.”). 
80 § 510.140(1) (“A person is guilty of sexual misconduct when he engages in sexual 
intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse with another person without the latter’s consent.”). 
81 §§ 510.130, .140. 
82 § 510.020(1). 
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or impliedly acquiesce in the actor’s conduct.”
83
 
In summary, Kentucky’s “contradictory definition” of non-consent 
accomplishes two things.  First, it negates the “non-consent” effect of most 
of the state’s sex crime statutes (including sexual misconduct, which, on its 
face, is a “non-consent” law) by requiring a showing of force or incapacity.  
Second, it specifically excludes sexual abuse from the contradictory 
definition, thereby turning the sexual abuse statute into a “true non-consent” 
provision. 
2. Contradictory States with Non-Consensual Sexual Intercourse Provisions 
Texas and Iowa are the only two states in this Part that criminalize 
non-consensual sexual intercourse without criminalizing any non-
consensual sexual contact offenses.  Texas’s sexual assault statute reads: 
A person commits an offense if the person: (1) intentionally or knowingly: (A) causes 
the penetration of the anus or sexual organ of another person by any means, without 
that person’s consent; (B) causes the penetration of the mouth of another person by 
the sexual organ of the actor, without that person’s consent; or (C) causes the sexual 
organ of another person, without that person’s consent, to contact or penetrate the 
mouth, anus, or sexual organ of another person, including the actor.
84
 
As with the other states in this Part, the “non-consent” effect of Texas’s 
sexual assault statute is quickly undone when the lawmakers require a 
showing of force or threat of force to prove that an act was committed 
“without consent of the other person.” 
The same “contradictory definition” analysis applies to Iowa’s sexual 
abuse in the third degree offense,
85
 which on its face appears to be a true 
non-consent sexual intercourse provision.
86
  However, sexual abuse in the 
third degree occurs if it is “against the will of the other person.”
87
  Iowa 
defines the phrase “against the will of the other person” to mean “the 
consent or acquiescence of the other is procured by threats of violence 
toward any person or . . . the act is done while the other is under the 
influence of a drug inducing sleep or is otherwise in a state of 
 
83 § 510.020(2). 
84 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011 (West 2011). 
85 Sex acts are defined as “penetration of the penis into the vagina or anus; contact 
between the mouth and genitalia or by contact between the genitalia of one person and the 
genitalia or anus of another person; contact between the finger or hand of one person and the 
genitalia or anus of another person, . . . or by use of artificial sexual organs or substitutes 
therefor in contact with the genitalia or anus.”  IOWA CODE ANN. § 702.17 (West 2003 & 
Supp. 2011). 
86 § 709.4 (“A person commits sexual abuse in the third degree when the person 
performs a sex act [when] [t]he act is done by force or against the will of the other person, 
whether or not the other person is the person’s spouse or is cohabiting with the person.”). 
87 Id. 
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unconsciousness.”
88
  Effectively, the statute’s definition makes sexual abuse 
in the third degree provable by force or incapacity to consent, instead of by 
lack of consent. 
In light of the foregoing discussion, states should rethink their 
approach to sex crimes and adopt true non-consent language to resolve the 
sham that is the “non-consent statute with a contradictory definition” trend.  
Several states have begun that resolution.  New York and Kentucky have 
adopted true non-consent language for at least one of their sex crime 
statutes; however, they still require force or threat of force for many of their 
sex offenses through “catchall” contradictory definitions that subvert the 
substantive non-consent offenses.  True non-consent language continues to 
elude every state discussed in this Section. 
C. CASE LAW 
This Section discusses case law that illustrates state courts’ 
interpretations of non-consent or force statutes in sex offense 
prosecutions.
89
  Case law in the majority of both true non-consent states and 
contradictory non-consent states confirms that courts apply a plain reading 
of the sex offense statutes.
90
  However, some true non-consent states and 
contradictory states have case law that liberally interprets the language of 
the statutes.  This Section also notes the surprising dearth of case law in 
many states on the issue of non-consent.  This lack of case law is more 
pronounced for sexual contact cases, particularly those with non-consent 
standards. 
1. Case Law That Liberally Interprets the Language of the Statutes 
Some state courts have broadened definitions, misapplied definitions, 
or created new definitions of non-consent, thus expanding the scope of the 
language in their statutory provisions.
91
  First, where state statutes fail to 
define “consent” or “lack of consent,” some courts define those terms in 
case law, providing non-consent standards for sexual assault offenses that 
are not immediately apparent in the criminal codes. 
 
88 § 709.1. 
89 See infra notes 90–126. 
90 Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, South Dakota, and Tennessee fit into this category.  See, e.g., People v. 
Pahlavan, 83 P.3d 1138, 1141–42 (Colo. App. 2003) (concluding that a jury instruction 
defining “consent” which simply followed the statutory language was proper). 
91 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Montana, and Oregon fit into this category.  
See, e.g., Ex parte Gordon, 706 So. 2d 1160 (Ala. 1997); State v. Witwer, 856 P.2d 1183 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Coleman, 727 A.2d 246 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999); State v. 
Detonancour, 34 P.3d 487 (Mont. 2001). 
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In Montana, for example, courts have created a non-consent standard 
for sexual contact offenses.
92
  As discussed above, both penetration and 
sexual contact offenses in Montana require that the acts be committed 
without the victim’s consent.
93
  Although the Montana legislature 
specifically defined “without consent” in the offense of “sexual intercourse 
without consent” to mean that the perpetrator forcibly compels the victim to 
submit to intercourse, the criminal code does not define “without consent” 
as it relates to the offense of sexual contact without consent.
94
 
The Montana Supreme Court filled in the gap for sexual contact 
offenses, holding that the “ordinary meaning of ‘without consent’” applies 
(as opposed to the definition of “without consent” in the sexual intercourse 
offenses).
95
  While the Montana Supreme Court has not explicitly defined 
the term “ordinary meaning,” lower courts interpret “without consent” to 
mean “simply the absence of affirmative consent.”
96
  Therefore, in Montana 
bare proof that the victim did not consent to sexual contact with a 
perpetrator suffices to establish the element of non-consent.
97
 
Other states have statutes requiring a showing of force for various sex 
offenses, but some have case law defining force more broadly than the 
statutory language implies.  For example, a plain reading of the Connecticut 
criminal code suggests that most sex offenses require a showing of force or 
threats of force to convict a defendant, but fourth-degree sexual assault only 
requires a showing that sexual contact occurred without a victim’s 
consent.
98
  Although Connecticut courts do not apply a true non-consent 
standard to penetration offenses, they do apply relaxed standards for what 
constitutes “force” in all sexual contact cases, not just fourth-degree sexual 
assault. 
In State v. Coleman,
99
 the Connecticut Court of Appeals expanded the 
meaning of the term “force” for first-degree sexual assault (a penetration 
offense).  In Coleman, the defendant pulled down the victim’s shorts and 
underwear, fondled her genitalia, performed oral sex on her, and penetrated 
her vagina with his penis after confronting her in the bathroom of a 
nightclub.
100
  The victim stated that the defendant did not use physical 
 
92 See infra notes 95–97. 
93 See supra notes 44–49. 
94 MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-501(1)(a), -502 (2010). 
95 Detonancour, 34 P.3d at 495. 
96 See, e.g., State v. Mihalko, No. DC-02-138(B), 2003 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 3398, at *2–5 
(Jan. 20, 2003) (citing State v. Lundblade, 717 P.2d 575 (Mont. 1986)). 
97 Mihalko, 2003 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 3398, at *1. 
98 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-73a (West 2007). 
99 State v. Coleman, 727 A.2d 246 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999). 
100 Id. at 248. 
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violence against her, but rather that he held her shoulder and pushed his 
body weight against her.
101
  She also testified that she was too weak and 
sick from the alcohol she consumed at the club to fight or call for help.
102
 
The defendant argued that because the state did not prove that he used 
physical force to overcome the victim’s “earnest” resistance, there was 
insufficient evidence to establish the use of force, as required for first-
degree sexual assault.
103
  In rejecting the defendant’s argument, the 
appellate court stated that resistance is not required under Connecticut law 
and explained that the “use of force” is defined broadly as the “use of actual 
physical force or violence or [the use of] superior physical strength against 
the victim.”
104
  Therefore, although the defendant did not use physical 
violence against the victim, the court found that because the defendant used 
his superior size and strength to his advantage, a reasonable jury could find 
him guilty of first-degree sexual assault.
105
 
Finally, despite contradictory definitions of non-consent in state 
statutes that require a showing of force, some state courts refuse to require a 
showing of force to convict a perpetrator of a sex crime.  For example, 
Arizona’s sexual abuse and sexual assault offenses state that the offenses 
are committed when sexual contact or sexual penetration occurs without the 
consent of the victim.
106
  However, a separate provision in the criminal code 
states that the “without consent” standard is met by force or threats of force, 




Without examining case law, Arizona looks like a classic contradictory 
state: a non-consent standard is effectively negated by a contradictory 
definition of consent.  However, the case law relating to jury instructions 
illustrates the Arizona courts’ different interpretation of “without consent.”  
In State v. Witwer,
108
 the defendant engaged in sexual contact with the 
victim during her training as a chiropractic assistant.  He continued to touch 
her genitals and breasts after she asked him to stop.  The appellate court 
 
101 Id. at 249. 
102 Id. at 250. 
103 Id. at 249. 
104 Id. 
105 Id.; see also State v. Malon, 898 A.2d 843, 850 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006) (holding that 
the following jury instructions were acceptable: “[Consent] must have been actual and not 
simply acquiescence brought about by force, by fear, or by shock.  The act must have been 
truly voluntary on the part of the complainant.”). 
106 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1404, -1406 (2010). 
107 § 13-1401. 
108 State v. Witwer, 856 P.2d 1183 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993). 
2012] “NO” STILL MEANS “YES” 1099 
affirmed the defendant’s conviction for sexual abuse.
109
  Although the 
defendant argued that the jury instructions should have defined “without 
consent” within the four examples listed in the statute, the appellate court 
determined that the meaning of “without consent” was not limited to those 
four situations.
110
  Instead, the court held that it was acceptable in a sexual 
abuse case to give the words “without consent” their “ordinary meaning.”
111
  
In State v. Kelley, an Arizona appellate court approved jury instructions 
stating that if a rape victim’s conduct reasonably manifested her lack of 
consent, that conduct was sufficient to show non-consent.
112
 
Similarly, although the Alabama statute defines “lack of consent” as 
resulting from forcible compulsion or incapacity to consent,
113
 the Alabama 
courts have stated that they are not requirements for every sex offense.  In 
Ex parte Gordon, the victim did not object to the defendant’s initial 
advances but verbally resisted when the defendant pushed her onto the bed 
and made further sexual advances.
114
  Despite the victim’s verbal resistance, 
the defendant held her down and engaged in sexual intercourse.
115
  
Alabama’s sexual misconduct statute states in pertinent part: “A person 
commits the crime of sexual misconduct if . . . being a male, he engages in 
sexual intercourse with a female without her consent . . . .”
116
  However, 
according to a separate provision in the Alabama criminal code, “lack of 
consent” results from forcible compulsion or incapacity to consent.
117
 
The defendant argued that the state did not prove “lack of consent” 
because he did not use forcible compulsion and the victim was not 
incapacitated.
118
  However, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the 
defendant’s conviction, holding that force is not a necessary element of 
sexual misconduct, despite the contradictory definition in the code.
119
  The 
court reasoned that the Alabama legislature created two offenses relating to 
non-consensual intercourse: rape, which requires a showing of force, and 
sexual misconduct, which does not.
120
  A defendant can be convicted of 
 
109 Id. at 1184. 
110 Id. at 1185–86. 
111 Id. 
112 State v. Kelley, 516 P.2d 569, 570–71 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973) (“[T]he conduct of the 
female person need only be such as to make non-consent and actual resistance reasonably 
manifest.”). 
113 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60 (LexisNexis 2005). 
114 Ex parte Gordon, 706 So. 2d 1160, 1162 (Ala. 1997). 
115 Id. 
116 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65. 
117 § 13A-6-70(b)(1)–(2). 
118 Gordon, 706 So. 2d at 1163–64. 
119 Id. at 1163. 
120 Id. at 1164. 
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sexual misconduct even if the state fails to prove the defendant applied or 
threatened force.
121
  Despite establishing this fairly progressive “non-
consent” standard, the court did not articulate a specific definition for “lack 
of consent” for the offense of sexual misconduct. 
2. Lack of Relevant Case Law 
In some states, while there is case law interpreting sex offenses that 
require a showing of forcible compulsion, there is a dearth of case law 
involving adult victims for the non-consent offenses.
122
  In Georgia, for 
example, the offense of rape requires a showing of force, while the offense 
of sexual battery requires only a lack of consent.
123
  In the Georgia rape 
cases involving adult victims, the courts require some evidence of force or 
threat of force.
124
  While some Georgia courts have affirmed convictions of 
rape where the victims seemed to consent and there was no evidence of 
force, these cases involve victims under the age of eighteen.
125
  
Furthermore, the Georgia cases focusing on the issue of non-consent in 
sexual battery and aggravated sexual battery cases involve persons who are 
incapable of consenting to sexual activity, including children and victims 
with diminished mental capacity.
126
  There is no Georgia case law on non-
consent in the context of sexual battery or aggravated sexual battery. 
An examination of case law in true non-consent states and 
contradictory states reveals that most state courts are applying the non-
consent provisions as they are written in the applicable statutes.  However, 
there is a trend among some non-consent states of broadening or creating 
definitions of non-consent, or applying definitions of non-consent that 
liberally expand a particular statute’s reach as it relates to non-consent.  
There is also a dearth of relevant case law in a significant number of non-
 
121 Id. at 1163–64. 
122 Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, New 
Mexico, and Utah all fall under this category. 
123 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-6-1(a)(1), -22.1 (West 2009). 
124 See, e.g., Curtis v. State, 223 S.E.2d 721, 723 (Ga. 1976) (“‘A person commits rape 
when he has carnal knowledge of a female, forcibly and against her will.’ . . .  Intimidation 
may substitute for force.” (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1(a)(1)). 
125 See, e.g.,Wightman v. State, 656 S.E.2d 563, 566 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (finding the 
element of force present even though defendant had sex with victim without actual use or 
threat of force, where child rape victim testified that defendant stated that he would 
distribute nude photographs of the victim at school and get the victim in trouble with her 
father if she did not comply, that no one would believe victim, and that she would be sent to 
a foster home if she attempted to report the sexual abuse). 
126 See, e.g., Driggers v. State, 662 S.E.2d 872 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008); Melton v. State, 639 
S.E.2d 411 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006); Weldon v. State, 607 S.E.2d 175 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004); 
Carson v. State, 576 S.E.2d 12 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). 
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consent states, suggesting that either the state is not prosecuting sex 
offenses using a non-consent standard or such cases are not being appealed. 
D. PROSECUTORS MUST TAKE NON-CONSENT PROHIBITIONS 
SERIOUSLY 
Despite a seeming trend toward rejecting antiquated force 
requirements and embracing non-consent standards for sex crimes, the 
reality is far from progressive.  First, many states still require a showing of 
forcible compulsion or a victim’s incapacity to consent for a sex crime 
conviction.  Second, although there are twenty-eight true non-consent 
states, eleven of those states only have non-consent provisions for sexual 
contact offenses.  In these states, the more egregious penetration offenses 
still require a showing of force or threat of force.  Third, while the 
contradictory states appear to be non-consent states, statutory definitions of 
“consent,” either in the sex-crime statutes or elsewhere in the codes, negate 
the non-consent standards of these statutes. 
Additionally, there is a striking dearth of relevant case law in a 
significant number of non-consent states.  This suggests that either the 
states are not prosecuting non-consent sex offenses, that defendants in such 
cases are being acquitted, or that defendants are convicted and opting not to 
appeal.  Given the novelty of the non-consent movement and the apparent 
resistance to it, it is difficult to imagine many instances in which defendants 
are convicted without any showing of force and then waiving their right to 
appeal.  Thus, unless all these defendants are being acquitted, it appears 
much more likely that prosecutors are not pursuing these cases.  If this is 
true, it is disheartening to see the movement’s attempts at reform minimized 
by a lack of prosecution. 
III. RESISTANCE 
At common law, rape law required that a victim resist a defendant.
127
  
This Part analyzes the existence or absence of that antiquated requirement 
in all fifty states’ current sex offense statutes and discusses whether there 
remains a judicial reliance on resistance to prove either a victim’s non-
consent or a defendant’s use of force.  This portion of the Article argues 
that resistance continues to be a decisive indicator of both a victim’s non-
consent and a defendant’s use of force, whether states’ statutes retain 
resistance requirements or not. 
Section A provides a brief description of the history of the resistance 
requirement in rape law and the progression from an utmost resistance 
 
127 See infra notes 135–138 and accompanying text. 
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requirement to either a reasonable resistance requirement or the elimination 
of a resistance requirement.
128
  Section B reviews the status of the resistance 
requirement in all fifty states’ current sex offense statutes.
129
  It divides state 
statutes into four categories.  The first category includes states that have 
retained an explicit requirement for a victim to resist a defendant in order to 
prove that she did not consent or that the defendant used force or forcible 
compulsion.
130
  The second category encompasses state statutes that may 
not explicitly reference “resistance” but still retain comparable language 
requiring the offender to cause “submission against the victim’s will” or 
“overcome the victim.”
131
  The third category includes states that have 
explicitly eliminated a resistance requirement.
132
  The last category 
comprises states that do not formally demand resistance as an affirmative 
requirement but define the elements of offenses in a manner merely 
requiring the victim to be “incapable of resisting” to prove that she did not 
consent or that the defendant committed a sex offense.
133
  Section C 
outlines state court decisions interpreting the four categories of statutes 
described in Section B.
134
 
A. TRADITIONAL RAPE LAW AND THE RESISTANCE REQUIREMENT 
Under English common law, rape was defined as “carnal knowledge of 
a woman forcibly and against her will.”
135
  Traditional rape law emphasized 
the victim’s resistance to indicate whether consent had been withheld or 
force used.
136
  “At common law, the state had to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the woman resisted her assailant to the utmost of her physical 
capacity to prove that an act of sexual intercourse was rape.”
137
  Thus, the 
focus shifted from the alleged offender’s conduct to the victim’s conduct.
138
 
The Model Penal Code (MPC) sought to move away from the common 
 
128 See infra notes 135–142 and accompanying text. 
129 See infra notes 143–202 and accompanying text. 
130 See infra notes 144–162 and accompanying text. 
131 See infra notes 163–165 and accompanying text. 
132 See infra notes 166–193 and accompanying text. 
133 See infra notes 194–202 and accompanying text. 
134 See infra notes 203–251 and accompanying text.  The cases in this portion of the 
Article illustrate instances where courts have implemented a resistance requirement where 
none was required or have interpreted a resistance requirement in a particular way of note. 
135 SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & CAROL S. STEIKER, CRIMINAL LAW 
AND ITS PROCESSES 296 (8th ed. 2007). 
136 Michelle J. Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape Law, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 953, 
962. 
137 Id. 
138 See Stacy Futter & Walter R. Mebane, Jr., The Effects of Rape Law Reform on Rape 
Case Processing, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 72, 75 (2001). 
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law approach by downplaying—but not eliminating—the resistance 
requirement.
139
  Although it “removed ‘against her will’ from the definition 
of rape, it included a requirement that the [defendant] had ‘compelled her to 
submit.’”
140
  Most states did not follow the MPC’s recommendation to 
eliminate a resistance requirement and instead followed the MPC’s 
emphasis on force instead of the victim’s non-consent.
141
  Thus, the victim’s 
resistance remained an explicit element in most states’ rape statutes as an 
indicator of the defendant’s use of force and the victim’s non-consent.
142
 
B. STATUS OF THE RESISTANCE REQUIREMENT IN THE STATES’ 
CURRENT RAPE LAWS 
Some states have liberalized the common law resistance requirement 
by requiring “earnest resistance,” “reasonable resistance,” or simply 
“resistance” on the part of the victim in order to prove the elements of force 
or non-consent.  Only one state maintains the common law resistance 
requirement of “utmost resistance.”
143
  Other states, while not explicitly 
requiring resistance, require something comparable by requiring 
“submission against the victim’s will.”  Similarly, while not formally 
requiring resistance, some states continue to define the elements of force 
and non-consent in terms of resistance by requiring that the victim either be 
“incapable of resisting,” “unable to resist,” “prevented from resisting,” or 
some variant of the same.  Finally, while many states are silent with regard 
to requiring resistance, some have codified that resistance is not required. 
1. Statutory Resistance Requirement 
Eight states require that the victim resist.
144
  In this category, there are 
four types of resistance requirements.  There are three states with what this 
Article labels “Type One resistance.”  Type One resistance requires that the 
victim resist in order to prove that the victim did not consent due to the 
 
139 Id. at 75–76. 
140 Id. at 76; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1)(a) (1962). 
141 Lyon, supra note 5, at 287. 
142 Id. at 285–87. 
143 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42(A)(1) (2007) (requiring that “the victim resist[] the 
act to the utmost” for the crime of aggravated rape). 
144 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60(8) (LexisNexis 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 761(j)(1) 
(2007 & Supp. 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-6101(4), -6108(4) (2004 & Supp. 2011); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42(A)(1) (2007) (requiring resistance for aggravated rape but not for 
forcible or simple rape); MO. ANN. STAT. § 556.061(12)(a) (West 1999 & Supp. 2011); NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 28-318(8)(b)–(c), (9)(a) (2008 & Supp. 2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 9A.44.010(6) (West 2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-1(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2010).  Note 
that the total number of states will equal nine because Nebraska is counted twice: it requires 
resistance for both “force” and “without consent.” 
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 unless the victim 
was in fear of harm or death to herself or to another person.
147
  There are 
two states with what this Article calls “Type Two resistance.”  Type Two 
resistance requires that the victim resist in order to prove that the defendant 
engaged in the sexual act with the victim by “forcible compulsion,”
148
 
unless the victim was in fear of harm or death to herself or to another 
person.
149
  There are two states with what is described herein as “Type 
Three resistance.”  Type Three resistance requires that the victim resist to 
the extent that it is reasonable for the defendant to know that the victim did 




The Type One and Type Two states have different standards of 
resistance and all focus on the victim’s actions or inactions.  In Alabama, 
the defendant must use “[p]hysical force that overcomes earnest resistance” 
to prove that the victim did not consent due to the defendant’s use of 
“forcible compulsion” for the crimes of first-degree rape and first-degree 
sexual abuse, but not for sexual misconduct.
151
  In West Virginia, the 
defendant must use physical force that overcomes “earnest resistance as 
might reasonably be expected under the circumstances” to prove the victim 
did not consent due to the defendant’s use of “forcible compulsion” for the 
crimes of second- and third-degree sexual assault and first-, second-, and 
third-degree sexual abuse.
152
  In Nebraska, the defendant must use physical 
force that “overcomes the victim’s resistance” to prove that the victim did 
 
145 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60(8); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-1(1)(a). 
146 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318(9)(a). 
147 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60(8); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318(9); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-
8B-1(1)(b).  West Virginia also provides that resistance is not required to prove “forcible 
compulsion” where the victim is in fear that she or another will be kidnapped or where the 
defendant intimidates a person under the age of sixteen.  In addition, Nebraska requires that 
the victim believe the defendant has the ability to execute the threat. 
148 MO. ANN. STAT. § 556.061(12)(a); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010(6). 
149 Washington and Missouri also provide that resistance is not required to prove 
“forcible compulsion” where the victim is in fear that herself or another will be kidnapped.  
MO. ANN. STAT. § 556.061(12)(b); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010(6). 
150 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 761(j)(1) (2007 & Supp. 2010); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-
318(8)(b). 
151 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-70(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2005) (defining lack of consent); § 13A-6-
60(8) (defining forcible compulsion); § 13A-6-65 (sexual misconduct); ALA. CODE § 13A-6-
66 (LexisNexis Supp. 2010) (sexual abuse in the first degree). 
152 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-1(1) (defining forcible compulsion); § 61-8B-2 (defining 
lack of consent); § 61-8B-4 (sexual assault in the second degree); § 61-8B-5 (sexual assault 
in the third degree); 61-8B-7 (sexual abuse in the first degree); § 61-8B-8 (sexual abuse in 
the second degree); § 61-8B-9 (sexual abuse in the third degree). 
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not consent due to the defendant’s use of “force.”
153
  In Missouri, the 
defendant must use physical force that overcomes “reasonable resistance” 
to prove that the defendant engaged in the sexual act with the victim by 
“forcible compulsion.”
154
  Finally, in Washington, the defendant must use 
physical force that overcomes “resistance” to prove that the defendant 
engaged in the sexual act with the victim by “forcible compulsion.”
155
 
The Type Three states focus not only on the victim’s actions or 
inactions, but also on the defendant’s mental state.  In Delaware, the victim 
need not resist if doing so would be futile, and otherwise the victim must 
resist “only to the extent that is reasonably necessary to make the victim’s 
refusal to consent known to the defendant.”
156
  Similarly, in Nebraska, the 
victim need not resist if resistance would be futile, and “[t]he victim need 
only resist, either verbally or physically, so as to make the victim’s refusal 
to consent genuine and real and so as to reasonably make known to the 
actor the victim’s refusal to consent.”
157
  The victim can also contend that 
she did not consent due to the defendant’s use of “force”
158
 or that she did 
not consent because she expressed her lack of consent to the defendant 
through words or conduct.
159
  For the former, the defendant must use 
physical force that overcomes the victim’s “resistance.”
160
  However, in 
both cases, the victim must resist “so as to make the victim’s refusal to 
consent genuine and real” and so as to reasonably make her lack of consent 
known to the defendant.
161
 
West Virginia provides the only definition of resistance in all the states 
that have a resistance requirement.  West Virginia defines resistance as 





153 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318(8) (2008 & Supp. 2010) (defining “without consent”); 
§ 28-318(9) (defining force or threat of force). 
154 MO. ANN. STAT. § 556.061(12) (West 1999 & Supp. 2011) (defining forcible 
compulsion). 
155 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010(6) (West 2009) (defining forcible compulsion). 
156 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 761(j) (2007 & Supp. 2010). 
157 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318(8)(b)–(c). 
158 § 28-318(8)(a)(i) (defining “without consent” as “the victim was compelled to submit 
due to the use of force or threat of force or coercion”). 
159 § 28-318(8)(a)(ii) (defining “without consent” as “the victim expressed a lack of 
consent through words”); § 28-318(8)(a)(iii) (defining “without consent” as “the victim 
expressed a lack of consent through conduct”). 
160 § 28-318(9) (defining force or threat of force). 
161 § 28-318(8)(b). 
162 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-1(1) (LexisNexis 2010). 
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2. Comparable Language to a Resistance Requirement 
Seven states do not specifically require “resistance” in their statutes; 
however, they mandate something comparable, such as “submission against 
the victim’s will”
163
 or action by the defendant to “overcome the victim.”
164
  
For example, in Colorado, a defendant who “causes submission of the 
victim by means of sufficient consequence reasonably calculated to cause 
submission against the victim’s will” is guilty of sexual assault.
165
 
3. Statutory Provision Eliminating a Resistance Requirement 
Although twenty-four states are silent regarding a resistance 
requirement,
166
 fourteen state statutes ostensibly do not require resistance 
on the part of the victim.
167
  Of these fourteen states, eight distinguish 
 
163 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402(1)(A) (2011); see CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(2) (West 
2008) (defining a circumstance constituting rape where the defendant engages in sexual 
intercourse with the victim “against a person’s will by means of force, violence, duress, 
menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or another”); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(A) (2009) (defining a circumstance constituting rape where the 
defendant engages in sexual intercourse with the victim “against the complaining witness’s 
will”). 
164 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-0.1 (West Supp. 2011) (defining a circumstance 
constituting “force or threat of force” as when the defendant has “overcome[] the victim by 
use of superior strength or size, physical restraint, or physical confinement”); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 11-37-2(3) (2002) (defining a circumstance constituting first-degree sexual assault 
as a defendant engaging in sexual penetration with the victim and through concealment or 
surprise “is able to overcome the victim”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-651(b)–(c) (2003) 
(defining “aggravated coercion” and “aggravated force” as the defendant using coercion or 
force “to overcome the victim”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(2)–(3) (LexisNexis 2008) 
(defining two circumstances constituting “sexual offenses against the victim without consent 
of the victim” as the defendant using force, concealment, or surprise “to overcome the 
victim”). 
165 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402(1)(A); see infra Part III.C (discussing Colorado in 
terms of defining “submission against the victim’s will” because, in People v. Schmidt, 885 
P.2d 312, 316 (Colo. App. 1994), the statement “no” was sufficient for a jury to conclude 
that the victim resisted and that the defendant thereafter caused “submission against the 
victim’s will”). 
166 Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, 
Vermont, and Wisconsin. 
167 ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.470(8)(A) (2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(1)(a) (West 
2007); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.70(a); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.5 (West 2003); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.010(2) (LexisNexis 2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, 
§ 251(1)(E) (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520i (West 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 609.341(4)(a) (West 2009 & Supp. 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511(5) (2010); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(A) (2004 & Supp. 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(C) (West 
2006 & Supp. 2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.315(2) (2009); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3107 
(West 2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.6 (2009). 
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between verbal and physical resistance,
168
 while six do not.
169
  Typically, 
active resistance on the part of the victim is not required to prove the 
defendant used “forcible compulsion” or “force,” or to prove a sex offense 
occurred.
170
  However, some states qualify this elimination of a resistance 
requirement by conditioning the application of the rule on the defendant’s 
ability to show that the victim consented
171
 or by setting the degree of force 
required in terms of the victim’s resistance.
172
  In the states where these 
“resistance-not-required” provisions pertain to the element of consent, most 
states provide that (1) the victim’s lack of resistance does not affirmatively 
establish the presence of consent
173
 or (2) the victim is not required to resist 
in order to establish lack of consent.
174
  However, some states provide that 
the victim is not required to resist, yet allow the victim’s lack of resistance 
to be considered evidence of consent.
175
 
The fourteen states which provide that no resistance is required offer 
 
168 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(1)(a); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.70(a); IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 709.5; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.010(2); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(A); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(C); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.315(2); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
67.6. 
169 ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.470(8)(A); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 251(1)(E); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520i; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.341(4)(a); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-
5-511(5); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3107. 
170 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.5; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.010(2); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 251(1)(E); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520i; MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 45-5-511(5); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(A); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(C); 18 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3107; VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.6. 
171 See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3107 (“The alleged victim need not resist the 
actor in prosecutions under this chapter: Provided, however, That nothing in this section 
shall be construed to prohibit a defendant from introducing evidence that the alleged victim 
consented to the conduct in question.”). 
172 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520i. 
173 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(1)(a) (“‘Consent’ shall not be deemed or construed to 
mean the failure by the alleged victim to offer physical resistance to the [defendant].”); 720 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.70(a) (providing that “[l]ack of verbal or physical resistance 
or submission by the victim resulting from the use of force or threat of force by the accused 
shall not constitute consent”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.341(4)(a) (providing that “[c]onsent 
does not mean . . . that the complainant failed to resist a particular sexual act”); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 163.315(2) (providing that “lack of verbal or physical resistance does not, by itself, 
constitute consent”). 
174 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511(5) (“Resistance by the victim is not required 
to show lack of consent.”). 
175 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.6 (“The Commonwealth need not demonstrate 
that the complaining witness cried out or physically resisted the accused in order to convict 
the accused of an offense under this article, but the absence of such resistance may be 
considered when relevant to show that the act alleged was not against the will of the 
complaining witness.”). 
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no definition of resistance, physical resistance, or verbal resistance.
176
  Of 
the eight states that distinguish between verbal and physical resistance, four 
states apply the distinction to “forcible compulsion,” “force,” or certain or 
all sex offenses.
177
  Iowa and Kentucky provide that physical resistance is 
not required to prove “forcible compulsion.”
178
  New Mexico provides that 
neither physical nor verbal resistance is required to prove “force or 
coercion.”
179
  And Ohio provides that physical resistance is not required for 
certain offenses.
180
  The remaining four states’ “resistance-not-required” 
provisions pertain to the element of consent.
181
  Illinois states that “[l]ack of 
verbal or physical resistance or submission by the victim resulting from the 
use of force or threat of force by the accused shall not constitute 
consent.”
182
  Florida provides that lack of physical resistance does not 
constitute consent,
183
 and Oregon provides that lack of physical or verbal 
resistance does not constitute consent.
184
  In Virginia, physical resistance 
 
176 See ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.470(8)(A) (2010) (“without consent” is established “with 
or without resisting” by the victim); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(1)(a) (West 2007) (“failure 
. . . to . . . physically resist” is not equated with “consent”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-
1.70(a) (“Lack of verbal or physical resistance. . . shall not constitute consent.”); IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 709.5 (West 2003) (it is not “necessary to establish physical resistance” to prove 
sexual abuse); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.010(2) (LexisNexis 2008) (“[p]hysical resistance” 
by the victim is not required to establish “[f]orcible compulsion”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
17-A, § 251(1)(E) (2006) (victim has “no duty . . . to resist” compulsion, which is defined as 
“the use of physical force”); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520i (West 2004) (“A victim 
need not resist the actor . . . .”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.341(4)(a) (West 2009 & Supp. 
2011) (“[C]onsent does not . . . [arise because] the complainant failed to resist . . . .”); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 45-5-511(5) (2010) (“Resistance by the victim is not required to show lack of 
consent.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(A) (2004 & Supp. 2011) (“Physical or verbal 
resistance of the victim is not an element of force or coercion . . . .”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2907.02(C) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011) (“A victim need not prove physical resistance 
. . . .”); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.315(2) (2009) (“A lack of . . . physical resistance does not, by 
itself, constitute consent . . . .”); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3107 (West 2000) (“The alleged 
victim need not resist the actor in prosecutions under this chapter . . . .”); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 18.2-67.6 (2009) (“The Commonwealth need not demonstrate that the complaining witness 
cried out or physically resisted the accused in order to convict . . . .”). 
177 IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.5 (West 2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.010(2) 
(LexisNexis 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(A) (2004 & Supp. 2011); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2907.02(C) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011). 
178 IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.5; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.010(2). 
179 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(A). 
180 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.05(D) (gross sexual imposition); § 2907.02(C) (rape). 
181 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (1)(a) (West 2007); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-
1.70(a) (West Supp. 2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.315(2) (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.6 
(2009). 
182 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.70(a) (defenses to the element of “consent”). 
183 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(1)(a). 
184 OR. REV. STAT. § 163.315(2). 
2012] “NO” STILL MEANS “YES” 1109 
and “crying out” are not required to convict the defendant; however, the 
victim’s “lack of resistance” can still be considered as evidence that the 
victim consented to the act.
185
 
Of the six states that do not distinguish verbal and physical resistance, 
three have resistance-not-required provisions or sections that either pertain 
to the definition of “compulsion” or apply to all sex offenses.
186
  
Pennsylvania and Michigan have sections stating that resistance is not 
required for all sex offenses.
187
  However, Pennsylvania’s rule allows the 
defendant to introduce evidence that the victim consented to the act—thus 
inviting the defendant to use the victim’s lack of resistance as evidence 
suggesting the victim’s consent.
188
  Maine has a provision stating that the 
victim does not have a “duty to resist” to show “compulsion”; however, the 
force or threat of force required to prove compulsion must make the victim 
unable to “physically repel the actor.”
189
  The remaining three states have 
resistance-not-required provisions pertaining to the element of consent.
190
  
Alaska provides that consent can be shown “with or without resistance.”
191
  
Minnesota provides that lack of resistance does not constitute consent.
192
  




4. Incapable of Resisting, Unable to Resist, Defendant Prevents Resistance, 
or Comparable Language 
Sixteen states do not formally require resistance, but they continue to 
define the elements of force and consent in terms of a victim’s resistance by 
requiring the victim to be “incapable of resisting,” “unable to resist,” 
“prevented from resisting,” or some variant thereof to prove that she did not 
consent or that the defendant committed a sex offense.
194
  Eleven states 
 
185 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.6. 
186 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 17-A, § 251(1)(E) (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520i 
(West 2004); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3107 (West 2000). 
187 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520i; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3107. 
188 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3107. 
189 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 251(1)(E) (defining “compulsion”). 
190 ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.470(8)(A) (2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.341(4)(a) (West 
2009 & Supp. 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511(5) (2010). 
191 ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.470(8)(A). 
192 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.341(4)(a). 
193 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511(5). 
194 CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(3)–(4) (West 2009) (defining two circumstances 
constituting rape where the victim is (1) “incapable of resisting” or (2) “prevented from 
resisting” by an intoxicating substance); § 262(a)(2)–(3) (defining two circumstances 
constituting spousal rape where the victim is (1) “incapable of resisting” or (2) “prevented 
from resisting” by an intoxicating substance); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(1)(j) (West 2007) 
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(defining “physically incapacitated” as “bodily impaired or handicapped and substantially 
limited in ability to resist or flee”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6101(5)–(6) (2004 & Supp. 
2011) (defining three circumstances constituting rape where the victim is (1) “prevented 
from resistance by the infliction, attempted infliction, or threatened infliction of bodily 
harm,” (2) “unable to resist” due to any intoxicating substance, and (3) “incapable of 
resisting”); § 18-6108(5)–(6) (defining two circumstances constituting male rape where the 
victim is (1) “prevented from resistance by threats of immediate and great bodily harm, 
accompanied by apparent power of execution,” or (2) “prevented from resistance by the use 
of any intoxicating, narcotic, or anesthetic substance administered by or with the privity of 
the accused”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42.1(A)(1)–(2) (2007) (defining “forcible rape” as 
sexual intercourse without the consent of the victim when (1) the victim is “prevented from 
resisting” and (2) the victim is “incapable of resisting”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43(A)(1) 
(2007 & Supp. 2011) (defining “simple rape” as sexual intercourse without the consent of 
the victim when the victim is “incapable of resisting”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 17-A, 
§ 253(2)(D) (2006 & Supp. 2010) (defining a circumstance constituting gross sexual assault 
where the victim is “physically incapable of resisting”); § 255-A(1)(C)–(D) (defining a 
circumstance constituting unlawful sexual contact where the victim is “physically incapable 
of resisting”); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-301(b) (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2010) 
(defining “mentally defective individual” as “an individual who suffers from mental 
retardation or a mental disorder, either of which temporarily or permanently renders the 
individual substantially incapable of . . . resisting”); § 3-301(c) (defining “mentally 
incapacitated” as “an individual who, because of the influence of a drug, narcotic, or 
intoxicating substance, or because of an act committed on the individual without the 
individual’s consent or awareness, is rendered substantially incapable of . . . resisting”); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65(4)(a) (Supp. 2011) (providing an enhanced penalty where the 
defendant engages in sexual intercourse with a victim without the victim’s consent “by 
administering to the victim any substance or liquid which shall produce such stupor or such 
imbecility of mind or weakness of body as to prevent effectual resistance”); NEB. REV. STAT. 
§ 28-319(1) (2008) (proscribing sexual penetration without the consent of the victim where 
the victim is “mentally or physically incapable of resisting”); § 28-320(1) (proscribing 
sexual contact without the consent of the victim where the victim is “mentally or physically 
incapable of resisting”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.366(1) (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 
2009) (defining a circumstance constituting sexual assault where the victim is “mentally or 
physically incapable of resisting”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-1(g) (West 2005) (defining 
“physically helpless” as a “condition in which a person is unconscious or is physically 
unable to flee or is physically unable to communicate unwillingness to act”); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 14-27.1(1)–(3) (2009) (defining “mentally disabled” as “a victim who suffers from 
mental retardation or a mental disorder, either of which temporarily or permanently renders 
the victim substantially incapable . . . of resisting the act of vaginal intercourse or a sexual 
act;” “mentally incapacitated” as “a victim who due to any act committed upon the victim is 
rendered substantially incapable . . . of resisting the act of vaginal intercourse or a sexual 
act;” and “physically helpless” as “a victim who is physically unable to resist an act of 
vaginal intercourse or a sexual act or communicate unwillingness to submit to an act of 
vaginal intercourse or a sexual act”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-03(1)(b) (Supp. 2011) 
(defining a circumstance constituting gross sexual imposition where the defendant uses 
intoxicants against the victim with the intent to “prevent resistance”); § 12.1-20-04(1) 
(defining a circumstance constituting sexual imposition where the defendant “compels the 
other person to submit by any threat or coercion that would render a person reasonably 
incapable of resisting”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1)(a)–(c) (West 2006 & Supp. 
2011) (defining two circumstances constituting rape as (1) for the purpose of “preventing 
resistance,” the defendant substantially impairs the victim’s judgment or control, and (2) the 
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require the victim to be “incapable of resisting” in order to prove the 
defendant committed a sex crime or the defendant acted “without 
consent.”
195
  Seven states require the victim to be “prevented from 
resisting” by the defendant.
196
  Two states require the victim to be “unable 
to resist” due to any intoxicating narcotic
197
 or to be “physically helpless” 
because the victim is “unable to resist”
198
 to prove the defendant committed 
specific sex offenses.  In Maine, while the victim does not have a “duty to 
resist” to show “compulsion,” the force or threat of force required to prove 
compulsion must make the victim unable to “physically repel the actor.”
199
  
Finally, three states with comparable language require, as elements of sex 
offenses, that the victim is (1) “physically incapacitated” because the victim 
is “substantially limited in ability to resist or flee,”
200
 (2) “physically 
helpless” because the victim is “physically unable to flee,”
201
 or (3) 
possessing an “ability to resist [that] is substantially impaired by mental or 
physical condition or advanced age.”
202
 
C. CASE LAW 
Whether a state codifies a resistance requirement or no resistance 
requirement, for many courts a victim’s resistance still determines whether 
 
victim’s ability to resist is substantially impaired by mental or physical condition, or 
advanced age); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(b)(3) (West 2011) (defining a circumstance 
constituting sexual assault where the sexual act occurs without the victim’s consent when the 
victim is “unable to resist”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(5)–(6) (LexisNexis 2008) 
(defining a circumstance constituting a sexual offense without the consent of the victim 
where the victim is “physically unable to resist”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303(a)(ii) (2011) 
(defining a circumstance constituting second degree sexual assault where the defendant 
causes submission of the victim by any means that would “prevent resistance”).  Note that 
the total number of states equals twenty-four because California, Idaho, Louisiana, Maine, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, and Ohio are counted more than once.  These states require 
more than one of the variants of a resistance requirement described in this Section—namely, 
“incapable of resisting,” or some variant thereof. 
195 CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(4); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6101(6); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 14:42.1(A)(2), :43; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 253(2)(D), 255-A(1)(C)–(D); MD. 
CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-301(b)–(c); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-319(1), -320(1); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 200.366(1); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.1(1)–(3); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-
04(1); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(b)(3); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(5)–(6). 
196 CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(3); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6101(5); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 14:42.1(A)(1) (2007); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65(4)(a); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-
03(1)(b); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1)(a); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303(a)(ii). 
197 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6101(5). 
198 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.1(3). 
199 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 251(1)(E) (2006) (defining compulsion). 
200 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(1)(j) (West 2007). 
201 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-1(g) (West 2005). 
202 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1)(C) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011). 
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she consented or whether the defendant used force.  As applied, the 
definitions of “force,” “forcible compulsion,” and “without consent” often 
make the victim’s resistance a necessity for convicting a defendant of a sex 
offense. 
1. Statutory Resistance Requirement 
In states that explicitly require the victim to resist by statute, courts 
often apply a “totality of the circumstances” standard to determine whether 
the evidence establishes the resistance element.  While applying this 
standard, courts often rely on the victim’s actions or inactions as 
determinative.
203
  There is little difference in how courts interpret “earnest 
resistance,” “reasonable resistance,” and “resistance.”  In the states that 
require the victim to resist, to the extent that the defendant knows the victim 
does not consent, courts scrutinize more heavily the victim’s actions or 
inactions since the degree of resistance required is dependent on the 
defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s refusal to consent.
204
 
In the states where the victim must resist in order to establish the 
victim’s lack of consent to the sexual act due to the defendant’s use of force 
or forcible compulsion, the resistance inquiry focuses on the circumstances 
surrounding the encounter.  The victim’s actions or inactions are more 
determinative than the defendant’s misconduct.
205
  For example, in 
Alabama, much of the case law discussing whether the defendant’s use of 
force overcame the victim’s “earnest resistance” involves a minor victim 
and an adult defendant.
206
  However, in Ex parte Cordar, the defendant had 
been convicted of rape in the circuit court without having the jury instructed 
on the lesser offense of sexual misconduct.
207
  On appeal, the defendant 
 
203 For states requiring the victim to resist to prove the defendant used force or forcible 
compulsion, see State v. Vandevere, 175 S.W.3d 107, 108 (Mo. 2005) (en banc) (holding 
when determining whether the force employed during the commission of a crime is 
sufficient to overcome the victim’s reasonable resistance, a court must look at the “totality of 
the circumstances”) (citing State v. Niederstadt, 66 S.W.3d 12, 15 (Mo. 2002) (en banc)), 
and State v. McKnight, 774 P.2d 532, 534 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that whether the 
evidence establishes the element of resistance is a fact-sensitive determination based on the 
totality of the circumstances, including the victim’s words and conduct). 
204 Parrish v. State, 494 So. 2d 705, 706 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985); Richards v. State, 475 
So. 2d 893, 894 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985). 
205 West Virginia and Alabama are the two states that require the victim to resist to prove 
that the victim did not consent due to the defendant’s use of “forcible compulsion.”  See 
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-70(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-1(1) 
(LexisNexis 2010); supra notes 151–152 and accompanying text.  Relevant case law for 
West Virginia is sparse. 
206 Parrish, 494 So. 2d at 706; Richards, 475 So. 2d at 894. 
207 Ex parte Cordar, 538 So. 2d 1246, 1247 (Ala. 1988). 
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argued such an instruction was necessary because he could have been found 
guilty of having had sexual intercourse with the victim without her consent, 
but not by forcible compulsion.
208
  In reviewing the record, the Alabama 
Supreme Court acknowledged that there was some question as to why the 
victim did not scream for help during the assault and that no external signs 
of trauma to the victim’s body or pelvic region existed.
209
  Accordingly, the 
court found that a jury could reasonably conclude that the victim did not 
earnestly resist, and, therefore, determined that the defendant was entitled to 
a jury instruction on the lesser offense of sexual misconduct.
210
 
In states where the victim must resist before the defendant should 
reasonably have known that the victim did not consent, the inquiry focuses 
on the defendant’s mental state at the time of the sexual act.  As a result, the 
courts scrutinize the victim’s conduct rather than the defendant’s.
211
  In 
Nebraska, the prosecution must either prove that the victim did not consent 
through words or conduct, or prove that the victim did not consent due to 
the defendant’s use of force.
212
  In both cases, the victim still must resist 
physically or verbally “so as to make the victim’s refusal to consent 
genuine and real and so as to reasonably make known to the actor the 
victim’s refusal to consent.”
213
  If the victim contends that she did not 
consent due to the defendant’s use of force, the prosecution must also prove 
that the force “overc[ame] the victim’s resistance.”
214
  Thus, in Nebraska, 
both “force” and “without consent” are defined in terms of the victim’s 
resistance. 
For example, in State v. Gangahar,
215
 the defendant put his arm around 
the victim’s waist while describing her duties for work.  Shortly thereafter, 
the defendant and the victim began watching TV.  The defendant attempted 
to kiss her; however, the victim avoided the kiss.  When the defendant 
asked, “Do you like that?” the victim responded “Well, yeah . . . [i]t’s just, I 
don’t know, it’s not right to do at work.”  The victim then went into a hotel 
room with the defendant, sat on the edge of the bed, and kicked off her 
 
208 Id. at 1248. 
209 Id. at 1249. 
210 Id. 
211 See Johnson v. State, No. 492, 2006, 2007 WL 1575229, at *1–3 (Del. 2007) (finding 
that the victim resisted “to the extent that it is reasonably necessary to make the victim’s 
refusal to consent known to the defendant” to establish the sexual act occurred without the 
victim’s consent, where the victim had told the defendant “no” several times during the 
incident, that she cried out in pain, and that she was crying during the sexual assault even 
though the victim did not have any bruising on her arms or torso). 
212 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318(8)(b) (2008 & Supp. 2010). 
213 Id. 
214 § 28-318(9). 
215 State v. Gangahar, 609 N.W.2d 690 (Neb. Ct. App. 2000). 
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shoes.  The defendant attempted to kiss her.  The victim again avoided the 
kiss.  The defendant stopped when the victim told him to, but then he began 
again.  The defendant fondled the victim’s breast over her clothing and 
placed her hand on his penis over his clothing.  The victim pulled away and 
told him to stop.  The defendant then put his right leg over the victim’s left 
leg and rolled on top of her.  The victim pushed him away, got up, and left.  
The defendant did not attempt to stop her.
216
 
The Court of Appeals of Nebraska reversed the defendant’s conviction 
of third-degree sexual assault and remanded the matter for a new trial.
217
  
The court found that the victim’s testimony that she had said “no” and that 
she did not consent to the sexual contact was sufficient to support the 
defendant’s conviction.
218
  However, the court found reversible error 
because the trial court failed to instruct the jury to consider whether the 
victim’s refusal of consent was genuine, real, and would be known as such 
to a reasonable person in the defendant’s position.
219
  The court reasoned 
that the law places the burden on the state to prove not only whether the 
victim “refused consent,” but also whether such refusal was sufficient to 
show that the defendant either knew or should have known that the victim 
refused consent.
220
  The court explained, “while [the victim] said ‘no,’ the 
statute allows [the defendant] to argue that given all of her actions or 
inaction, ‘no did not really mean no.’”
221
 
In states that require the victim to resist to establish that (1) the 
defendant used force or forcible compulsion,
222
 (2) the victim did not 
consent due to the defendant’s use of force or forcible compulsion, or (3) 
the victim did not consent through words or conduct, the victim’s actions or 
inaction are more determinative than the defendant’s conduct.  
Additionally, courts are more reliant on the victim’s actions or inaction 
where the degree of resistance required is tied to the defendant’s knowledge 
that the victim did not consent. 
2. Comparable Language to a Resistance Requirement 
In the states where sex offense statutes do not contain specific 
resistance language but comparable language, such as requiring the 
defendant to cause “submission against the victim’s will,” courts have 
 
216 Id. at 690, 693. 
217 Id. at 696. 
218 Id. at 694. 
219 Id. at 693–95. 
220 Id. at 694–95. 
221 Id. at 695. 
222 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1)(C) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011). 
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interpreted that language liberally.  For example, in interpreting the phrase 
“submission against the victim’s will,” a Colorado appellate court found 
that the victim saying “no” provided a sufficient basis for a jury to find that 
the victim resisted sexual intercourse and the defendant’s actions caused 
“submission against the victim’s will.”
223
  In that case, the defendant 
appealed his conviction of second-degree sexual assault, arguing that the 
trial court should have instructed the jury on the lesser-included offense of 
third-degree sexual assault because the victim consented to the sexual 
intercourse.
224
  It was undisputed that the defendant had sexual intercourse 
with the victim.
225
  The defendant admitted that the victim said “no” to his 
request for sexual intercourse, but he did not believe she meant it.
226
  The 
Colorado Court of Appeals held that there was no basis for giving a third-
degree sexual assault instruction.
227
  The court reasoned that non-
consensual sexual intercourse, as opposed to other forms of sexual contact 
without consent, requires submission of the victim.
228
  The court concluded 
that the statement “no” provided a sufficient basis for a jury to find that the 
victim resisted sexual intercourse and the defendant caused “‘submission 
against the victim’s will.’”
229
 
3. Statutory Provision Eliminating a Resistance Requirement 
In states with explicit statutory provisions eliminating any requirement 
that the victim resist in order to prove she did not consent to the sexual act 
or that the defendant used force or forcible compulsion, some courts have 
retained the resistance factor in one form or another.
230
  For example, while 
Pennsylvania has a resistance-not-required statute, Pennsylvania courts 
have conflicted in their application of this statute with regard to the 
elements of consent and forcible compulsion, oftentimes retaining some 
degree of a resistance requirement on the part of the victim.
231
  In 
 
223 People v. Schmidt, 885 P.2d 312, 316 (Colo. App. 1994). 
224 Id. at 315–16. 





230 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.6 (2009) (providing that proof of the 
complainant’s physical or verbal resistance is not required to convict the defendant of rape, 
but lack of resistance may be considered as evidence that the complainant consented to the 
sexual act); Farish v. Commonwealth, 346 S.E.2d 736, 739 (Va. Ct. App. 1986) (holding 
that, although resistance was no longer required to prove rape, the woman’s lack of 
resistance strengthened the defendant’s contention that consensual sex occurred). 
231 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3107 (2000) (“The alleged victim need not resist the actor 
in prosecutions under this chapter . . . .”).  Compare Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 
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Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, for example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
wholly ignored the resistance-not-required statute in a rape prosecution 
involving a victim who repeatedly said “no” to the defendant’s sexual 
advances but offered no physical resistance.
232
 
In Berkowitz, the victim decided to visit her friend while she was 
waiting for her boyfriend to return to his dormitory.  Her friend was not in 
his dormitory; however, his roommate, the defendant, was.  The defendant 
asked the victim to stay and asked the victim to give him a back rub and sit 
on his bed.  The victim declined and sat on the floor.  The defendant moved 
off the bed and onto the floor where the victim was sitting.  He “kind of 
pushed the [victim] back with his body, straddled her, and started kissing 
her.”  The victim protested, but the defendant continued and lifted up her 
shirt and bra and fondled her breasts.  The victim said “no.”  The defendant 
tried to insert his penis into the victim’s mouth, but the victim continued to 
protest saying “no,” “let me go,” and “I gotta meet my boyfriend.”  The 
defendant locked the door, put the victim on the bed, and removed her 
sweatpants and underwear.  The victim neither physically resisted nor 
screamed.  After the defendant penetrated her vagina, the victim began 
saying “no” again.  After thirty seconds, the defendant ejaculated on the 
victim’s stomach and immediately got off of her.
233
 
The trial court found the defendant guilty of rape and indecent 
assault.
234
  On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court discharged the rape 
conviction and reversed and remanded the indecent assault conviction.
235
  
The Commonwealth appealed, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
granted allocator to address whether the defendant applied the degree of 
force necessary to satisfy the “forcible compulsion” element of rape.
236
  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the rape charge and 
 
1338, 1347–48 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (holding that verbal protests, such as “no,” while 
relevant to consent, are not sufficient to find forcible compulsion; thus, the victim must 
physically resist in order to satisfy the element of rape that the defendant engaged in sexual 
intercourse with the victim by forcible compulsion), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 641 A.2d 
1161 (Pa. 1994), and Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, 542 A.2d 1335, 1340 (Pa. 1988) 
(plurality opinion) (holding that the degree of force the defendant must use to engage the 
victim in sexual intercourse must be enough to “prevent resistance by a person of reasonable 
resolution”), with Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1226–27 (Pa. 1986) (holding 
that determining whether the defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim by 
forcible compulsion did not require the victim to “actually resist,” but rather required a case-
by-case analysis based on the totality of the circumstances). 
232 Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161, 1163–64 (Pa. 1994); see infra text 
accompanying notes 234–241. 
233 Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1339–40. 
234 Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1162. 
235 Id. 
236 Id. at 1162. 
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reinstated the indecent assault charge.
237
  The court reasoned that the only 
force applied to the victim was the weight of the defendant’s body on top of 
her and that this was not enough force to establish forcible compulsion.
238
  
Moreover, even though the court expressly stated that resistance is not 
required, the court emphasized that while the victim repeatedly said “no,” 
she neither physically resisted nor attempted to leave the room.
239
  The 
court reasoned that while the victim’s verbal protests such as “no” are 
relevant in determining consent, verbal protests are not relevant to the issue 
of force; forcible compulsion requires more than nonconsensual sexual 
intercourse.
240
  Thus, in Pennsylvania, where the statute does not require 
resistance, a victim saying “no” does not establish force sufficient to 
support a rape conviction.
241
  A victim must offer physical resistance. 
4. Incapable of Resisting, Unable to Resist, Defendant Prevents Resistance, 
or Comparable Language 
States retain a victim-resistance requirement where the victim must be 
(1) incapable of resisting, (2) unable to resist, or (3) prevented from 
resisting.  The extent of the resistance required and the degree of force 
required depend on the severity of the offense charged.  For example, the 
Louisiana Court of Appeal in State v. Schexnaider upheld a conviction of 
forcible rape based on the victim’s testimony that she was unable to push 
the defendant off of her because of his superior size and that she was unable 
to move during the attack because she cannot move when she is scared.
242
  
The victim also testified that after being penetrated several times she was 
finally able to tell the defendant “No!” and he ceased his attack.  Her 
 
237 Id. at 1163. 
238 Id. at 1164–65. 
239 Id. at 1164. 
240 Id. at 1164–65 (supporting its reasoning by citing Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, 542 
A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1988), and comparing the rape statute with the indecent assault statute).  In 
Mlinarich, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania sustained the reversal of a defendant’s 
conviction of rape where the victim repeatedly stated that she did not want to engage in 
sexual intercourse, but offered no physical resistance because “something more than a lack 
of consent is required to prove ‘forcible compulsion.’”  Id. at 1164 n.4.  In addition, since the 
indecent assault statute requires non-consent of the victim, while the rape statute does not, 
the court reasoned that the legislature did not intend to equate non-consensual intercourse 
with forcible compulsion.  Id.; see generally Rosemary J. Scalo, Note, What Does “No” 
Mean in Pennsylvania?, 40 VILL. L. REV. 193 (1995) (stating that the Pennsylvania 
legislature responded to this case by passing title 18, section 3124.1, making non-consensual 
intercourse a second-degree felony, as well as attempting to clarify the meaning of forcible 
compulsion in section 3101; however, no subsequent legislative action was taken to clarify 
whether or not a victim must resist despite the resistance-not-required provision). 
241 See Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1164–65.  See generally Scalo, supra note 240, at 193. 
242 State v. Schexnaider, 852 So. 2d 450, 454 (La. Ct. App. 2003). 
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testimony was further corroborated by a medical examination that revealed 
evidence of forcible penetration.  The court refused to disturb the jury’s 
determination of the credibility of testimony regarding the victim’s consent 
and instead focused its analysis on the victim’s failure to actively resist the 
attack.
243
  It ruled that the state had met its evidentiary burden and that the 
defendant’s use of force was sufficient to sustain a conviction.
244
 
While the court in Schnexnaider did not discuss the issue of consent in 
great depth, it is important to note that this ruling effectively overturned the 
appellate court’s previous decision in State v. Powell and adopted the 
dissent’s rationale.
245
  In Powell,
246
 the victim asked the defendant for a ride 
and he proceeded to drive her to a remote area and demand sexual 
intercourse.  The victim testified that he slapped her several times and told 
her that he would kill her with a gun he had under his seat if she did not 
have sex with him.  Both the victim and the defendant removed their own 
pants and he proceeded to penetrate her.  The victim had testified that she 
was scared and that she did not try to resist him.  The Louisiana Court of 
Appeal reversed the defendant’s conviction for forcible rape because the 
victim showed no resistance and was not prevented from resisting by force 
or threat of force.
247
  The court found that the victim did not consent to 
having sexual intercourse with the defendant, but the victim must have also 
been prevented from resisting the act by force or threats of physical 
violence to the point that the victim reasonably believed that resistance 
would not prevent the rape.
248
  The defendant in this case drove the victim 
to a secluded area, slapped her several times, and threatened to kill her prior 
to having sexual intercourse with her, but the victim was scared and did not 
try to resist.  The dissent disagreed with the majority’s reasoning for the 
crime of forcible rape but not for the crime of aggravated rape.
249
  The 
dissent argued that for forcible compulsion, the victim is not required to 
“actively resist”; rather, the victim must have a “reasonable belief” that 
resistance would not prevent the sexual act.
250
  The majority’s resistance 
standard was “more appropriate to that prescribed for aggravated rape.”
251
  
Thus, in Louisiana, even though resistance is not explicitly required, the 
phrase “prevented from resisting” imposes a reasonable standard of 
 
243 Id. at 457. 
244 Id. at 459. 
245 Id. at 458–59. 
246 State v. Powell, 438 So. 2d 1306 (La. Ct. App. 1983). 
247 Id. at 1307–08. 
248 Id. 
249 Id. at 1310–11 (Stoker, J., dissenting). 
250 Id. 
251 Id. at 1310. 
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resistance for forcible rape and actual resistance for aggravated rape. 
D. FAILING TO SAY NO SHOULD NOT MEAN YES 
An examination of the nation’s laws on the issue of resistance reveals 
the need for progress in this area.  Eight states still have legislation 
explicitly requiring victim resistance to rape, and six others have 
comparable language.  An additional sixteen states continue to define the 
elements of force, consent, or specific sex offenses in terms of a victim’s 
resistance.  Nearly half of all state statutes are silent as to whether or not 
resistance is required, allowing courts to assume that the common law rule 
demanding victim resistance still applies.  Today’s sex offense laws largely 
require the victim to vigorously assert non-consent or resist, rather than 
require the defendant to obtain consent before committing a sexual act. 
Court decisions can make matters worse.  The Nebraska appellate 
court’s proclamation in Gangahar—that maybe the victim’s “no did not 
really mean no”—evoked the common law view that a verbal objection to a 
sexual assault was not sufficient to establish rape.
252
  Additionally, when the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court acknowledged in Berkowitz that a victim’s 
statement that “she stated ‘no’ through the [entire] encounter” would never 
alone establish rape, it illustrated the willingness of the nation’s judiciaries 
to accept legal vestiges of yesteryear instead of abandoning the archaic 
concept of resistance in rape cases.
253
 
When a victim says “no” to a sexual overture, it clearly indicates that 
individual’s lack of consent.  Consequently, lawmakers who recognize this 
point should immediately move to amend their states’ rape laws to protect 
their citizens from unwanted sex.  Better yet, if an individual decides not to 
affirmatively agree to another’s sexual advance, the criminal law should 
punish the aggressor. 
IV. COERCION 
While many states criminalize sexual acts accomplished without the 
consent of the victim, eighteen states also protect victims who have 
consented to the sexual act only as a result of coercion.
254
  For this Article, 
 
252 State v. Gangahar, 609 N.W.2d 690, 695 (Neb. Ct. App. 2000). 
253 Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A. 2d 1161, 1164–65 (Pa. 1994). 
254 ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.470(8)(A) (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1401(5)(a) 
(2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 761(j)(1), 791 (2007 & Supp. 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 794.011(1)(a), (f), (4)(c) (West 2007); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-700 (LexisNexis 
2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6101(9) (2004 & Supp. 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 750.520d(1)(b), .520b(1)(f) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-
501(1)(a)(ii)(C) (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318(8)(a)(i), (9) (2008 & Supp. 2010); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A:1(II), :2(I)(d-e) (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2010); N.J. STAT. 
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the term coercion is defined as a “non-physical threat.”  Non-physical 
threats are verbal threats—not including those threatening physical harm to 
the victim or a third party—made to pressure the victim to submit to the 
sexual act.  Threatening to expose a secret or threatening to damage 




A. NON-PHYSICAL THREATS 
Eighteen states address non-physical threats in their sexual assault 
statutes, but to varying degrees.  This Article will divide the varying 
degrees of non-physical threats into three categories.  First, six states 
explicitly criminalize sexual acts where the perpetrator’s threats to the 
victim’s property caused the victim to submit to the sexual act.
256
  Second, 
fourteen states criminalize the use of extortion, intimidation, public 
humiliation, or coercion that is undefined but may be read to include any of 
the previously mentioned acts.  Of these fourteen states, seven criminalize 
the use of “extortion” in order to induce consent.
257
  Three states criminalize 
“coercion” as a means to induce consent, but fail to define the term.
258
  And 
three states criminalize “intimidation” or threats of “public humiliation” as 
a means of coercing the victim to consent.
259
  Finally, only three states 
contain a comprehensive list of non-physical threats, including, for 
example, threats to “expose a secret” or accuse the victim of a crime.
260
 
1. Threat of Use of Force Against Property 
In six states, it is illegal to make threats to a person’s property to 
 
ANN. §§ 2C:13-5, :14-1(j) (West 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(A) (2004 & Supp. 
2011); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-20-02(1), -04(1) (1997 & Supp. 2011); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-3-651(b) (2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-501(1) (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-
406(4) (LexisNexis 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(a) (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
61(A)(i) (2009). 
255 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 761(j)(1), 791. 
256 ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.470(8)(A) (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1401(5)(a) 
(2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 761(j)(1), 791; HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-700; IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 18-6101(9); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:13-5, 2C:14-1(j). 
257 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(1)(f); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520d(1)(b), 
.520b(1)(f); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A:1(II), :2(I)(d)–(e); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-
10(A); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-651(b); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-501(1); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-5-406(4). 
258 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318(8)(a)(i), (9); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(a); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 18.2-61(A)(i). 
259 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-700; N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-20-02(1), -04(1); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(A)(i). 
260 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 761(j)(1), 791; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6101(9); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 2C:13-5, :14-1(j). 
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obtain the victim’s consent to a sexual act.
261
  For example, Alaska 
criminalizes sexual contact where the perpetrator acts “without consent” of 
the victim.
262
  The statute defines “without consent” as any situation in 
which the victim “is coerced by the threat of use of force against a person or 
property.”
263
  Although six states criminalize threats of force against 
property as a way to pressure the victim to consent, most of these states fail 
to define “coercion by threat or use of force against property.”
264
  
Therefore, it is unclear from the statutory language what a “threat of force 
against property” entails. 
2. Extortion, Intimidation, Public Humiliation, or Undefined “Coercion” 
Some states utilize vague or broad statutory language in order to 
criminalize coercion.  These states use terms such as “extortion,” 
“intimidation,” or “coercion” without defining them.  In seven states, it is a 
crime to use “extortion” to procure the victim’s consent.
265
  In none of these 
seven states, however, do the statutes further define what constitutes 
“extortion.”  For example, Florida criminalizes sexual acts accomplished by 
threats of “retaliation,” which include “threats of future physical 
punishment, kidnapping, false imprisonment or forcible confinement, or 
extortion,” but the word “extortion” is not defined in the rape statute.
266
  
Three states criminalize threats of public humiliation or intimidation.
267
  For 
example, North Dakota defines coercion as exploiting “fear or anxiety 
through intimidation, compulsion, domination, or control with the intent to 
compel conduct or compliance.”
268
  Once again, however, the statute fails to 
offer guidance on the definitions of intimidation and similar terms.  Finally, 
 
261 ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.470(8)(A) (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1401(5)(a) 
(2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 761(j)(1), 791; HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-700; IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 18-6101(9) (2004 & Supp. 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:13-5, :14-1(j) (West 
2005). 
262 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.410. 
263 ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.470(8)(A). 
264 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1401(5)(a); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 791; HAW. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 707-700; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6101(9); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-
501(1)(a)(ii)(C) (2010). 
265 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(1)(f) (West 2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§§ 750.520d(1)(b), .520b(1)(f)  (West 2004 & Supp. 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-
A:1(II), :2(I)(d)–(e) (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(A) (2004 
& Supp. 2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-651(b) (2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-501(1) 
(2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(4) (LexisNexis 2008). 
266 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(1)(f). 
267 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 707-700, -731 to -732 (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2010); 
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-20-02(1), -04(1) (1997 & Supp. 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
61(A)(i) (2009). 
268 N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-02(1). 
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3. Comprehensive Statutes 
Outside the fifteen states that criminalize threats of force to property, 
threats of extortion, intimidation, public humiliation, or undefined coercion, 
three states include more comprehensive lists of specific acts constituting 
acts of coercion.
270
  Delaware, for example, has one of the most 
comprehensive statutes criminalizing coercion.  It defines coercion as one 
of seven acts used to “compel” or “induce” the victim to engage in a sexual 
act.
271
  In particular these include: (1) a threat to accuse the victim or 
anyone else of a crime, (2) a threat to expose a secret, (3) a threat to testify 
falsely against any person or refuse to testify against any person, and (4) a 
variety of other acts meant to cause harm to the victim or another person.
272
  




B. CASE LAW 
There is a distinct lack of case law involving coercion—significantly 
less than the amount involving force.  Many states that include “coercion” 
language in their sex crime statutes do not have any case law on topic.
274
  
Other states do have case law on this topic, but conflate coercion with 
 
269 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501(1)(a)(ii)(C) (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318(8)(a)(i), 
(9) (2008 & Supp. 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(a) (2009). 
270 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 761(j)(1), 791 (2007 & Supp. 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. 
§ 18-6101(9) (2004 & Supp. 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:13-5, :14-1(j) (West 2005). 
271 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 774. 
272 Id.  The Delaware statute provides that sexual extortion occurs when: 
[t]he person intentionally compels or induces another person to engage in any sexual act 
involving contact, penetration or intercourse with the person or another or others by means of 
instilling in the victim a fear that, if such sexual act is not performed, the defendant or another 
will: (1) Cause physical injury to anyone; (2) Cause damage to property; (3) Engage in other 
conduct constituting a crime; (4) Accuse anyone of a crime or cause criminal charges to be 
instituted against anyone; (5) Expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false, 
intending to subject anyone to hatred, contempt or ridicule; (6) Falsely testify or provide 
information or withhold testimony or information with respect to another’s legal claim or 
defense; or (7) Perform any other act which is calculated to harm another person materially with 
respect to the other person’s health, safety, business, calling, career, financial condition, 
reputation or personal relationships. 
Id. 
273 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-5. 
274 Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, 
Montana, Ohio, and Vermont fall into this category. 
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deception or abuse of authority.
275
  Still other states only have coercion case 
law dealing with minors, force, or threats of force against either the victim 
or a third person.
276
 
Although many state statutes separate sex crimes involving coercion 
from those where the defendant uses forcible compulsion, courts often 
conflate coercion with forcible compulsion in practice.  For example, in 
New York, the elements of “forcible compulsion” for sex crimes
277
 
correspond to the definition of coercion.
278
  However, there are other 
elements of “coercion” that would not be sufficient to find “forcible 
compulsion” for sex offenses, such as exposing the victim’s prior 
misconduct and threatening to cause another person harm by abusing one’s 
public office.
279
  Thus, in New York, where there is sufficient evidence of 
coercion by physical threat, there is necessarily sufficient evidence of 
“forcible compulsion.” 
For example, in People v. Seifert,
280
 the trial court dismissed the 
charge of first-degree coercion as “repugnant.”
281
  The victim alleged that 
the defendant, a police officer, accepted sex from the victim, a passenger in 
a motor vehicle, with the understanding that the officer would not give the 
driver a ticket.
282
  The court found that the evidence was sufficient to 
sustain the indictment by citing previous cases in which sufficient evidence 
of force was found where the victims complied out of fear.
283
  However, 
because the grand jury found that the evidence was insufficient to support 
the element of forcible compulsion for the sex crimes charged, the court 
 
275 See, e.g., People v. Crippen, 617 N.W.2d 760 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000); People v. Regts, 
555 N.W.2d 896 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Day, 501 N.W.2d 649 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1993). 
276 Kentucky, Maine, New Jersey, New Mexico, and North Dakota are in this category. 
277 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00(8) (McKinney 2009 & Supp. 2011). 
278 §§ 135.60, .65(1) (McKinney2009) (“A person is guilty of coercion . . . when he or 
she compels or induces a person to engage in conduct which the latter has a legal right to 
abstain from engaging in . . . by means of instilling in him or her a fear that, if the demand is 
not complied with, the actor or another will . . . cause physical injury to a person . . . .”). 
279 William C. Donnino, Practice Commentary, NY PENAL LAW, § 135.60 (McKinney 
2009). 
280 People v. Seifert, 727 N.Y.S.2d 607 (Cnty. Ct. 2001). 
281 Id. at 611–12. 
282 Id. at 608. 
283 Id. at 608–09 (citing People v. Bennett, 79 N.Y.2d 464 (1992) (finding sufficient 
evidence of forcible compulsion where the victim acquiesced to the police officer’s demands 
for sex after being pulled over for driving while intoxicated because she was “terrified” and 
felt that any attempt at escape would be futile); People v. Smolen, 564 N.Y.S.2d 105, 106 
(App. Div. 1990) (finding sufficient evidence of forcible compulsion where the victim 
testified that she was “frozen in fear” and complied with the defendant’s requests because 
she did not want to die)). 
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was forced to dismiss the coercion charge.  This was the only possible 
outcome because the definition of “forcible compulsion” and the definition 
of “coercion” were the same.
284
 
Furthermore, some states’ statutes criminalize sex resulting from 
“intimidation.”  At first glance, intimidation looks as though it may include 
coercion; however, there is a scarcity of case law in these states as to what 
constitutes intimidation.  An exception is Virginia, where the judiciary has 
distinguished “intimidation” from threats of force.
285
 
It is apparent that the legislative intent, in amending the statute to include a 
prohibition against sexual intercourse with a woman against her will by threat or 
intimidation, was to expand the parameters of rape.  There is a difference between 
threat and intimidation.  As used in the statute, threat means expression of an intention 
to do bodily harm.  Intimidation may occur without threats.  Intimidation, as used in 
the statute, means putting a victim in fear of bodily harm by exercising such 
domination and control of her as to overcome her mind and overbear her will.  
Intimidation may be caused by the imposition of psychological pressure on one who, 
under the circumstances, is vulnerable and susceptible to such pressure.
286
 
Thus, the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the defendant’s rape 
conviction in Sutton v. Commonwealth, where a defendant did not display a 
weapon or verbally threaten his physically handicapped fifteen-year-old 
niece, but did threaten to return her to her physically abusive father if she 
did not agree to have sexual intercourse.
287
  In that same case, the 
defendant’s wife was also convicted as a principal in the second degree for 
the rape actually perpetrated by her husband; the wife exerted “relentless 
pressure” by stating that the victim would be returned to her abusive father 
if she did not agree to the defendant’s advances.  In addition, the 
defendant’s wife purchased birth-control pills for the victim and suggested 
she had a bad attitude because she thought she was “too good to go to bed 
with [her] uncle.”  These actions established that the wife had “embarked 




On the other hand, in Sabol v. Commonwealth, the Virginia Court of 
Appeals concluded a defendant had not used intimidation prior to having 
sex with his alleged victim, who was thirty-one years old at the time of 
trial.
289
  In that case, where the victim described the defendant as like a 
 
284 Seifert, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 611–12. 
285 See Sutton v. Commonwealth, 324 S.E.2d 665, 669–70 (Va. 1985). 
286 Id. 
287 Id. at 670–71. 
288 Id. at 671–72. 
289 Sabol v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 533 (Va. Ct. App. 2001).  However, the 
defendant was properly convicted of a different count of rape on a different date where he 
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father to her, the defendant’s earlier threat to have the victim prosecuted for 
the theft of $700 from her mother’s bank account, as well as his 
contributing to the victim’s fear of losing her work-free lifestyle if she did 
not submit to defendant’s sexual advances, did not amount to intimidation 
for purposes of rape.
290
 
A few states have prosecuted defendants accused of coercing victims 
to engage in sexual contact or penetration without a showing of force or 
threats of force.  New Hampshire, for example, recognizes an offense of 
sexual assault induced by threats of economic retaliation.  In Lovely v. 
Cunningham, the defendant threatened the victim with the loss of the 
victim’s job, kicking the victim out of his home (where the victim was 
renting), and vaguely “keeping [him] out of trouble with the police,” unless 
the victim performed sexual acts with the defendant.
291
  The appellate court 
affirmed the New Hampshire jury conviction for felonious sexual assault, 
regardless of the lack of physical threats.
292
 
C. COERCION OF ANY STRIPE MUST BE CONDEMNED 
Although most states have some provision that criminalizes sexual 
relations based on non-physical coercion in their statutes, many provisions 
lack teeth.  For example, some states use the term coercion or extortion but 
fail to define the term or provide the authorities with an ascertainable 
standard of guilt.
293
  Without a clear definition of the parameters of a law, 
courts and prosecutors cannot adequately enforce it.  Additionally, some 
states criminalize the use of coercion to obtain consent, but make the crime 
a low-level misdemeanor rather than a felony or more serious charge.
294
  
This suggests that the legislatures in those states are not taking a crime 
involving coercion seriously. 
The lack of convictions also indicates that states are failing to protect 
their citizens.  The case law is very scarce in this area, showing that 
defendants accused of these crimes are either: (1) never prosecuted, (2) 
acquitted, or (3) if convicted, almost uniformly not pursuing an appeal—an 
unlikely proposition.  Outlawing non-physical coercion in a statute is 
meaningless unless offenders are prosecuted and convicted.  Therefore, 
although most states have language in their statutes prohibiting the use of 
 
had pushed the victim down a hallway toward a bedroom where he had sex with her.  Id. at 
537. 
290 Id. at 537–38. 
291 Lovely v. Cunningham, 796 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1986). 
292 Id. 
293 See supra notes 256–260 and accompanying text. 
294 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-733 (misdemeanor sexual assault in the fourth 
degree occurs where the accused used “compulsion” to accomplish a sexual contact). 
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coercion in the context of sexual relations, many of those provisions are 
essentially meaningless. 
V. POSITIONS OF AUTHORITY 
A majority of states have statutes that criminalize sexual conduct 
between a defendant in a position of authority and a subordinate victim.
295
  
“Position of authority” refers to any relationship in which the defendant has 
an opportunity to assert his dominant status over the victim.  Common 
examples of relationships involving positions of authority include those 
between prison employees and inmates, doctors and patients, clergymen 
and members of the parish, nursing home employees and patients, and 
teachers and students. 
This Part divides the statutory provisions into two categories.  The first 
Section discusses “specific statutes” that criminalize sexual conduct 
between defendants and victims based solely on named classes of 
relationships.  The second Section examines “broad statutes” that 
criminalize any situation in which a defendant perpetrates sexual conduct 
by asserting the power of his dominant position over the victim.  Most of 
the broad statutes include a provision prohibiting a person from asserting 
one’s authority to commit a sexual act and also name specific position-of-
authority relationships.  For purposes of this discussion, a statute is 
 
295 ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.410, .240, .425, .427 (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
1419 (2010 & Supp. 2011); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-126 (2006 & Supp. 2011); CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 261 (West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-405.5 (2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 53a-70 (West 2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-5.1 
(West 2009 & Supp. 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-731 (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 
2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-919, -6110 (2004 & Supp. 2011); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§§ 709.15–.16 (West 2003 & Supp. 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-5503, -5512 (West, 
Westlaw through 2010 Legis. Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 510.060, .090, .130 
(LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 255-A (2006 & Supp. 
2010); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW. §§ 3-308, -316 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2010); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520b (West 2004 & Supp. 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.344–
345 (West 2009 & Supp. 2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65 (2006 & Supp. 2011); MO. REV. 
STAT. § 566.086 (West Supp. 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501 (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. 
§ 28-322.04 (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2 to :4 (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2010); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2 (West 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11(E) (2004 & Supp. 
2011); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(3)(e)–(g) (McKinney 2009 & Supp. 2011); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 14.27.7 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-06 (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2907.03(5)–(7), (10)–(11) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 1111(A)(7) 
(West 2002 & Supp. 2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.452 (2009); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 3124.2 (West 2000 & Supp. 2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655 (2003 & Supp. 2010); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7.6, -27 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-501(1) (2010); TEX. 
PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011 (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-412 (LexisNexis 2008); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3257 (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.4 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 9A.44.050 (West 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(2) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010). 
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classified as a broad statute if it contains any provision prohibiting a general 
assertion of authority to obtain a sexual act.  Some of the broad and specific 
statutes contain requirements beyond merely a position of authority, making 
them “hybrid statutes.” Hybrid statutes essentially provide for 
circumstances in addition to the particular authoritative relationship of the 
defendant to the victim.
296
 
A. POSITION-OF-AUTHORITY STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
To date, forty-two states have statutes criminalizing sexual activity 
when the defendant is in a position of authority over the victim.  Only eight 
states have no position-of-authority statutes at all.
297
 
1. Specific Statutes 
Of the forty-two states that have position-of-authority statutes, thirty-
eight focus on specific lists of authority figures and prohibit them from 
having sexual relations with any person under their supervision.  Under 
these statutes, only sexual conduct between specified parties is illegal.  The 
most common relationship mentioned is that of an inmate in a correctional 
facility and an employee at that facility.
298
  This includes prison guards and 
prisoners, juvenile offenders and correctional officers, and inmates at 
psychiatric detention centers and center employees.  Some states also 




Many states also prohibit medical professionals from engaging in 
sexual conduct with their patients.
300
  Statutes covering medical 
professionals apply to conduct of a sexual nature or conduct involved in 
medical testing that is done with the intent to create arousal.  
 
296 See infra notes 317–318 and accompanying text. 
297 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 761–780 (2007 & Supp. 2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-
42-4-1 (West 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:41–:43.3 (2007 & Supp. 2011); MASS. ANN. 
LAWS ch. 265, § 22 (LexisNexis 2010); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.366 (LexisNexis 2006 
& Supp. 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-2 (2002); TENN. CODE ANN. 39-13-501(1) (2010) 
(allowing a position-of-authority exception only for minors); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-3 
to -7 (LexisNexis 2010). 
298 Of the states that have specific position-of-authority statutes, only Missouri, North 
Carolina, and South Carolina fail to include inmates as a protected class.  See MO. ANN. 
STAT. § 566.086 (West 1999 & Supp. 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14.27.7; S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-3-655. 
299 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520c(i)–(k). 
300 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 601 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-5.1; IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 18-919 (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5503; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A:2 
to :4; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(e)–(g). 
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“Psychotherapists”
301
 or “medical care providers”
302
 and patients are also 
often specifically mentioned in statutes.  Another common category covers 
conduct between school personnel and students.  These provisions can fill 
the gap when a student is over the age of majority but still in school.
303
  For 
example, in Oklahoma, a sixteen-year-old can legally consent to sex.
304
  
The Oklahoma position-of-authority statute, however, criminalizes sexual 
conduct between a student ages sixteen to eighteen and a school 
employee.
305
  Some statutes provide for a grace period; for example, New 
Mexico prohibits sexual conduct between psychotherapists and patients 
during treatment or for a year after treatment concluded.
306
 
Other relationships commonly covered by statute include members of 
the clergy and the people they advise,
307
 employees of the Department of 
Health and people under its supervision,
308
 and police officers and 
detainees.
309
  Some states have unique or uncommon categories in their 
statutes.  For instance, Minnesota criminalizes sexual conduct between 
special transportation service employees and their passengers and between 
massage therapists and their clients.
310
 
2. Broad Statutes 
Broad statutes are those that prohibit sexual conduct involving a 
defendant with authority over a victim, but do not specify a type of 
relationship.  Most broad statutes also have specific components: they 
criminalize sexual conduct when a position-of-authority relationship exists 
but also prevent any exploitation of a position of authority by the 
defendant.
311
  Four states have broad statutes regarding positions of 
 
301 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-5.1; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-9-10(A)(5), -11(F) 
(2004 & Supp. 2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-22-27 to 29 (2006). 
302 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1418 (2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-919. 
303 See Teacher Acquitted in Sex Case, CNN.COM (Dec. 11, 2009), 
http://www.cnn.com/video/#/video/crime/2009/12/10/pn.teacher.student.legal.sex.cnn. 
304 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111(A)(1) (2002 & Supp. 2011). 
305 § 1111(A)(8). 
306 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(A)(5) (2004 & Supp. 2011). 
307 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-126 (2006 & Supp. 2011). 
308 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-322.04 (2008).  People under departmental supervision may 
include youth in foster care or adults who have been civilly committed. 
309 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111(A)(7); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.452 (2009). 
310 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.344–345 (West 2009 & Supp. 2011); see also WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 9A.44.050 (West 2009) (transporation service employees). 
311 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-126 (2006 & Supp. 2011); CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 261(a)(7) (West 2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(5)–(7), (10)–(11) (West 2006 & 
Supp. 2011). 
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authority.
312
  For example, Arkansas’s statute prohibits sexual conduct 
when the defendant is a “mandated reporter” who is in one of a wide variety 
of positions of authority over the victim and the defendant uses that position 
to engage in the conduct.
313
 
Of the four states that have broad statutes, all specify certain positions 
of authority.
314
  These statutes also provide general provisions criminalizing 
any exploitation of authority over a victim.  For example, Michigan’s 
statute criminalizes sexual conduct between a teacher and a student and 
makes it illegal for a defendant to use a position of authority to compel a 
victim to submit.
315
  As discussed below, states with broad statutes typically 




3. Hybrid Statutes 
Hybrid statutes prohibit sexual conduct between a defendant in a 
position of authority and a victim who is subject to that authority, but add 
other requirements.
317
  For example, some statutes require that the 
defendant holds a position of authority and the victim lacks full capacity.  
Examples include Michigan, which criminalizes sexual conduct between a 
defendant in a position of authority and a victim subject to that authority 





Consent is not a complicated issue under position-of-authority statutes.  
While some do not explicitly provide that the defendant will never have a 
defense if the victim consented,
319
 most clearly provide that a victim’s 
consent is never valid when the victim and defendant are in a position-of-
 
312 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 510.060, .090 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2011); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520b (West 2004 & Supp. 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2 (West 
2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.050 (West 2009). 
313 ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-14-126, 12-18-402. A “mandated reporter” includes a wide 
variety of supervisory positions including a domestic abuse advocate, resident intern, social 
worker, and teacher.  § 12-18-402. 
314 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520b; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2; TEX. PENAL CODE 
ANN. § 22.011 (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.050. 
315 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520b. 
316 See discussion infra notes 322–339 and accompanying text. 
317 § 750.520b. 
318 Id. 
319 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1419 (2010 & Supp. 2011); N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 130.05(e)–(g) (McKinney 2009 & Supp. 2011). 
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authority relationship.
320
  However, in four states the position-of-authority 
statutes include marital exemptions.
321
 
B. CASE LAW 
It appears that case law interpreting position-of-authority statutes is 
fairly scarce.  The most significant cases concern the broad statutes, and the 
most important issue by far is consent.  This Section discusses cases that 
interpret the statutes. 
1. Psychotherapist–Patient Cases 
Courts have held that statutes criminalizing sexual conduct when a 
defendant is in a position of authority do not violate the Constitution, even 
when they exclude consent as a defense.
322
  In Ferguson v. People, the 
Supreme Court of Colorado held that psychotherapists and patients did not 
have a fundamental right to engage in sexual intercourse.
323
  The court 
refused to hold that the position-of-authority statute criminalizing that 
conduct was overbroad.
324
  The court upheld the statute and noted the 
importance of protecting “vulnerable” psychotherapy patients.
325
  The court 
further stated that “psychotherapist–client sex is the very antithesis of 
effective and responsible psychotherapy.”
326
 
The Missouri Court of Appeals echoed this disapproval of sexual 
conduct between psychotherapists and patients by virtue of their 
relationship.  In State v. Spencer, the Missouri court held that the position 
of authority the defendant therapist held over his victims was significant, 
even though the state had no position-of-authority statute.
327
  Missouri 
requires the state to prove “reasonable resistance” on the part of the victim 
to establish the defendant used “forcible compulsion”;
328
 however, the court 
reasoned, the fact that the victims were patients of the defendant affected 
 
320 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 163.452 (2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-412 (LexisNexis 
2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(2) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010). 
321 IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-919, -6110 (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5512 (West, 
Westlaw through 2010 Legis. Sess.); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 255-A (2006 & Supp. 
2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.344–345 (West 2009 & Supp. 2011). 
322 Ferguson v. People, 824 P.2d 803 (Colo. 1992). 
323 Id. at 809–10. 
324 Id. 
325 Id. at 811. 
326 Id. at 810 (“[T]here are absolutely no circumstances which permit a psychiatrist to 
engage in sex with his patient.” (quoting Alan A. Stone, The Legal Implications of Sexual 
Activity Between Psychiatrist and Patient, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1138, 1139 (1976))). 
327 State v. Spencer, 50 S.W.3d 869, 874 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001). 
328 MO. REV. STAT. § 556.061 (West 2009 & Supp. 2011). 
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their capacity to resist.
329
  The court said that the defendant’s “position of 




2. Prison Employee–Prisoner Cases 
The most common type of position-of-authority statute criminalizes 
sexual conduct between persons in a correctional or detention facility and 
an employee at the facility.  Courts have often interpreted these statutes as 
precluding all sexual contact between the inmates and employees, 
regardless of consent.  In State v. Cardus,
331
 a female prisoner consented to 
perform oral sex on a male guard.
332
  The court held that her consent was 
not valid both because the guard used his position to pressure her and 
because consent can never be effective in that situation.
333
 
3. Teacher–Student Cases 
In Chase v. State,
334
 the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that a teacher 
who engaged in sexual conduct with her student could not be found guilty 
of sexual assault when the student was (1) over the age of majority, (2) no 
longer taking a class from the teacher, and (3) not subject to the teacher’s 
control or authority.
335
  The court held that the statute did not prohibit 
consensual sexual conduct between teachers and adult students.
336
  
Therefore, consent is a defense to sexual assault for teacher–student 
relationships under certain circumstances in Georgia. 
C. PROTECTING SEXUAL DIGNITY FROM ABUSES OF POWER 
Though some states have comprehensive statues governing a wide 
variety of persons in supervisory positions, a substantial number of states 
cover only a few categories of individuals in positions of authority.  One 
notable category omitted from every statutory position-of-authority offense 
is employers.  Few people have a greater capacity to compel compliance 
with sexual overtures than bosses.  While civil suits and employment 
regulations may potentially provide a legal remedy for the victim, this does 
not excuse the lawmaker’s failure to criminalize that conduct. 
 
329 Spencer, 50 S.W.3d at 874. 
330 Id. 
331 State v. Cardus, 949 P.2d 1047 (Haw. Ct. App. 1997). 
332 Id. at 1050. 
333 Id. at 1055. 
334 Chase v. State, 681 S.E.2d 116 (Ga. 2009). 
335 Id. 
336 Id. 
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Further, the defense of consent should not be available to a perpetrator 
who takes sexual gratification from one in a subservient position, as is the 
case in some states.  Position-of-authority sex crimes should provide the 
same consent defense framework as statutory rape provisions, namely, a 
strict liability approach making it clear that each American state mandates 
zero tolerance of such conduct. 
VI. DECEPTION 
This Part considers a defendant’s use of deception to procure consent 
or accomplish a sexual act.  It analyzes state court decisions that have 
interpreted current deception provisions, typically limited in their 
application.  It argues that most states do not specifically proscribe a 
defendant’s use of deception to procure consent or accomplish a sexual act 
outside of instances of positions of authority or coercion.  This Part further 
argues that deception used to achieve sexual gratification undermines a 
victim’s consent, violates public policy, and should be considered a basis 
for a criminal sanction with a graduated penalty structure reflecting its 
lesser culpability level. 
Section A reviews all fifty states’ current sex offense statutes for 
deception.
337
  It focuses on instances in which a defendant’s deception as to 
the nature of the act, a defendant’s identity, or any other deceptive 
circumstance that is sufficient to prove that (1) a victim did not consent to 
the sexual act, (2) a defendant used force, or (3) the deception amounts to 
conduct constituting a specific offense.  This Section divides state statutes 
into four categories.  The first category includes statutes that deem a 
victim’s consent to a sexual act ineffective due to a defendant’s use of 
deception when considering the states’ statutory definitions of “consent” or 
“without consent.”
338
  The second category reviews statutes that proscribe a 
defendant’s use of deception as conduct constituting a specific offense.
339
  
The third category describes a statute proscribing a defendant’s use of 
deception as a circumstance constituting force.
340
  The fourth category 
discusses statutes that penalize specific instances of deception, such as 
spousal deception, medical deception, therapeutic deception, and any 
unique form of deception.
341
  Section B discusses state court decisions 




337 See infra notes 343–403 and accompanying text. 
338 See infra notes 345–354 and accompanying text. 
339 See infra notes 355–359 and accompanying text. 
340 See infra notes 360–361 and accompanying text. 
341 See infra notes 362–403 and accompanying text. 
342 See infra notes 404–449 and accompanying text. 
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A. STATUS OF DECEPTION IN STATES’ STATUTES AS PROOF OF LACK 
OF CONSENT, FORCE, OR AS A CIRCUMSTANCE OF A SPECIFIC SEX 
OFFENSE 
The defendant’s use of “deception” to procure a victim’s consent or to 
accomplish the sexual act is not proscribed in most states.  In a majority of 
states, deception is not mentioned in sex offense statutes.
343
  While some 
states specifically proscribe deception, only one provides a definition of 
“deception.”
344
  In most cases, states proscribe a specific type of deception, 
such as spousal deception, medical deception, or therapeutic deception, or 
proscribe behavior comparable to deception (although somewhat more 
limiting), such as concealment, surprise, fraud, artifice, or pretense.  
Oftentimes, these specific types of deception are situational, such as a 
doctor treating a patient for any reason other than a bona fide medical 
purpose. 
1. Deception and Consent 
Five states define “without consent” or “consent” so that a victim’s 
consent to a sexual act is ineffective if a defendant uses deception to obtain 
it.
345
  In Arizona, a victim does not consent to a sexual act if “the victim is 
intentionally deceived as to the nature of the act” or “the victim is 
intentionally deceived to erroneously believe that the person is the victim’s 
spouse.”
346
  In Hawaii, if a victim consents to a sexual act, it is “ineffective 
consent” if it is “induced by . . . deception.”
347
  In Montana, a victim does 
not consent to a sexual act if a victim is “incapable of consent” because the 
victim is “overcome by deception . . . or surprise.”
348
  In addition, Montana 
contains the only definition of “deception” in all fifty states.
349
  In Utah, a 
 
343 Twenty-seven states do not criminally prohibit the use of deception to achieve a 
sexual gratification in any way. 
344 See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(18) (2010). 
345 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1401(5)(c)–(d) (2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-
235(4) (LexisNexis 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501(1)(a)(ii)(C); NEB. REV. STAT. 
§ 28-318(8)(a)(iv) (2008 & Supp. 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(3) (LexisNexis 
2008). 
346 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1401(5)(c)–(d). 
347 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-235(4). 
348 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501(1)(a)(ii)(C). 
349 § 45-2-101(18). 
“Deception” means knowingly to: 
a) create or confirm in another an impression that is false and that the offender does not believe 
to be true; 
(b) fail to correct a false impression that the offender previously has created or confirmed; 
(c) prevent another from acquiring information pertinent to the disposition of the property 
involved; 
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sexual act is without the consent of a victim when the defendant is able to 
“overcome the victim through concealment or by the element of 
surprise.”
350
  Finally, in Nebraska, a victim does not consent to a sexual act 
when the victim is deceived as to a defendant’s “identity” or the “nature or 
purpose” of a defendant’s act.
351
 
In two states, while deception is not included in the definition of 
“consent” or “without consent,” a victim’s consent procured by deception 
provides a basis for proving specific offenses.
352
  In Alabama, a male 
defendant commits the crime of sexual misconduct if he has sexual 
intercourse with a female victim with the victim’s consent if the consent 
was obtained by the use of “fraud or artifice.”
353
  In California, a defendant 
commits the crime of unlawful sexual intercourse when a victim’s consent 




2. Deception and Circumstances Constituting Specific Sex Offenses 
In four states, a defendant’s use of deception gives rise to a specific 
offense.
355
  As stated, in Alabama and California, consent is invalid if 
procured by “fraud or artifice” and “false or fraudulent representation or 
pretense,” respectively.
356
  However, in California, a defendant also 
commits the crime of rape when the victim is unconscious of the nature of 
the act due to the defendant’s “fraud in fact.”
357
  In Rhode Island, a 
defendant commits the crime of first-degree sexual assault when a 
defendant, through “concealment or by the element of surprise, is able to 
 
(d) sell or otherwise transfer or encumber property without disclosing a lien, adverse claim, or 
other legal impediment to the enjoyment of the property, whether the impediment is or is not of 
value or is or is not a matter of official record; or 
(e) promise performance that the offender does not intend to perform or knows will not be 
performed.  Failure to perform, standing alone, is not evidence that the offender did not intend to 
perform. 
Id. 
350 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(3) (circumstances of sexual offenses against the victim 
without consent of the victim). 
351 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318(8)(a)(iv) (2008 & Supp. 2010). 
352 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2005); CAL. PENAL CODE § 266(c) (West 
2008). 
353 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(1). 
354 CAL. PENAL CODE § 266(c) (West 2008). 
355 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(1) (sexual misconduct); CAL. PENAL CODE § 266(c) 
(unlawful sexual intercourse); CAL. PENAL CODE § 264 (West 2008 & Supp. 2011) (rape); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-2(3) (2002) (first-degree sexual assault); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-
503(a)(4) (2010) (rape); § 39-13-505(a)(4) (sexual battery). 
356 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(1); CAL. PENAL CODE § 266(c). 
357 CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(4)(C). 
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overcome the victim.”
358
  Finally, in Tennessee, a defendant commits the 
crime of rape or sexual battery when the sexual intercourse or sexual 
contact, respectively, is “accomplished by fraud.”
359
 
3. Deception and Force 
Michigan is the only state that views a defendant’s use of deception as 
constituting force.  In Michigan, a defendant commits the crimes of first-, 
second-, third-, and fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct when force or 
coercion is used to accomplish the sexual act.
360
  In each of these 
prohibitions, one circumstance under which “force or coercion is used to 
accomplish the [act]” is when “the [defendant], through concealment or by 
the element of surprise, is able to overcome the victim.”
361
 
4. Specific Circumstances of Deception 
Sixteen states have codified specific circumstances of deception that 
may establish that the victim did not consent, that the defendant used force, 
or that the defendant committed a specific offense.
362
  The most common 
examples of specific circumstances of deception are impersonating the 
victim’s spouse,
363
 engaging in a sexual act for other than a bona fide 
medical purpose,
364




358 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-2(3). 
359 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-503(a)(4) (rape); § 39-13-505(a)(4) (sexual battery). 
360 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520b(1)(d)(ii) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011) (criminal 
sexual conduct in the first degree); § 750.520c(1)(d)(ii) (criminal sexual conduct in the 
second degree); § 750.520d(1)(b) (criminal sexual conduct in the third degree); 
§ 750.520e(1)(b) (criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree). 
361 §§ 750.520b(1)(f)(v), .520c(1)(d)(ii), .520d(1)(b), .520e(1)(b)(v). 
362 See infra notes 363–366. 
363 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-401(5)(d) (2010); CAL. PENAL CODE § 264 (West 2008 
& Supp. 2011) (rape); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402(1)(c) (2011) (sexual assault); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 14:43(a)(3) (2007 & Supp. 2011) (simple rape); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
2907.03(4) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011) (sexual battery); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(7) 
(LexisNexis 2008) (circumstances of sexual offenses against the victim without consent of 
the victim); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303 (2011) (sexual assault in the second degree); § 6-2-
304 (sexual assault in the third degree). 
364 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402(1)(g) (sexual assault); § 18-3-404(1)(g) (unlawful 
sexual contact); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53(a)-71(a)(7) (West 2007) (sexual assault in the 
second degree); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5503(a)(4) (West, Westlaw through 2010 Legis. 
Sess.) (rape); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 17-A, § 253(3)(A) (2006 & Supp. 2010) (gross sexual 
assault); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.520b(1)(f)(iv), .520c(1)(d)(ii), .520d(1)(b), 
.520e(1)(b)(iv); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.344(1)(k) (West 2009 & Supp. 2011) (criminal 
sexual conduct in the third degree); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(12) (circumstances of 
sexual offenses against the victim without consent of the victim); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-
303(vi) (sexual assault in the second degree); § 6-2-304(vi) (sexual assault in the third 
degree). 
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In addition to these three common categories of specific instances in which 




i. Spousal Deception 
Seven states prohibit impersonating a victim’s spouse and make that 
conduct either a specific offense or proof that the victim did not consent to 
the sexual act.
367
  In California, Colorado, Louisiana, Ohio, and Wyoming, 
deceiving a victim by pretending to be the victim’s spouse amounts to a sex 
offense.
368
  In California, a defendant commits the crime of rape when a 
victim “submits under the belief that the [defendant] is the victim’s spouse, 
and this belief is induced by any artifice, pretense, or concealment practiced 
by the accused, with intent to induce the belief.”
369
  In Colorado, an actor 
commits the crime of sexual assault when “the actor knows that the victim 
submits erroneously, believing the actor to be the victim’s spouse.”
370
  In 
Louisiana, a defendant commits the crime of simple rape when the “female 
victim submits under the belief that the [defendant] is her husband and such 
belief is intentionally induced by any artifice, pretense, or concealment 
practiced by the [defendant].”
371
  In Ohio, a defendant commits the crime of 
sexual battery when the “[defendant] knows that the [victim] submits 
because the [victim] mistakenly identifies the [defendant] as the [victim’s] 
 
365 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-405.5 (2011) (sexual assault on a client and aggravated 
sexual assault on a client); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53(a)-71(a)(6) (sexual assault in the 
second degree); § 53(a)-73(a)(4) (sexual assault in the fourth degree); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-
6-5.1(c) (West 2009 & Supp. 2010) (sexual assault by a practitioner of psychotherapy 
against a patient); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5503(a)(4) (rape); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.344(i)–
(j) (criminal sexual conduct in the third degree); § 609.345(i)–(j) (criminal sexual conduct in 
the fourth degree); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(10) (sexual battery); § 2907.06(5) 
(sexual imposition); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-28 (2006) (sexual contact by a 
psychotherapist); § 22-22-29 (sexual penetration by a psychotherapist). 
366 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.60(a)(7) (West Supp. 2011) (aggravated criminal 
sexual abuse); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1)(a) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011) (rape); 
§ 2907.05(A)(2) (gross sexual imposition); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1120 (West 2002) 
(seduction under promise of marriage). 
367 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1401(5)(d); CAL. PENAL CODE § 264 (West 2008 & 
Supp. 2011) (rape); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402(1)(c) (sexual assault); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 14:43(a)(3) (simple rape); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03 (4) (sexual battery); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(7) (circumstances of sexual offenses against the victim without 
consent of the victim); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303 (sexual assault in the second degree); 
§ 6-2-304 (sexual assault in the third degree). 
368 See infra notes 369–373. 
369 CAL. PENAL CODE § 264 (rape). 
370 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402(1)(c) (2011) (sexual assault). 
371 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43(a)(3) (2007 & Supp. 2011) (simple rape). 
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spouse.”
372
  Finally, in Wyoming, a defendant commits the crimes of 
second- and third-degree sexual assault when the “[defendant] knows or 
should reasonably know that the victim submits erroneously believing the 
[defendant] to be the victim’s spouse.”
373
 
In Arizona and Utah, proof that a defendant deceived a victim by 
impersonating the victim’s spouse is sufficient to establish that the victim 
did not consent to the act.
374
  Arizona deems consent lacking when “the 
victim is intentionally deceived to erroneously believe that the [defendant] 
is the victim’s spouse.”
375
  In Utah, a sexual act is deemed to be without the 
victim’s consent when “the [defendant] knows that the victim submits or 




ii. Medical Deception 
Eight states prohibit situations in which the defendant is a medical 
professional who deceives a victim by engaging in a sexual act for other 
than a legitimate medical purpose; this conduct is a specific offense, proof 
that the victim did not consent to the act, or proof that the defendant used 
force or coercion.
377
  In Colorado, Connecticut, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, 
and Wyoming, deceiving a victim by engaging in a sexual act for other than 
a legitimate medical purpose gives rise to culpability for sex offenses.
378
  In 
Colorado, a defendant commits the crimes of sexual assault and unlawful 
sexual contact when the defendant, while purporting to offer a medical 
service, “engages in treatment or examination of a victim for other than a 
bona fide medical purpose or in a manner substantially inconsistent with 
 
372 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(A)(4) (sexual battery). 
373 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303(a)(iv) (2011) (sexual assault in the second degree); § 6-
2-304 (sexual assault in the third degree). 
374 See infra notes 375–376. 
375 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1401(5)(d) (2010). 
376 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(7) (LexisNexis 2008) (circumstances of sexual offenses 
against the victim without consent of the victim). 
377 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402(1)(g) (2011) (sexual assault); § 18-3-404(1)(g) 
(unlawful sexual contact); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53(a)–71(a)(7) (West 2007) (sexual 
assault in the second degree); § 53(a)-73(a)(5) (sexual assault in the fourth degree); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 21-5503(a)(4)–(5) (West, Westlaw through 2010 Legis. Sess.) (rape); ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. 17-A, § 253(3)(A) (2006 & Supp. 2010) (gross sexual assault); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.520b(1)(f)(iv), .520c(1)(d)(ii), .520d(1)(b), .520e(1)(b)(iv) (West 
2004 & Supp. 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.344(1)(k) (West 2009 & Supp. 2011) 
(criminal sexual conduct in the third degree); § 609.345(1)(k) (criminal sexual conduct in the 
fourth degree); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(12) (circumstances of sexual offenses against 
the victim without consent of the victim); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303(vi) (sexual assault in 
the second degree); § 6-2-304(vi) (sexual assault in the third degree). 
378 See infra notes 379–385. 
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reasonable medical practices.”
379
  In Connecticut, a defendant commits the 
crimes of second- and fourth-degree sexual assault when the defendant 
accomplishes the sexual intercourse by means of “false representation” that 
the sexual intercourse or sexual contact is for a bona fide medical purpose 
by a health care professional.
380
 
In Kansas, a defendant commits the crime of rape when the victim’s 
consent is obtained “through a knowing misrepresentation made by the 
[defendant] that the sexual intercourse was a medically or therapeutically 
necessary procedure . . . or . . . was a legally required procedure within the 
scope of the [defendant’s] authority.”
381
  In Maine, a defendant commits the 
crime of gross sexual assault when the defendant has “substantially 
impaired [the victim’s] power to appraise or control the [victim’s] sexual 
acts by furnishing, . . . administering or employing drugs, intoxicants or 
other similar means.”
382
  Even when the victim voluntarily consumes a 
substance with knowledge of its nature, this is no defense when the victim 
is a patient of the defendant and has a reasonable belief that the defendant is 




In Minnesota, a defendant commits a crime when the defendant 
accomplishes sexual penetration or sexual contact by means of deception or 
false representation that the penetration or contact is for a bona fide medical 
purpose.
384
  Finally, in Wyoming, a defendant commits the crime of second- 
or third-degree sexual assault when the “[defendant] inflicts sexual 
intrusion in treatment or examination of a victim for purposes or in a 
manner substantially inconsistent with reasonable medical practices.”
385
 
In Michigan and Utah, medical deception triggers a finding of “force 
or coercion” or “without consent,” respectively.
386
  In Michigan, a 
defendant commits the crimes of first-, second-, third-, and fourth-degree 
criminal sexual conduct when the defendant uses “force or coercion” to 
accomplish the sexual intercourse or sexual contact.
387
  A defendant 
 
379 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402(1)(g) (sexual assault); § 18-3-404(1)(g) (unlawful 
sexual contact). 
380 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53(a)-71(a)(7) (sexual assault in the second degree); 
§ 53(a)-73(a)(5) (sexual assault in the fourth degree). 
381 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5503(a)(4)–(5) (rape). 
382 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 17-A, § 253(2)(A). 
383 § 253(3)(A) (gross sexual assault). 
384 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.344(1)(k) (West 2009 & Supp. 2011) (criminal sexual 
conduct in the third degree); § 609.345(1)(k) (criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree). 
385 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303(a)(viii) (2011) (sexual assault in the second degree). 
386 See infra notes 387–390. 
387 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520b(1)(f) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011) (criminal 
2012] “NO” STILL MEANS “YES” 1139 
engaging in medical treatment or examination of the victim in a manner or 
for purposes that are medically recognized as unethical or unacceptable 
constitutes “force or coercion.”
388
  In Utah, medical deception is sufficient 
to prove the victim did not consent to the act.
389
  A sexual act is deemed to 
be without the victim’s consent when 
the act is committed under the guise of providing professional diagnosis, counseling, 
or treatment, and at the time of the act the victim reasonably believed that the act was 
for medically or professionally appropriate diagnosis, counseling, or treatment to the 




iii. Therapeutic Deception 
Seven states have criminalized deceiving a victim by purporting to 
engage in a sexual act for therapeutic reasons.
391
  In Colorado, Connecticut, 
Georgia, Kansas, Minnesota, Ohio, and South Dakota, therapeutic 
deception is illegal.
392
  In Colorado, a defendant commits the crime of 
sexual assault on a client (or aggravated sexual assault on a client) when the 
defendant is a psychotherapist, the victim is a client, and the sexual 
penetration or intrusion occurred by means of “therapeutic deception.”
393
  In 
Connecticut, a defendant commits the crimes of second- and fourth-degree 
sexual assault when the defendant is a psychotherapist, the victim is a 
patient or former patient of the defendant, and the sexual intercourse occurs 
 
sexual conduct in the first degree); § 750.520c(1)(f) (criminal sexual conduct in the second 
degree); § 750.520d(1)(b) (criminal sexual conduct in the third degree); § 750.520e(1)(b) 
(criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree). 
388 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520b(1)(f)(iv) (criminal sexual conduct in the first 
degree); § 750.520c(1)(f) (criminal sexual conduct in the second degree); § 750.520d(1)(b) 
(criminal sexual conduct in the third degree); § 750.520e(1)(b)(iv) (criminal sexual conduct 
in the fourth degree). 
389 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(12) (LexisNexis 2008) (circumstances of sexual 
offenses against the victim without consent of the victim). 
390 Id. 
391 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-405.5 (2011) (sexual assault on a client and aggravated 
sexual assault on a client); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53(a)-71(a)(6) (West 2007) (sexual 
assault in the second degree); § 53(a)-73(a)(4) (sexual assault in the fourth degree); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 16-6-5.1(c) (West 2009 & Supp. 2010) (sexual assault by a practitioner of 
psychotherapy against a patient); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3502(a)(4) (West, Westlaw through 
2010 Legis. Sess.) (rape); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.344(j) (West 2009 & Supp. 2011) 
(criminal sexual conduct in the third degree); § 609.345(j) (criminal sexual conduct in the 
fourth degree); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(10) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011) (sexual 
battery); § 2907.06(5) (sexual imposition); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-28 (2006) (sexual 
contact by a psychotherapist); § 22-22-29 (sexual penetration by a psychotherapist). 
392 See infra notes 393–399. 
393 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-405.5 (sexual assault on a client and aggravated sexual 
assault on a client). 
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by means of “therapeutic deception.”
394
 
In Georgia, a defendant commits the crime of sexual assault by 
practitioner of psychotherapy against a patient when the defendant, as a 
purported practitioner of psychotherapy, engages in sexual contact with the 
victim who the defendant knew or should have known was the subject of 
the defendant’s purported treatment or counseling, or if the treatment or 
counseling relationship was used to facilitate sexual contact between the 
defendant and the victim.
395
  In Kansas, a defendant commits the crime of 
rape when the victim’s consent is obtained “through a knowing 
misrepresentation made by the [defendant] that the sexual intercourse was a 
medically or therapeutically necessary procedure . . . or . . . was a legally 
required procedure within the scope of the [defendant’s] authority.”
396
 
In Minnesota, a defendant commits the crimes of third- and fourth-
degree criminal sexual conduct when the defendant is a psychotherapist, the 
victim is a patient or former patient, and the sexual contact or penetration 
occurred by means of “therapeutic deception.”
397
  In Ohio, a defendant 
commits the crimes of sexual battery and sexual misconduct when “the 
[defendant] is a mental health professional, the [victim] is a mental health 
client or patient of the [defendant], and the [defendant] induces the [victim] 
to submit by falsely representing to the [victim] that the sexual conduct is 
necessary for mental health treatment purposes.”
398
  Finally, in South 
Dakota, a defendant commits the crimes of sexual penetration by 
psychotherapist and sexual contact by psychotherapist when the defendant 
is a psychotherapist and knowingly engages in sexual contact or sexual 
penetration with a victim who is a patient and who is “emotionally 




iv. Other Circumstances of Deception 
Three states have criminalized other forms of deception for sexual 
 
394 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53(a)-71(a)(6) (sexual assault in the second degree); 
§ 53(a)-73(a)(4) (sexual assault in the fourth degree). 
395 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-5.1(c) (sexual assault by a practitioner of psychotherapy 
against a patient). 
396 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5503(a)(4)–(5) (West, Westlaw through 2010 Legis. Sess.) 
(rape). 
397 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.344(j) (West 2009 & Supp. 2011) (criminal sexual conduct 
in the third degree); § 609.345(j) (criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree). 
398 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(10) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011) (sexual battery); 
§ 2907.06(5) (sexual imposition). 
399 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-28 (2006) (sexual contact by a psychotherapist); § 22-
22-29 (sexual penetration by a psychotherapist). 
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advantage.
400
  In Oklahoma, a defendant commits the crime of seduction 
under promise of marriage when the defendant, “under promise of marriage, 
seduces and has illicit connection with any unmarried female of previous 
chaste character.”
401
  In Ohio, a defendant commits the crimes of rape and 
gross sexual imposition when the defendant has sexual contact with another 
and, “for the purpose of preventing resistance, the [defendant] substantially 
impairs the [victim’s] judgment or control by administering any drug, 
intoxicant, or controlled substance to [the victim] surreptitiously or by . . . 
deception.”
402
  In Illinois, a defendant commits the crime of aggravated 
criminal sexual abuse when committing an act of criminal sexual abuse 
where “the [defendant] delivered . . . to the victim without his or her 
consent, or by threat or deception, . . . any controlled substance.”
403
 
B. CASE LAW 
There is little case law considering a defendant’s use of deception to 
procure consent or as a circumstance constituting a specific offense, except 
for instances in which the defendant is in a position of authority or 
impersonates a person in a position of authority.  In some instances, a 
defendant’s use of deception is interpreted as coercion. 
1. Deception and Consent 
A Montana Supreme Court case provides a rare example of a court 
interpreting “without consent” in a manner that prompted the Montana 
legislature to amend the criminal code to exclude deception from the 
definition of consent.
404
  In State v. Haser, the defendant confessed to using 
his occupation as a photographer to deceive aspiring models into submitting 
to sexual intercourse under the guise of showing them how to pose for 
modeling photos.
405
  The defendant appealed his conviction for sexual 
intercourse without consent.  He alleged that his actions did not constitute 
the element of “without consent” under the “sexual intercourse without 
consent” offense.
406
  He argued that the victims were neither compelled to 
submit by force nor “incapable of consent” as required by the code.
407
  The 
 
400 See infra notes 401–403. 
401 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1120 (West 2002) (seduction under promise of marriage). 
402 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1)(a) (rape); § 2907.05(A)(2) (gross sexual 
imposition). 
403 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.60(a)(7) (West Supp. 2011) (aggravated criminal 
sexual abuse). 
404 See infra notes 405–410. 
405 State v. Haser, 20 P.3d 100, 107 (Mont. 2001). 
406 Id. 
407 Id. 
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Montana Supreme Court held that there was insufficient evidence to satisfy 
the force element of “without consent.”
408
  The court also held that the 
victims were not “incapable of consent” under the Montana code because 
they did not experience mental incapacity or physical helplessness.
409
  In an 
apparent response to Haser, the Montana legislature amended the code to 
provide that a victim is incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse if he 
or she is overcome by deception, coercion, or surprise.
410
 
Another case before the Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawaii 
required the court to decide whether deception voids consent.  There, the 
court affirmed a dentist’s rape conviction when the dentist used nitrous 
oxide on a dental assistant purportedly for a legitimate purpose and sexually 
assaulted her while she was mentally incapacitated.
411
  The dentist in this 
case suggested to his new dental assistant that she try nitrous oxide so she 
could explain what the experience was like to patients.
412
  She agreed to try 
the drug, but soon realized its disorienting effects when the defendant 
touched parts of her body, including one of her breasts, asking where she 
was numb.
413
  The defendant proceeded to touch her in inappropriate places, 
kiss her, remove her pants, and eventually engage in sexual intercourse with 
her while she was passing in and out of consciousness.
414
  The court 
affirmed his rape conviction, reasoning, among other things, that any 
consent that the victim may have given to the taking of the nitrous oxide 
was obtained by defendant’s use of deception; therefore, the deception 
vitiated the victim’s consent to taking the drug.
415
 
The Montana legislature codified a definition of deception that courts 
could apply to cases of sexual intercourse without consent.
416
  But in 
 
408 Id. at 109. 
409 Id. at 110. 
410 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501(1)(a)(ii)(C) (2010). 
411 State v. Oshiro, 696 P.2d 846, 848–49 (Haw. Ct. App. 1985). 
412 Id. at 849. 
413 Id. 
414 Id. 
415 Id. at 849–50. 
416 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(18) (2010) provides: 
“Deception” means knowingly to: 
a) create or confirm in another an impression that is false and that the offender does not believe 
to be true; 
(b) fail to correct a false impression that the offender previously has created or confirmed; 
(c) prevent another from acquiring information pertinent to the disposition of the property 
involved; 
(d) sell or otherwise transfer or encumber property without disclosing a lien, adverse claim, or 
other legal impediment to the enjoyment of the property, whether the impediment is or is not of 
value or is or is not a matter of official record; or 
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Alabama and California, where deception is not included in the definition 
of “consent” or “without consent” but deception constitutes specific sex 
offenses, there is little to no case law involving consent procured by 
deception. 
In some instances, a defendant’s use of deception is interpreted as a 
use of coercion to procure consent.  Although South Dakota does not 
criminalize sexual acts achieved through deceit, the South Dakota Supreme 
Court has applied the coercion provision to technically consensual, but 
deceptive, situations.  In State v. Klaudt,
417
 a representative to the South 
Dakota legislature had several foster children living with him.
418
  When the 
victim (one of the foster children) turned seventeen, he conducted an 
elaborate scam in which he convinced the victim to sell her eggs to infertile 
couples.
419
  He told the victim that he had to conduct “examinations” to 
determine her qualifications to donate.
420
  He took the victim to a hotel 
where he used his hands and instruments to penetrate her as part of the fake 
exams.
421
  The victim allowed him to perform the exams, but became upset 
by them and cried each time.
422
  To perpetuate the scam, the defendant 
created a fake email address and wrote to the victim in the guise of a 
woman working for a fertility clinic.
423
  At one point, he gave her an 
advance of $250, claiming it came from this woman.
424
 
The jury convicted the defendant of rape and the South Dakota 
Supreme Court affirmed.
425
  While explicitly mentioning that, “[u]nlike 
several states, South Dakota has not criminalized the use of deception or 
fraud . . . to obtain consent to sexual penetration,” the court called the 
defendant’s actions “psychological coercion.”
426
  The court cited the 
defendant’s elaborate scheme and long-running deception to distinguish this 
case from simple deceit.
427
  Therefore, the court said, although the victim 
technically consented to the sexual contact, the defendant’s actions were so 
 
(e) promise performance that the offender does not intend to perform or knows will not be 
performed.  Failure to perform, standing alone, is not evidence that the offender did not intend to 
perform. 
Id. 
417 State v. Klaudt, 772 N.W.2d 117 (S.D. 2009). 
418 Id. at 118–19. 
419 Id. at 119–20. 
420 Id. at 119. 
421 Id. 
422 Id. 
423 Id. at 120. 
424 Id. 
425 Id. at 118. 
426 Id. at 126–27. 
427 Id. at 131–32. 
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extreme that her consent was coerced.
428
 
2. Deception and Circumstances Constituting Specific Sex Offenses 
Alabama, California, and Rhode Island have little to no case law on 
what constitutes deception as it pertains to a sex offense.  Tennessee, 
however, provides some insight as to how courts apply deception offenses.  
The Tennessee statutes for rape and sexual battery provide specific 
prohibitions against accomplishing penetration or sexual contact through 
fraud.
429
  The criminal code defines fraud by its normal conversational 
meaning: including, but not limited to, “deceit, trickery, misrepresentation, 
and subterfuge.”
430
  In four cases before the Tennessee Court of Criminal 
Appeals, the court has found defendants who impersonate boyfriends or 
husbands, doctors or hypnotists, or security guards as accomplishing 
penetration or sexual contact through fraud.
431
 
The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals has upheld the fraud 
provision against a defendant who impersonated boyfriends and husbands.  
In State v. Mitchell,
432
 the defendant was convicted of rape by fraud after he 
impersonated the boyfriends and husbands of several women to convince 
them to submit to intercourse while blindfolded.  The court upheld his 




The same court has held that impersonating a doctor to achieve sexual 
contact can support a conviction for sexual battery by fraud.  In State v. 
Tizard,
434
 the defendant doctor fondled the genitals of a young male patient 
in the course of a physical exam, making him believe that the sexual 
conduct was part of the exam.  The court made several important holdings 
involving the general interpretation of the statute.
435
  First, the court held 
that fraud was a valid substitute for the force requirement of the old 
statute.
436
  Second, the court held that obtaining a victim’s consent through 
fraudulent misrepresentations vitiated that consent.
437
  Third, the court held 
 
428 Id. 
429 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-503(a)(4) (2010) (rape); § 39-13-505(a)(4) (sexual 
battery). 
430 § 39-11-106(a)(12) (2010). 
431 See infra notes 432–445. 
432 State v. Mitchell, No. M1996-00008-CCA-R3-CD, 1999 WL 559930, at *5 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. July 30, 1999). 
433 Id. 
434 State v. Tizard, 897 S.W.2d 732, 742 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). 
435 Id. 
436 Id. 
437 Id. at 741–42. 
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that both fraud in the inducement and factual misrepresentation could 
support a conviction for sexual battery by fraud.
438
  Some commentators 
have argued that misrepresentation of fact vitiates consent, while fraud in 
the inducement cannot support a conviction of rape or sexual battery.
439
  
This court rejected that view.  According to the court, fraud in the 
inducement is particularly significant when the victim’s reliance on the 
defendant’s misrepresentations leads to the sexual encounter.
440
  For this 




Tizard’s holding that misrepresentations relied upon by a victim are 
enough to vitiate consent controlled the outcome in the more recent case of 
State v. Batts.
442
  In that case, the defendant was a janitor at a bar but 
pretended to be the security guard when he encountered the victim in the 
parking lot.  The defendant told the victim that he had received complaints 
about her stumbling around the area and that he had to perform a strip 
search.  The victim removed her clothes voluntarily, but expressed some 
verbal resistance.  At trial, the defendant argued that the victim had 
consented to the encounter.  The court held that, even if the victim had 
consented, the consent was invalid because the defendant had 




Finally, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals has established that 
inappropriate sexual conduct done under the guise of medical care will 
typically support a conviction for rape by fraud.  In State v. Remsen,
444
 the 
victim sought counseling from the defendant, a hypnotherapist.  While the 
victim was hypnotized, the defendant fondled her inappropriately.  The 
court held that this constituted rape or sexual battery by fraud because the 
defendant committed the sexual acts by either the use of hypnosis or “under 
the guise of medical treatment,” either of which was a crime.
445
 
i. Deception and Force 
As discussed earlier, Michigan has a unique statute that treats taking 
 
438 Id. at 742. 
439 Id. at 741. 
440 Id. at 743. 
441 Id. at 742. 
442 State v. Batts, No. M2001-00896-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 31039378, at *3 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. Sept. 11, 2002) (citing Tizard, 897 S.W.2d at 742). 
443 Id. 
444 State v. Remsen, No. 01C01-9204-CR-00122, 1993 WL 31988, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. 
App. Feb. 11, 1993). 
445 Id. 
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advantage of a victim by “concealment or surprise” as being tantamount to 
“force or coercion.”
446
  Michigan, however, has no case law interpreting the 
defendant’s use of “concealment or surprise” to overcome the victim as a 
circumstance constituting “force or coercion.” 
ii. Specific Circumstances of Deception 
There is little to no case law interpreting the defendant’s use of spousal 
deception, medical deception, or therapeutic deception as constituting 
specific offenses or as a circumstance in which the victim does not consent 
to the act.  Similarly for other circumstances of deception not in these 
categories, there is little to no case law.  In Oklahoma, where a defendant 
commits the crime of seduction under promise of marriage if he seduces an 
unmarried female under promise of marriage,
447
 almost all of the case law 
dates back to the early 1900s.  There was one major case in 1951 that dealt 
primarily with the sufficiency of evidence in a prosecution of seduction 
under promise to marry.
448
  The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma 
held that evidence of a woman’s previous chaste character need not be 
corroborated, but her testimony that she was promised marriage and illicit 
intercourse occurred must be corroborated.
449
 
C. OUTLAWING FRAUDULENT SEXUAL OVERTURES 
With few exceptions, states do not specifically protect victims against 
a defendant’s use of deception to obtain the victim’s consent or accomplish 
a sexual act.  Twenty-seven states do not criminally prohibit the use of 
deception to achieve sexual contact in any way.  Even in the states that do 
criminalize deception, the provision is rarely prosecuted and, if it is, it 
usually involves a defendant who is in a position of authority.  Indeed, most 
state statutes protect victims against deception when the defendant is, or 
purports to be, a person in a position of authority, such as a doctor or 
therapist.  In other cases, when there is no explicit provision for deception, 
state courts will incorporate deception into other provisions, such as the 
defendant’s use of coercion. 
The lack of protection against the use of deception suggests that states 
do not find the use of deception to procure consent criminal conduct.  
Moreover, the lack of case law on the deception provisions that are in place 
indicates that either deception provisions are not being prosecuted, 
 
446 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.520b(1)(f)(v), .520c(1)(d)(ii), .520d(1)(b), 
.520e(1)(b)(v) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011). 
447 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1122 (West 2002). 
448 Holland v. State, 229 P.2d 215 (Okla. Crim. App. 1951). 
449 Id. at 221–22. 
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prosecutions of these provisions are uniformly resulting in acquittals, or 
convictions based on these provisions are never appealed.  The presumption 
remains that an offender’s use of deception is not culpable—or not as 
culpable as the use of force is. 
Furthermore, some states choose not to criminalize an offender’s one-
time use of deceit and view only continuous acts of deceit as involving 
coercion.  A South Dakota court explained that, “[u]nlike several states, 
South Dakota has not criminalized the use of deception or fraud . . . to 
obtain consent to sexual penetration,” but stated the defendant’s actions 
reflected wrongful “psychological coercion.”
450
  Even though the court 
acknowledged the defendant’s conduct was criminal, it seems a single 
incident, or perhaps even multiple incidents of “simple” deceit would not 
necessarily have been viewed as criminal.  Only ongoing deception 
amounts to “coercion” sufficient to subject the deceiver from the bite of the 
criminal law. 
VII. CORROBORATION 
Under English common law, when victims and witnesses of crimes 
cried out, all who heard it were required to join in the pursuit of the felon.
451
  
Under this old “hue and cry” rule, “a [victim] was required to prove a 
timely complaint of an alleged rape in order to corroborate her claim that 
the assault was against her will.”
452
  Similar to the hue and cry rule, many 
American laws previously required corroborating evidence in order to 
convict a defendant of rape.
453
 
Today, for the most part, testimony of an alleged rape victim is 
sufficient to uphold a conviction for rape without the need for corroborating 
evidence.
454
  Although a number of states continue to subscribe to the 
common law approach, a few jurisdictions have implemented, either by 
statute or through case law, a corroboration requirement in connection with 
sexual assault crimes.  Meanwhile, the case law in other jurisdictions 
reveals that corroborating evidence is required only when the facts of the 
case are contradictory or inherently improbable. 
This Part initially examines various states that discuss corroboration by 
 
450 State v. Klaudt, 772 N.W.2d 117, 126–27 (S.D. 2009). 
451 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 740 (6th ed. 1990). 
452 Wilson v. Commonwealth, 615 S.E.2d 500, 505 n.3 (Va. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting 
Woodard v. Commonwealth, 448 S.E.2d 328, 330 (Va. Ct. App. 1994)). 
453 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 33.07[A] (4th ed. 2006) 
(“Opponents of the corroboration rule appear to be winning the day.  A number of states that 
adopted the rule since repealed it.”).  Corroborating evidence is evidence that strengthens or 
confirms what other evidence shows.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 344 (6th ed. 1990). 
454 See DRESSLER, supra note 453. 
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statute.  This Part then reviews the case law of the states where the criminal 
code is silent with respect to corroboration to determine how the judiciary 
has dealt with the issue. 
A. STATES THAT CONSIDER CORROBORATION STATUTORILY 
Of the seventeen states that address corroboration by statute, thirteen 
states have eliminated the common law approach by expressly providing 
that the uncorroborated testimony of a victim is sufficient to uphold a 
conviction for rape.
455
  Where the statute does not explicitly require 
corroboration for a rape conviction, the courts have a strong tendency to 
uphold the conviction even when there is little more than the victim’s 
testimony.  In fact, some courts take it one step further and permit expert 
testimony “to assist the jury in evaluating the evidence, and . . . to respond 
to defense claims that the victim’s behavior after the alleged rape was 
inconsistent with the claim that the rape occurred.”
456
 
For example, in State v. Kinney, the Supreme Court of Vermont upheld 
the admission of expert testimony in a “he said she said” rape case.
457
  The 
court allowed a doctor to testify that “studies have shown that victims of 
rape are more likely to resist their attacker by making verbal protests than 
by struggling or screaming.”
458
  The doctor was allowed to further explain 
why others who were present in the home at the time would be unaware of 
the incident or any sign of a struggle and why a victim may not tell anyone 
what happened immediately after the incident.
459
 
The remaining four states in the statutory category each have their own 
unique approach.  Texas requires corroboration of a victim’s testimony only 
when the victim fails to inform “any person, other than the defendant, of the 
alleged offense” within one year of the assault.
460
  Mississippi is the only 
state that has taken the opposite approach, enacting a statute providing that 
“[n]o person shall be convicted upon the uncorroborated testimony of the 
 
455 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(1) (West 2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 750.520(h) (West 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.341(4)(c) (West 2009 & Supp. 2011); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2028 (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:6(13) (LexisNexis 2007); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-15 (2004); 18  PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3106 (West 2000 & Supp. 
2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-11 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-657 (2003 & Supp. 
2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-22-15.1 (2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3255(a)(2) 
(2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.020(1) (West 2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-311 
(2011). 
456 State v. Kinney, 762 A.2d 833, 842 (Vt. 2000). 
457 Id. at 846. 
458 Id. at 840. 
459 Id. 
460 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07(a) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010). 
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injured female.”
461
  In other states, similar enactments have been 
repealed.
462
  New York repealed its corroboration requirement for forcible 
sex offenses
463
 and replaced it with a statute requiring corroboration for sex 




New York is one of the two states that use case law to fill in the gaps 
that statutes leave behind.  Since New York repealed its general 
corroboration requirement, it may be suggested that the legislature sought to 
have courts rely on the victim’s unsupported testimony where the victim 
has the capacity to consent.  However, it appears that without an express 
statutory direction undoing the corroboration requirement, New York courts 
are reluctant to accept the victim’s unsupported testimony in “pure 




Similarly, Ohio statutorily limited its corroboration requirement to 
only certain sexual offenses.
466
  In Ohio, corroboration is necessary to 
convict for the misdemeanor of sexual imposition.
467
  However, since the 
Ohio legislature did not determine whether corroboration is required to 
prove felony sexual offenses, the courts were again left to make a 
determination.  Unlike those in New York, the Ohio courts determined that 
a victim’s uncorroborated testimony was sufficient to support a rape case.
468
 
B. STATES THAT ALLOW THE COURTS TO CONSIDER 
CORROBORATION 
The remaining thirty-three states do not have a statutory provision 
related to corroboration; however, in all but three of these states the 
judiciary has addressed the issue.  New Jersey is the only state that fails to 
address corroboration either by statute or through its case law.  In 
Massachusetts and Alaska, although the courts fail to discuss corroboration 
in rape cases involving adult victims, they do consider the victim’s 
 
461 MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-69 (2006). 
462 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-68 (repealed 1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2001 
(repealed 1978). 
463 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.15 (repealed 1974). 
464 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.16 (McKinney 2009). 
465 People v. Lawrence, 447 N.Y.S.2d 793, 796 (App. Div. 1981) (defining “pure” 
identification as a situation when “no corroborative evidence is presented to support 
testimony of a single eye-witness who forcefully states that the accused person committed a 
criminal act upon her person”). 
466 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.06(B) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011). 
467 § 2907.06(C). 
468 State v. Love, 550 N.E.2d 951, 954 (Ohio 1988). 
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testimony alone sufficient to support a conviction for rape of a child under 
the age of sixteen.
469
 
In states where the courts have addressed the corroboration issue, a 
review of the case law indicates that the courts have generally taken one of 
two approaches to corroborating evidence: (1) the victim’s testimony alone 
is sufficient to sustain a conviction, or (2) corroborating evidence is not 
required except in limited circumstances. 
1. Victim’s Unsupported Testimony Is Sufficient 
In twenty states, the case law demonstrates that a victim’s testimony 
alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction for rape.
470
  For example, in 
Taylor v. State, the Supreme Court of Indiana held that corroborating 
evidence is not a legal requirement under Indiana law, even when proof of 
the physical fact of penetration rests solely upon the victim’s testimony.
471
  
In Taylor, the defendant was convicted of rape based on the testimony of 
the victim and challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal.
472
  
Even though no direct or independent evidence like a medical examination 
was presented to support the rape charge, the court recognized that it is a 
well-settled principle in Indiana that the uncorroborated testimony of a rape 
victim is sufficient evidence to support a conviction.
473
 
In State v. Goodman, Tennessee’s Court of Criminal Appeals 
addressed the sufficiency of a rape conviction when the defendant testified 
that the sexual act was consensual, the victim admitted to smoking 
marijuana prior to the act, and the rape examination revealed the victim had 
 
469 See State v. Burke, 624 P.2d 1240, 1253 (Alaska 1980); Commonwealth v. Souza, 
653 N.E.2d 1127, 1133 (Mass. 1995). 
470 See Myers v. State, 677 So. 2d 807, 809 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995); Goodman v. State, 
306 S.W.3d 443, 446 (Ark. Ct. App. 2009); People v. Poggi, 753 P.2d 1082, 1094 (Cal. 
1988); State v. Dabkowski, 506 A.2d 118, 121–22 (Conn. 1986) (citing 17 S. Proc., pt. 3, 
1974 Sess., pp. 1308–09; 17 H.R. Proc., pt. 4, 1974 Sess., pp. 2005–06); Hardin v. State, 840 
A.2d 1217, 1224 (Del. 2003); Duran v. State, 619 S.E.2d 388, 390–91 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005); 
State v. Smith, 105 P.3d 242, 250 (Haw. Ct. App. 2004) (citing State v. Eastman, 913 P.2d 
57, 67 (Haw. 1996)); State v. Byers, 627 P.2d 788, 789–90 (Idaho 1981); People v. Schott, 
582 N.E.2d 690, 696–97 (Ill. 1991); Taylor v. State, 480 N.E.2d 907, 909 (Ind. 1985); State 
v. Knox, 536 N.W.2d 735, 742 (Iowa 1995); Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 63 S.W.2d 780, 
781 (Ky. 1933); State v. Taylor, 774 So. 2d 379, 384–85 (La. Ct. App. 2000); State v. 
Preston, 581 A.2d 404, 409 (Me. 1990); Crenshaw v. State, 283 A.2d 423, 429 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1971); Martinez v. State, 360 P.2d 836, 838 (Nev. 1961); State v. Bailey, 245 
S.E.2d 97, 99 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978); State v. Dietz, 115 N.W.2d 1, 5 (N.D. 1962); State v. 
Fitzmaurice, 475 P.2d 426, 428 (Or. Ct. App. 1970); State v. Goodman, No. W2007-00956-
CCA-R3-CD, 2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 802, at *9 (Oct. 8, 2008). 
471 See Taylor, 480 N.E.2d at 909. 
472 Id. at 907. 
473 Id. at 909 (citing Lynch v. State, 316 N.E.2d 372 (Ind. 1974)). 
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no bruises or internal injuries.”
474
  The court acknowledged that all 
questions involving the credibility of witnesses are resolved by the trier of 
fact and the jury rendered a guilty verdict, despite the defendant’s 
contentions.
475
  At trial, the victim testified that she did not consent to the 
penetration and the jury had ample opportunity to weigh her credibility in 
light of the defendant’s allegations.
476
  The appellate court concluded that 
the victim’s testimony provided sufficient evidence to support a guilty 
verdict and accordingly upheld the conviction.
477
 
2. Corroborating Evidence Is Not Required Except in Limited 
Circumstances 
In ten states, case law indicates that corroborating evidence is not 
required unless the victim’s story is physically impossible or so inherently 
improbable that no reasonable person could believe it.
478
  These states, 
however, seem to differ in what they require for a showing of inherent 
improbability.  For example, in State v. McPherson, the West Virginia 
Supreme Court of Appeals examined a rape conviction based on the 
victim’s uncorroborated testimony that was highly contradictory.
479
  
Initially, the court acknowledged that a conviction for any sexual offense 
could be obtained on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim unless the 
testimony was inherently incredible.
480
  In that case, the defendant 
attempted to demonstrate that the victim’s story was inherently incredible 
by pointing to a variety of evidentiary deficiencies, including (1) a lack of 
physical evidence to confirm intercourse, (2) the internal contradictions 
between the victim’s out-of-court statements and her testimony, (3) the 
inconsistent testimony of the victim and one of the state’s witnesses, and (4) 
the extensive use of leading questions by the prosecutor during direct 
examination of the victim.
481
  Nevertheless, the court held that the victim’s 
testimony was not “inherently incredible” because inherent incredibility 
 
474 2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 802, at *9. 
475 Id. at *7–8. 
476 Id. at *11. 
477 Id. 
478 See State v. Williams, 526 P.2d 714, 716–17 (Ariz. 1974); People v. Fierro, 606 P.2d 
1291, 1293 (Colo. 1980) (citing People v. McCormick, 508 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1973)); State v. 
Cooper, 845 P.2d 631, 637 (Kan. 1993); State v. Cooper, 673 S.W.2d 848, 849 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1984); State v. Bauer, 39 P.3d 689, 693 (Mont. 2002); Colbert v. State, 567 P.2d 996, 
998 (Ok. Crim. App. 1977); State v. Studham, 572 P.2d 700, 701–02 (Utah 1977); Willis v. 
Commonwealth, 238 S.E.2d 811, 812–13 (Va. 1988); State v. McPherson, 371 S.E.2d 333, 
337 (W. Va. 1988); Thomas v. State, 284 N.W.2d 917, 923 (Wis. 1979). 
479 371 S.E.2d at 337. 
480 Id. 
481 Id. 
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was more than contradiction and lack of corroboration.
482
  It proclaimed 
that in order to make a determination of inherent incredibility, a showing of 
“complete untrustworthiness” is required.
483
  According to the court, “when 
a trial court is asked to grant a motion for acquittal based on insufficient 
evidence due to inherently incredible testimony, it should do so only when 
the testimony defies physical laws.”
484
 
Other states seem to require much less than West Virginia does.  For 
instance, the courts in Missouri have recognized that a rape conviction 
“may be sustained upon the uncorroborated testimony of the [victim] alone, 
unless her testimony is contradictory and in conflict with physical facts, 
surrounding circumstances, and common experience so as to be so 
unconvincing and improbable that it is extremely doubtful.”
485
  Missouri’s 
rule was best illustrated in State v. Phillips, where the defendant’s rape 
conviction was reversed because the victim’s testimony was uncorroborated 
and contradictory in nature.
486
  In Phillips, the victim was an older female 
cab driver, while the defendant was a seventeen-year-old boy.
487
  The 
victim testified she picked up the defendant at approximately 10:00 p.m. 
and, as the two were driving along the local lake, the defendant allegedly 
grabbed the steering wheel, causing the victim to stop the car.
488
  Once the 
car was in park, the defendant started to make sexual advances and led the 
victim away from the vehicle; he tried to remove her pants, but was 
unsuccessful.
489
  As they walked back toward the car, they heard the 
dispatcher call on the radio, and the defendant grabbed for the radio while 
the victim took off running.
490
  The defendant caught her, revealed his fist, 
and told her to “take off her boots.”
491
  He then said, “If you don’t, I’ll 
throw you in the river.”
492
  The victim took off her boots, and even though 
not asked, voluntarily removed her pants after which the defendant 
penetrated her.
493
  At some point, the defendant lost his erection and the 
victim “started to help him with it.”
494
  The court found the evidence to be 
 
482 Id. at 339. 
483 Id. at 338. 
484 Id. 
485  State v. Phillips, 585 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (citing State v. Lee, 404 
S.W.2d 740, 747 (Mo. 1966)). 
486 Id. at 521. 
487 Id. at 518. 
488 Id. 
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vague and contradictory and, therefore, reversed the conviction.
495
  It 
reasoned as follows: 
A meticulous review of the evidence shows, at the very least, that the testimony of 
prosecutrix regarding the fear issue is contradictory and in conflict with surrounding 
circumstances, common experience and common sense . . . .  After she took her boots 
off, there is no testimony that he threatened her in any way, or that she submitted out 
of fear.  She helped him take her pants off and, after he lost his erection, was in the 
process of voluntarily helping him to “get it back” when her employer arrived at the 
scene.  There was no evidence that she made a prompt outcry to him, or to the police, 
that she had been raped.  There was no evidence that she was crying or hysterical.  
There was no medical evidence that she had been sexually abused.
496
 
Even though Phillips is older precedent, the corroboration rule applied in 
the case has been consistently affirmed over the years.
497
 
Similarly, in Virginia, a conviction for rape may be sustained solely 
upon the uncorroborated testimony of the victim unless the evidence is 
inherently incredible or so contrary to human experience that it is unworthy 
of belief.
498
  In Willis v. Commonwealth, the court said that because the 
victim failed to report the rape for an “unreasonable period” after it had 
occurred, suspicion and doubt were cast on the victim’s truthfulness when 
she did not present a credible explanation for the delay.
499
  The court 
concluded that her unexplained failure to report the rape for nearly a month 
made her story incredible as a matter of law.
500
  Although subsequent courts 
in Virginia have ruled that the credibility of the witness is for the jury to 
decide,
501
 the court’s decision in Willis to consider contrary evidence when 
weighing the credibility of a victim’s uncorroborated testimony has not 
been overruled.  Interestingly, in Garland v. Commonwealth, the court 
extended the no-corroboration requirement to other sexual offenses while 
not making any mention of the inherently improbable exception.
502
 
It appears that in almost every state, as a general rule, corroboration is 
not required.  There may be some variations on that rule from state to state, 
but in modern times it seems state laws reflect an understanding that there 
may not always be evidence of sexual assault outside of the victim’s 
testimony.  Usually, courts allow the entry of other evidence to consider the 
 
495 Id. at 521. 
496 Id. at 520–21. 
497 See State v. Story, 646 S.W.2d 68, 72 n.3 (Mo. 1983); State v. Edwards, 785 S.W.2d 
703 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Pippenger, 708 S.W.2d 256, 260 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). 
498 See Willis v. Commonwealth, 238 S.E.2d 811, 812–13 (Va. 1977). 
499 Id. at 813 (noting that the victim reported the rape one month after it had occurred). 
500 Id. 
501 See Mullis v. Commonwealth, 351 S.E.2d 919, 923 (Va. Ct. App. 1987) (citing Zirkle 
v. Commonwealth, 55 S.E.2d 24, 29 (Va. 1949)). 
502 379 S.E.2d 146, 147 (Va. Ct. App. 1989). 
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sufficiency of a victim’s testimony.  However, in most states, because the 
question of whether a court should convict on the victim’s uncorroborated 
testimony is so delicate, the decision of how to weigh the sufficiency of 
such evidence is left entirely to the jury.
503
  In fact, appellate courts 
typically give great deference when reviewing a jury’s decision to accept or 
reject a victim’s uncorroborated testimony.
504
 
As one court explained, “[b]ecause sexual offenses are typically 
clandestine in nature, seldom involving witnesses to the offense except the 
perpetrator and the victim, a requirement of corroboration would result in 
most sexual offenses going unpunished.”
505
  Nevertheless, a jury may 
conclude that the events did not occur without witnesses to the crime.  
Therefore, corroboration is useful and reliable to a victim’s testimony and 
should be admitted when available. 
C. THE ABOLITION OF THE COMMON LAW CORROBORATION 
REQUIREMENT: A MODEL FOR REFORM OF OTHER SEXUAL 
ASSAULT LAW? 
Despite widespread adherence to the status quo in other areas of rape 
or sexual assault law, it is striking that most have almost totally eliminated 
the common law corroboration requirement.  Although a significant 
minority of the states has eliminated through legislation this archaic 
requirement, the principal impetus for this change has been the 
prosecutorial willingness to pursue charges against sexual wrongdoers even 
where little or no evidence beyond the victim’s testimony was available.  
The judiciary’s willingness to uphold rape or sexual assault convictions 
where corroborative evidence was lacking must be acknowledged.  
However, government prosecutors successfully argued that no other crime 
imposed this additional burden when a citizen came forward as a victim.  
So it followed that a different rule should not apply to the testimony of a 
rape victim.  In response, both judge and jury came to accept a rape victim’s 
testimony standing alone before rendering judgments of guilty.  Now, 
corroboration has for the most part become a relic of the past in rape and 
sexual assault cases. 
Perhaps the change in the enforcement of sexual assault law that led to 
the abrogation of the corroboration requirement should be viewed as a 
model for addressing many of the other problems documented in this 
Article.  If prosecutors throughout the nation are more willing to exercise 
 
503 See, e.g., State v. Fitzmaurice, 475 P.2d 426, 428 (Or. Ct. App. 1970). 
504 See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 774 So. 2d 379, 384 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (citing State v. 
Bosley, 691 So.2d 347 (La. Ct. App. 1997)). 
505 Garland, 379 S.E.2d at 147. 
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their immense power to initiate charges against those using deceit or non-
physical coercion to gain sexual advantage, then perhaps judges and juries 
will respond to the calls of innocent victims for justice as they did when 
they no longer insisted on proof of corroboration in sexual assault cases. 
VIII. MARITAL EXEMPTION 
A significant feature of common law rape was the so-called marital 
exemption, which criminalized only forcible sex by a man “with a female, 
not his wife.”
506
  But since 1993, some form of non-consensual sexual 
encounters between married persons has been a crime in all fifty states.  No 
state retains a complete marital exemption within its sexual assault 
provisions, thus criminalizing a spouse’s unwanted sexual encounter with 
his marital partner in at least one form.  However, many of these states still 
maintain in some of their strictures an exemption that frees a spouse from 
the reach of criminal liability for taking sexual advantage of his marital 
partner. 
A. STATUTES 
Currently, fourteen states have completely abolished marital immunity 
for sexual offenses and treat all sex offenses between married persons the 
same as those between non-married persons.
507
  In contrast, thirty-five 
states and the District of Columbia provide some form of marital immunity 
in their legislation.
508
  Although in some of these states marital immunity 
 
506 See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 11-1 (repealed 1983). 
507 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West 2007); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-42-4-1, -8 (West 
2004); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 22 (LexisNexis 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.342-
3451 (West 2009 & Supp. 2011); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-319 to -322.04 (2008 & Supp. 
2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-5(b) (West 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.8 (2009); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-07 (1997 & Supp. 2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.305–479 (2009 & 
Supp. 2010); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-501 to -532 (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-
402(2) (LexisNexis 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(A) (2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 940.225(6) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-307(a) (2011). 
508 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-68 (LexisNexis 2005); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.432(a)(2), (b) 
(2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1407(D) (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-124(a) (2006 
& Supp. 2011); CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a) (West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-405(1) 
(2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-67b (West 2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 770(a)(2) 
(2007 & Supp. 2010); D.C. CODE §§ 22-3011(b), -3017(b) (LexisNexis 2010); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 16-6-3(a) (West 2009); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-730(1)(c)(ii) (LexisNexis 2007 
& Supp. 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6107 (2004 & Supp. 2011); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/11-9.2(f)(1) (West 2010 & Supp. 2011); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.4(2) (West 2003); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-5503(c), -5501(a) (West, Westlaw through 2010 Legis. Sess.); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.020(4) (LexisNexis 2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.1(A) (2007 
& Supp. 2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 253(1)(B)–(C) (2006 & Supp. 2010); MD. 
CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-318(a) (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
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for a crime involving forcible sexual penetration no longer remains, 
immunity exists for other sexual offenses not involving penetration.
509
  For 
example, in several states, the crime of “spousal rape” outlaws sexual 
intercourse involving force or great bodily harm.
510
  However, non-physical 
threats employed to engage in sex with one’s spouse might be allowed.
511
  
Meanwhile, although sexual intercourse with a minor is almost always an 
offense, some states exempt this conduct if the accused is married to the 
minor.
512
  Therefore, although many states may appear to have entirely 
eliminated the marital exemption from their sexual assault or rape statutes, 
aspects of this barrier to prosecution remain alive. 
While fourteen states have removed any type of marital exemption 
from their sex crimes legislation, most states’ sexual assault laws still 
differentiate sexual activity between spouses from that between non-
married persons.  There are four ways in which this marital differentiation 
appears in a state’s criminal code: (1) separate offenses for marital and non-
marital rape,
513
 (2) marital immunity for sexual contact offenses only,
514
 (3) 
exemptions for those in positions of authority who are married to the 
 
ANN. § 750.520l (West 2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-99 (2006); MO. ANN.  STAT. 
§ 566.023 (West 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-503(1) (2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 632-A:2(I)(h), (j)(1)–(2), (k), -A:2(III), -A:3(II)–(III), -A:4(I)(b)–(c) (LexisNexis 2007 & 
Supp. 2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11(G)(1)–(2) (Supp. 2011); N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 130.10(4) (McKinney 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.02(A)(1), .03(A) (West 2006 
& Supp. 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111(A) (West 2002 & Supp. 2011); 18 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3122.1 (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-2(1) (2002); S.C. CODE 
ANN. §§ 16-3-615(A), -658 (2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7.2 (2006); TEX. PENAL 
CODE ANN. § 22.011(b)(11), (e)(1) (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(c)(1) (2009); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.44.050(1)(c), (f), .060(1), .073(1), .076(1), .079(1) (West 
2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-8B-3(a)(2), -5(a)(2), -6 (LexisNexis 2010). 
509 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1407(D). 
510 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 262. 
511 See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-658 (“A person cannot be guilty of criminal sexual 
conduct under Sections 16-3-651 through 16-3-659.1 if the victim is the legal spouse unless 
the couple is living apart and the offending spouse’s conduct constitutes criminal sexual 
conduct in the first degree or second degree . . . .”); § 16-3-654 (“A person is guilty of 
criminal sexual conduct in the third degree if the actor engages in sexual battery with the 
victim” and “[t]he actor uses force or coercion to accomplish the sexual battery in the 
absence of aggravating circumstances.”). 
512 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-3(a) (West 2009) (providing that “no conviction shall be had 
for this offense on the unsupported testimony of the victim”).  Because this article focuses on 
sexual assault between adults, the issue of the marital exemption for minors will not be 
explored. 
513 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 261–262 (West 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-
70b (West 2007). 
514 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1407(D) (2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-6101, 
-6107 (2004 & Supp. 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5501(a) (West, Westlaw through 2010 
Legis. Sess.). 
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victim,
515




1. Separate Statutes for Marital Sexual Offenses 
Some states have separate spousal sexual misconduct statutes that 
differ from statutes proscribing the same misconduct committed by a non-
spouse.  Five states currently have separate offenses criminalizing some 




South Carolina’s criminal code includes the crime of spousal sexual 
battery,
518
 as well as three separate criminal sexual offenses
519
 that cannot 
be directed at spouses due to a marital exemption provision.
520
  According 
to the South Carolina Code, “spousal sexual battery” is: (a) a “sexual 
battery,” which includes sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal 
intercourse, or any intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s body 
or of any object into the genital or anal openings of another person’s body, 
(b) when accomplished through threat or use of (1) a weapon or (2) 
“physical force or physical violence of a high and aggravated nature,” and 
(c) when the misconduct in question is “by one spouse against the other 
spouse if they are living together.”
521
  Criminal sexual conduct in the first 
degree is similar to spousal sexual battery in that it prohibits a sexual 
battery involving “aggravated force.”
522
  Unlike spousal sexual battery, 
however, criminal sexual conduct in the first degree also outlaws a person’s 
 
515 See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-9.2(f)(1) (West 2010 & Supp. 2011) 
(exempting from the reach of the Illinois “custodial sexual misconduct” prohibition, for 
example, a probation officer from having sex with a probationer where the parties were 
married before the date of custody). 
516 ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.432(a)(2), .410(a)(3) (2010); CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(1); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-67(b); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.4(2)(a) (West 2003); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 97-3-99 (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2(I)(h) (LexisNexis 2007 & 
Supp. 2010); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.10(4) (McKinney 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2907.02(A)(1)(c) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111(A)(2) 
(West 2002 & Supp 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-2(1) (2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-
22-7.2 (2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-8B-1, 61-8B-8 (LexisNexis 2010). 
517 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 261, 262; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-70b; IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 18-6107; MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-318 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2010); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-615(A) (2003). 
518 S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-615(A). 
519 S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-652 (2003 & Supp. 2010) (criminal sexual conduct in the first 
degree); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-653 (2003) (criminal sexual conduct in the second degree); 
§ 16-3-654 (criminal sexual conduct in the third degree). 
520 S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-658 (2003). 
521 § 16-3-615(A) (referring to § 16-3-651(h) (definition of “sexual battery”)). 
522 § 16-3-652(1)(a). 
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commission of a sexual battery against a victim who (1) is also the victim 
of physical confinement, kidnapping, extortion, or other similar offense, or 
(2) is rendered mentally or physically helpless due to the person’s use of a 
controlled substance or intoxicant against the victim.
523
  Moreover, neither 
criminal sexual conduct in the second degree
524
—which requires 
“aggravated coercion” (such as threats to retaliate “in the future by 
infliction of physical harm, kidnapping or extortion . . . against the victim or 
any other person”)
525
—nor criminal sexual conduct in the third degree—
which requires any force or coercion
526
—contains a marital exemption.  
These three sexual conduct statutes offer a wider range of protection than 
the spousal sexual battery statute does.
527
  Thus, a comparison of spousal 
sexual battery against all three of South Carolina’s non-spousal criminal 
sexual conduct provisions reveals a variety of circumstances in which a 
spouse is completely immune from prosecution.
528
 
In Connecticut, the offenses for spouses and non-spouses are 
respectively “sexual assault in a spousal or cohabitating relationship”
529
 and 
“sexual assault in the first degree.”
530
  Under the statutory crime of sexual 
assault in a spousal or cohabitating relationship, if a person is married or 
cohabiting, that person shall not compel the spouse or cohabiter to engage 
in sexual intercourse by the use of force or the threat of force “which 
reasonably causes such other spouse or cohabiter to fear physical injury.”
531
  
However, sexual assault in the first degree—the corresponding statute for 
non-married persons—provides that a person commits this offense when 
compelling another to engage in sexual intercourse by using or threatening 
force against the person or a third person.
532
  In actuality, this latter offense 
is broader in its coverage than its counterpart involving spouses and 
 
523 § 16-3-652(1)(b)–(c). 
524 § 16-3-653. 
525 § 16-3-651(b) (definition of “aggravated coercion”). 
526 § 16-3-654. 
527 In addition, pursuant to section 16-3-658 (criminal sexual conduct where victim is 
spouse), a person “cannot be guilty of criminal sexual conduct under sections 16-3-651 
through 16-3-659.1 if the victim is the legal spouse unless the couple is living apart and the 
offending spouse’s conduct constitutes criminal sexual conduct in the first degree or second 
degree.”  This means that if the spouses live together, the victim must bring her complaint 
under the spousal sexual battery statute. 
528 Additionally, under the crime of “spousal sexual assault,” the offending spouse’s 
conduct must be reported to the appropriate law enforcement authorities within thirty days 
for prosecution to occur.  § 16-3-615(B).  No such requirement is present under the non-
spousal criminal sexual conduct statutes.  §§ 16-3-652, -653, -654 (2003 & Supp. 2010). 
529 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-70b (West 2007). 
530 § 53a-70. 
531 § 53a-70b. 
532 § 53a-70(a)(1). 
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cohabitors because it contemplates threats or force directed at a third party 
and prohibits sexual intercourse with a mentally incapacitated person.
533
  
Thus, in Connecticut, the protections afforded potential victims differ 
between the two offenses. 
2. Immunity for “Contact” Type Sexual Offenses 
Another exemption for spousal sexual misconduct occurs in sexual 
contact offenses.  Sexual contact offenses do not involve intercourse, but 
rather only involve types of contact, such as touching or exposure of the 
breasts or genitalia.
534
  Five states currently have marital exemptions under 
one of their “contact” offenses.
535
  Arizona and West Virginia have marital 
exemptions under their sexual abuse statutes,
536
 while Kansas and Louisiana 
extend marital immunity in their sexual battery strictures.
537
  Lastly, 
Alabama has a spousal exemption under the crime of indecent exposure.
538
 
To illustrate, under Arizona law, a person commits “sexual abuse” by 
“intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual contact with any person 
who is fifteen or more years of age without consent of that person.”
539
  
Sexual contact is defined as “any direct or indirect touching, fondling or 
manipulating of any part of the genitals, anus or female breast by any part 
of the body or by any object or causing a person to engage in such 
contact.”
540
  However, in Arizona, it is a defense to a sexual abuse charge 
that the person was the spouse of the victim when the act was committed.
541
  
Similarly, West Virginia legislation specifies that the crime of sexual abuse 
in the first degree (an offense also outlawing sexual contact) cannot occur 




533 § 53a-70(a)(4). 
534 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-68 (LexisNexis 2005) (“exposes his genitals”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-1401(2) (2010) (“sexual contact” includes “touching”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
5501(a) (West, Westlaw through 2010 Legis. Sess.) (“touching”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 14:43.1(A)(1)–(2) (2007 & Supp. 2011) (“touching”); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-1(6) 
(LexisNexis 2010) (“touching”). 
535 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-68; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1407(D) (2010); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 21-5501(a); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43:1(A)(1)–(2); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-7 
(LexisNexis 2010). 
536 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1407(D); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-8B-1, 61-8B-7. 
537 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5501(a); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43:1(A). 
538 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-68. 
539 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1404(A) (2010). 
540 § 13-1401. 
541 § 13-1407(D). 
542 W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-8B-1, -7 (LexisNexis 2010). 
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3. Exemptions for Persons in Positions of Authority Married to the 
Supervised Individual 
A third exemption for spousal sexual conduct appears in prohibitions 
directed at persons in positions of authority.
543
  In nine states, when the 
actor is in a position of authority over and married to the victim, that person 
is exempt from the criminal sexual offense.
544
  This form of exemption is 
found in a wide variety of strictures focusing on those individuals taking 





 custodians in a local or state 
agency,
547
 and health care providers.
548
  Although a wide range of 
authoritative positions are covered, all of the statutes have a common 
element that includes a relationship with another involving a duty of trust, 
care, or custody.
549
  Jurisdictions that have codified this type of exemption 
include Arkansas, Kentucky, Illinois, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, 
Texas, Washington, and the District of Columbia. 
The laws of the states of Washington and Kentucky serve as examples.  
In two different contexts, Washington has a marital exemption that 
immunizes a person in a position of authority from prosecution for 
engaging in sexual intercourse with another under his supervision.  First, 
under Washington law, an individual commits the crime of rape in the 
second degree when he engages in sexual intercourse with a “person with a 
developmental disability,” and that individual: (1) has “supervisory 
authority over the victim,” (2) was “providing transportation, within the 
course of his or her employment, to the victim,” or (3) was a health care 
provider and the victim was a client or patient.
550
  However, this offense 
does not apply when the person and the victim are married.
551
  Second, a 
person can also commit this same offense by having sexual intercourse with 
 
543 See supra text accompanying notes 295–340 for a more in-depth discussion of 
positions of authority. 
544 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-124(a)(1)–(3) (2006 & Supp. 2011); D.C. CODE § 22-3017(b) 
(LexisNexis 2010); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-9.2(f)(1) (West 2010 & Supp. 2011); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.020(4) (LexisNexis 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11(G)(2) 
(Supp. 2011); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.10(4) (McKinney 2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, 
§ 1111(A)(7)–(8) (West 2002 & Supp. 2011); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(b)(11), 
(e)(1) (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.050(1)(c), (e) (West 2009). 
545 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-124(a)(1). 
546 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11(G)(2). 
547 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.020(4). 
548 ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-18-402(b) (2009 & Supp. 2011). 
549 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.050(1)(c)(i) (“Has supervisory authority 
over the victim . . . .”). 
550 § 9A.44.050(1)(c)–(d). 
551 § 9A.44.050(1)(c). 
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a “victim [who] is a resident of a facility for persons with a mental disorder 
or chemical dependency” when the accused “has supervisory authority over 
the victim.”
552
  Again, the offense only applies where the person “is not 
married to the victim.”
553
 
Kentucky law provides a marital exemption to a person in a position of 
authority over individuals in the care or custody of state or local agencies.
554
  
Kentucky codifies its exemption under its definition of “lack of consent.”
555
  
Under the Kentucky statutory definition of “lack of consent,” a person is 
deemed incapable of consenting to a sexual encounter when he or she is 
“[u]nder the care or custody of a state or local agency pursuant to court 
order and the actor is employed by or working on behalf of the state or local 
agency.”
556
  However, another provision clarifies that the section shall not 
apply when the custodian or caregiver and the alleged victim are lawfully 
married to each other.
557
  Therefore, a person having sex with someone 
under his care in a state or local agency cannot be prosecuted under a 
Kentucky offense requiring “lack of consent” if he is married to the victim. 
4. Exemptions for Sexual Misconduct with a Mentally Impaired Spouse 
The final category of marital exemptions provides immunity to persons 
who engage in sexual acts with their spouses when the spouse suffers from 
a mental condition, defect, or incapacity that impairs his or her ability to 
give consent.  Although this type of exemption is the least common marital 
exemption, twelve states retain it.
558
  The exemptions are generally directed 
toward situations in which the victims are mentally incapable of providing 
consent
559
 or when the victims suffer from a mental condition that 
substantially impairs or precludes their ability to give consent.
560
  For 
example, Alaska provides an exemption from the crime of sexual assault in 
 
552 § 9A.44.050(1)(e). 
553 Id. 
554 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.020(3)(e) (LexisNexis 2008). 
555 § 510.020. 
556 § 510.020(3)(e). 
557 § 510.020(4). 
558 ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.432(a)(2) (2010); CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(1) (West 2008); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-67(b) (West 2007); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.4(2)(a) (West 
2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-99 (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2(I)(h) 
(LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2010); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.10(4) (McKinney 2009); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1)(c) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, 
§ 1111(A)(2) (West 2002 & Supp. 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-2(1) (2002); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7.2 (2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-8B-1, -8 (LexisNexis 2010). 
559 See ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.410(a)(3)(A); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520l (West 
2004). 
560 See IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.4(2)(a). 
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the first degree when one engages in sexual penetration with one’s spouse 
while knowing such spouse is mentally impaired.
561
  Iowa likewise provides 
a marital exemption to liability for sexual abuse in the third degree for 
persons who perform sex acts with their spouses who suffer from a mental 




B. CASE LAW 
There are a few states that prosecute husbands for raping their wives 
when the marital exemption is raised.  However, these cases tend to deal 
with instances of extreme violence and force.
563
  The lack of cases on 
record could be due to juries and judges constantly acquitting the 
defendants; however, it is more likely due to a failure to prosecute husbands 
for raping their wives, even if no marital exemption exists. 
There is a select group of cases in which the judiciary decided to 
abolish the marital exemption, either using the Fourteenth Amendment or 
declaring that there is no rational reason for the marital exemption to 
exist.
564
  These cases provide a blueprint for eliminating the marital 
 
561 ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.410(a)(3)(A). 
562 IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.4(2)(a). 
563 See, e.g., State v. Eric M., 858 A.2d 767, 770 (Conn. 2004) (affirming defendant’s 
conviction where he pounced on his wife while she checked the fuse box, placed her in a 
chokehold, put handcuffs on her, removed her shirt, tied her to a chair, performed 
cunnilingus, and tackled her through the glass storm door when she attempted to escape); 
State v. Gregory, 893 A.2d 912, 916 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006) (reversing defendant’s 
conviction for sexual assault in a spousal relationship due to exclusion of evidence where 
defendant pinned his wife down by her neck, removed her clothes while she struggled, pried 
her legs apart, injured her knees, and then engaged in vaginal intercourse); Trigg v. State, 
759 So. 2d 448, 450 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (affirming defendant’s conviction for sexual 
battery where defendant placed antidepressants in his wife’s food to render her unconscious 
and then videotaped himself orally and digitally penetrating her vagina); State v. Hardy, No. 
96-P-0129, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 4588, at *6–7 (Oct. 10, 1997) (affirming defendant’s 
conviction for rape where he attacked his wife with a gun, handcuffed her, forced her to 
consume pills, engaged in vaginal intercourse with her, then tried to electrocute her in the 
bathtub); Davis v. State, No. 05-05-01694-CR, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 352, at *1–3 (Jan. 18, 
2007) (affirming defendant’s conviction for aggravated sexual assault where he hit his wife, 
tied her up, forced a bat and a beer bottle into her vagina, then threatened to kill her, before 
having vaginal intercourse with her); Morse v. Commonwealth, 440 S.E.2d 145, 147 (Va. Ct. 
App. 1994) (reversing defendant’s conviction due to reversible error where defendant’s wife 
refused to have sex, he flipped the mattress over and injured her, threatened her repeatedly, 
and then had vaginal intercourse with her). 
564 State v. Rider, 449 So. 2d 903, 904 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); People v. M.D., 595 
N.E.2d 702, 713 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Commonwealth v. Chretien, 417 N.E.2d 1203, 1207–
10 (Mass. 1981); State v. Willis, 394 N.W.2d 648, 650–51 (Neb. 1986); State v. Smith, 426 
A.2d 38, 46–47 (N.J. 1981); People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 573 (N.Y. 1984); Shunn v. 
State, 742 P.2d 775, 778 (Wyo. 1987). 
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exemption, and are therefore worthwhile to examine. 
The paradigmatic case which first overturned the marital exemption is 
State v. Smith,
565
 cited in almost every case eliminating the marital 
exemption.
566
  In Smith, the defendant broke into the apartment of his 
estranged wife and proceeded to beat and rape her.
567
  Though they were 
separated for one year at the time of the attack, the defendant and his wife 
were still legally married under New Jersey law.
568
  Subsequently, the trial 
court dismissed the defendant’s rape charge, believing that the common law 
marital exemption was “implicitly incorporated into [New Jersey’s] 
statutory definition of rape,” and the state appealed this dismissal.
569
 
The reviewing court in Smith began by recounting the historical 
development of the marital exemption and unveiled a surprising fact: the 
marital exemption came into existence solely because of an extra-judicial 
argument written by Sir Matthew Hale in the seventeenth century: “the 
husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful 
wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath 
given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract.”
570
  
The court then noted that Hale cited no authority for this proposition and 
that even Blackstone did not mention a marital exemption.
571
 
The court next considered three justifications for a marital rape 
exemption.  First, it referred to the antiquated idea that “a woman was the 
property of her husband or father.”
572
  However, the court dismissed this out 
of hand because the idea that a woman was owned by her husband was 
never a valid proposition in this country.
573
  The second possible 
justification was based on the theory that marriage made a husband and 
wife one legal entity, and as such, a man could not legally “rap[e] 
himself.”
574
  The court noted that this justification did not comport with the 
rest of the common law at the time, as a husband could be convicted of 
other crimes, such as assault and battery, upon his wife.
575
  In addition, even 
if, arguendo, legal marital unity existed at one point, it was rejected in this 
 
565 Smith, 426 A.2d 38. 
566 Rider, 449 So. 2d at 904; Chretien, 417 N.E.2d at 1207; Willis, 394 N.W.2d at 650; 
Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 572; Shunn, 742 P.2d at 777. 
567 Smith, 426 A.2d at 39. 
568 Id. 
569 Id. at 40. 
570 Id. at 41. 
571 Id. at 43. 
572 Id. at 43–44. 
573 Id. at 44. 
574 Id. 
575 Id. 
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country in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries through statutes such as 
the Married Women’s Acts, which gave married women the legal rights to 
sue, own property, and enter contracts separately from their husbands.
576
 
Finally, the court analyzed a third popular justification for the marital 
exemption, that through the marriage contract, “a wife consents to sexual 
intercourse with her husband,” and this “irrevocable consent” eliminates the 
essential “lack of consent” element of rape.
577
  In dismissing this 
justification, the Smith court called this theory “offensive to our valued 
ideals of personal liberty” and “not sound where the marriage itself is not 
irrevocable.”
578
  According to the court, if the wife can eventually terminate 
the marriage contract through divorce, then she must also be able to revoke 
a single term of that contract, in this case consent to sexual intercourse.
579
  
The court went on to state that, in the case of such a “‘breach’ of the 
marriage ‘contract,’ [the husband’s] remedy is in a matrimonial court, not in 
violent . . . self-help.”
580
  After dismissing these three justifications for the 
marital exemption as “irrational,” the court concluded that “no justification 
remained at this late date for believing that a rigid marital exemption rule 
. . . would be retained.”
581
 
Other courts soon followed suit in a similar vein, rejecting their states’ 
marital exemptions as irrational and outdated.  In State v. Rider and Shunn 
v. State, the Florida District Court of Appeals and the Wyoming Supreme 
Court eliminated the marital exemption in their respective states, following 
the arguments of Smith
582
 and adding that “[w]hatever the traditional 
notions concerning spousal consent to sexual intercourse may be they 
certainly do not contemplate consent to acts of violence.”
583
  The Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Commonwealth v. Chretien, used the 
language of the rape statute to reject the marital exemption.
584
  The court 
determined that an earlier version of the rape statute encompassed a 
common law spousal exception, forbidding “unlawful carnal knowledge of 
a woman forcibly and against her will,” which precluded a husband from 
raping his wife.
585







581 Id. at 45. 
582 State v. Rider, 449 So. 2d 903, 907 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Shunn v. State, 742 
P.2d 775, 777–78 (Wyo. 1987). 
583 Rider, 449 So. 2d at 906. 
584 Commonwealth v. Chretien, 417 N.E.2d 1203, 1208–09 (Mass. 1981). 
585 Id. at 1206–08, 1208 n.4. 
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word “unlawful,” which meant that a husband could now be prosecuted for 
raping his wife forcibly and against her will.
586
  Finally, the Nebraska 
Supreme Court, in State v. Willis, eliminated the marital exemption by 
stating that first-degree sexual assault “proscribes a crime of violence, not a 
crime of sex,” and a crime of violence committed by a husband against his 
wife has always been punishable, even at common law.
587
 
The courts of New York and Illinois took another approach and used 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate the 
marital exemption in those states.
588
  In People v. Liberta, the defendant 
appealed his conviction for the rape and sodomy of his wife, arguing that 
the New York rape statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause, because 
they unfairly burdened unmarried, but not married men, and only burdened 
men, not women.
589
  The New York Court of Appeals agreed, ruling the 
rape statutes unconstitutional.
590
  The court stated that “there [was] no 
rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and nonmarital rape” 
because the rationales used to support the distinction were “based upon 
archaic notions” of consent and property rights, or were “unable to 
withstand even the slightest scrutiny.”
591
  The court then reiterated many of 
the same arguments that the Smith court had used a few years earlier, 
adding that “[a] married woman has the same right to control her own body 
as does an unmarried woman.”
592
  The court also declared that the female 
exemption in the law violated the Equal Protection Clause, because the 
classification (male–female) was not substantially related to the 
achievement of an important governmental objective.
593
  The court felt that, 
though relatively infrequent, female rape of a male, or male rape of another 
male, was as emotionally scarring and violent as a man raping a woman, 
and that criminal liability needed to exist.
594
 
The Liberta court also refuted the arguments put forth by the Colorado 
Supreme Court in People v. Brown, the only modern case in which a state 
 
586 Id. at 1208–09. 
587 State v. Willis, 394 N.W.2d 648, 651 (Neb. 1986). 
588 In the Illinois decision of People v. M.D., 595 N.E.2d 702, 708 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), 
the Second District Appellate Court ruled that the availability of a marital exemption for 
criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual assault was contrary to the Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Federal and Illinois Constitutions. 
589 People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 569 (N.Y. 1984). 
590 Id. at 575, 577–78. 
591 Id. at 573. 
592 Id. 
593 Id. at 576–77. 
594 Id. at 577. 
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supreme court upheld the marital exemption for all rape laws.
595
  In Brown, 
the Colorado court ruled that there was a rational reason for the 
classification of married and unmarried men because, first, the marital 
exemption allows for the possibility of reconciliation between estranged 
spouses, and second, the marital exemption “averts difficult emotional 
issues and problems of proof inherent” in prosecuting marital rape cases.
596
  
Therefore, the court concluded, the marital exemption was “neither 
arbitrary nor irrational,” and so was constitutional.
597
 
Addressing the first point, the Liberta court said that “if the marriage 
has already reached the point where intercourse is accomplished by violent 
assault it is doubtful that there is anything left to reconcile,” especially “if 
the wife is willing to bring criminal charges against her husband which 
could result in a lengthy jail sentence.”
598
  In regard to the second rationale 
put forth by the Brown court, the court in Liberta said that marital rape is no 
more difficult to prove than any other rape, since “[p]roving lack of consent 
. . . is often the most difficult part of any rape prosecution” and it is no more 
likely that “vindictive” wives would fabricate stories of rape than it is that 
unmarried women would do so.
599
  In fact, the criminal justice system “is 
presumed to be capable of handling any false complaints,” and if it were 




In an article on the evolution of the law, Justice Holmes wrote: 
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in 
the time of Henry IV.  It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid 




As the cases discussed above demonstrate, this is perhaps more applicable 
to the marital exemption for rape than it is for any other legal issue 
considered here.  The exemption is rooted in a centuries-old extrajudicial 
statement and has persisted in the common law tradition ever since.  The 
cases that have dealt with the marital exemption at length have exposed it as 
irrational and ungrounded, and have provided a blueprint for eliminating the 
marital exemption altogether. 
 
595 People v. Brown, 632 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1981). 
596 Id. 
597 Id. 
598 Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 574. 
599 Id. 
600 Id. 
601 Id. at 574 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 
457, 469 (1897)). 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
This Article exposed the sex crime laws of America as fundamentally 
flawed as they relate to non-consent, deception, and coercion.  The lack of 
appropriate criminal sanctions for non-consensual sex is particularly vexing 
in the context of adolescent and young adult sexual interaction, when 
hormones, curiosity, insecurity, and fear dominate the arena.  Before the 
age of majority, most states prohibit sex of any kind with strict liability.  
However, upon reaching adulthood—sixteen or seventeen in most states—
adolescents and young adults are free to engage in sex with anyone, 
unprotected from and exposed to unwanted sex. 
The effort of reformers over the last several decades has led to the 
criminalization of some types of unwanted, non-consensual sex; however, 
most states do not criminalize that conduct, or only do so in a limited 
fashion.  Using force or threatening force to have sex is abhorrent and 
criminal.  That conduct should be punished to a greater degree than non-
consent offenses.  But non-consensual sex should be criminalized across the 
board.  A victim, frozen with fear, who fails to express approval by words 
or actions should have that decision protected by the criminal justice 
system.  Sex should be based on a freely given agreement between adults.  
In other words, sex cannot rightly occur unless each party consents before 
the act takes place.  Establishing an objective manifestation of that 
agreement, and placing the onus on the aggressor to obtain consent before 
sex, would fix the problem.  This freely-given-agreement approach relieves 
the victim of a burden to verbally or physically “resist” in order for non-
consensual sex to be criminal.  It also allows flexibility in prosecutorial 
charging decisions by simplifying proof requirements.  Prosecutors would 
have to prove that (1) no objective manifestation of consent was provided 
by the victim, and (2) the defendant proceeded without that agreement.  The 
burden of proof remains beyond a reasonable doubt, so the defendant’s 
presumption of innocence is preserved.  A freely-given-agreement 
requirement eliminates confusion and ambiguity as to the legal application 
of “no means no.” 
Use of deception is another tolerated mechanism for achieving sex.  A 
majority of the states do not criminalize the use of deception in any way.  
Those states that do typically limit liability to circumstances involving 
treating physicians or other professional actors.  Only four states have sex 
crimes that generally prohibit deception when it is used with the intent of 
achieving sex. 
Many conversations that precipitate sexual encounters involve 
exaggerations or overt lies.  This conduct becomes unacceptable if it is 
intended to achieve sex.  The fact that deception is commonplace does not 
justify its tolerance.  Deceiving another in order to gain control over his 
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property is criminalized in every state; the value of the property obtained by 
deception is irrelevant.  Thus, pocketing an apple at a grocery store is 
punishable by jail time, but deceiving another to obtain sexual gratification 
is perfectly legal.  Why is deception tolerated in the context of sex?  What 
protection does society provide to a person’s sexual integrity?  Sexual 
activity is one of the most intimate encounters people engage in and yet 
under the law it is treated as less valuable than a piece of fruit if deception 
is used. 
The solution is to establish a sex-by-deception crime prohibiting the 
use of deception with the intent to engage in sexual activity.  A specific 
intent requirement would preclude idle bombast from being criminalized, 
prohibiting only deception utilized to obtain sex.  It is time to remove 
deception from the realm of sexual interaction in American society.  Its 
tolerance promotes an unseemly status quo in our social fabric that 
denigrates the most intimate of relationships. 
Coercion in any form or taking advantage of one’s position of 
authority to achieve sex must be outlawed everywhere.  American criminal 
law cannot ignore the employer who uses a threat of termination of 
employment or a promise of promotion to sexually exploit an employee. 
The arguments against these three reforms focus on a variety of myths.  
The first argument is that these changes de-romanticize adult sexual 
relationships; it suggests all sexual acts would require a written contract.  
This argument is specious because if a person is unclear as to his sex 
partner’s intentions, sexual advances should cease.  Removing ambiguity 
and requiring the initiator to procure the victim’s freely given consent 
resolves the problem. 
The second argument suggests that these changes would lead a jilted 
sex partner to lie about the encounter.  Again, this claim is without merit.  
Under current law in all states, a person who wishes to frame a former sex 
partner can do so by making false claims of physical threats or force.  One 
cannot automatically assume the likelihood of false charges or commission 
of perjury will increase due to non-consent or anti-deception law changes. 
The final antagonistic argument implies that these changes are 
unnecessary and current law sufficiently criminalizes sex crimes.  This final 
argument ignores our society’s endemic level of sexual assault, comprised 
of forced and non-consensual sex.  Studies reveal that the vast majority of 
sex crime victims are female, and between one in three and one in four 
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Current law has inadequately addressed this problem. 
Making it clear to the citizenry that society will not tolerate any form 
of unwanted sex sends a message to the fraternity pledges and Joe 
Sixpacks: no means no, and deception, non-physical coercion, or taking 
advantage of one’s superior position cannot be the means of sexual 
conquest.  Only then will we begin to address this profound, systemic 
problem and confront those who choose to take advantage of the gaps in sex 
crime laws in our country to the detriment of victims. 
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